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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last quarter century, the United States has aggressively 
shifted among various international law and policy-making forums to 
promote a goal of harmonizing the world’s intellectual property laws 
  
2012] U.S. PROPOSAL FOR IP CHAPTER FOR TPP 107 
 
in its image.1 In the 1980s and ’90s, the primary forum for the 
achievement of that goal was multilateral2—the United States was 
one of the primary promoters of the World Trade Organization 
accords of 1994, including its landmark agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).3 In the immediate 
post-TRIPS period, the multilateral regime became hostile to a U.S. 
agenda to further harmonize international intellectual property 
protection beyond TRIPS,4 and the agenda was confronted as well by 
 
 1. Cf. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102, 116 Stat. 933, 995–
996 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3802) (setting as an international trade negotiating 
objective: “ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade 
agreement governing intellectual property rights that is entered into by the United 
States reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in United States law”). 
 2. Throughout this paper, we distinguish between what we call “multilateral,” 
“plurilateral,” and “regional” international law regimes. By “multilateral” we mean 
to designate those forums and agreements in which the construction of the norms is 
open to all countries that wish to participate, regardless of whether the ultimate 
agreement actually binds all countries of the world. Such agreements are most 
frequently negotiated within broad-based multilateral organizations headquartered 
in Geneva, such as the World Trade Organization or World Intellectual Property 
Organization. We thus refer to both the World Trade Organization agreements and 
the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty as “multilateral,” 
even though neither binds all countries. By using the term “plurilateral,” we refer 
to those agreements, sometimes called “country club” agreements, in which an 
exclusive coalition of more than two countries negotiate the rules, which are then 
open to signatory by a broader group of countries. We use the term to describe 
agreements, including, e.g., the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, in which 
geographic proximity is not a central factor limiting the membership in the drafting 
or joining coalition. We refer to “regional” agreements as those among more than 
two countries in a specific geographic region and in which the final agreement is 
not open to further membership expansion. The North American Free Trade 
Agreement is such an example. As described below, we refer to the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership as a plurilateral agreement because it has as a prime objective the 
expansion of membership beyond its original negotiating members and because, 
despite its potential limitation of membership to the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation region, both the negotiating members and the ultimate intended 
signatories are geographically diverse. 
 3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods arts. 9.1, 21, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement]. 
 4. See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International 
Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 326 (2004) (discussing 
developed countries’ shift toward bilateral free trade agreements that position them 
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growing public opposition from increasingly vocal and organized 
global social movements.5 A central argument of the opposition was 
that one size does not fit all in intellectual property policy and that, 
instead, countries need to take advantage of the flexibilities and 
ambiguities in the international legal system to craft laws to best 
serve their own policy goals. An over-expansion of one-size-fits-all 
intellectual property laws was framed as a threat to numerous vital 
social and economic objectives, including promoting access to 
affordable medications, enabling farmers to save and trade their own 
seeds, and ensuring that students can access affordable learning 
materials.6 In response to the success of this opposition at the 
multilateral level and in more open policy-making forums, the U.S. 
agenda shifted “vertically” into a series of closed-door bilateral and 
plurilateral trade agreement negotiations.7 
 
“to use economic strengths to induce their less powerful trading partners to ratchet 
up intellectual property protection”); Peter Drahos, Expanding Intellectual 
Property’s Empire: The Role of FTAs, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. 6–11 (2003), http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/08/drahos-fta-2003-en.pdf 
(describing the post-TRIPS shift in U.S. strategies to bilateral and regional forums 
as a “process of forum shifting . . . from fora in which they are encountering 
difficulties” (WTO and WIPO) and as a process bent on achieving a “global 
ratchet for IP” through “waves of bilaterals . . . followed by occasional multilateral 
standard setting”). 
 5. See Jean-Frédéric Morin, Multilaterlising TRIPs-Plus Agreements: Is the 
U.S. Strategy a Failure?, 12 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 175, 190 (2009) (describing 
the shift to bilateral trade agreements as an attempt to escape social movement 
attention). See generally Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization 
and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008) 
(describing the rise and influence of social movements in the construction of 
international intellectual property law). 
 6. See Kapczynski, supra note 5 (describing the impact of social movement 
arguments on international intellectual property lawmaking). 
 7. See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, 
FTAs, ACTA and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2011) [hereinafter Sell, TRIPS 
Was Never Enough] (describing a “multi-level” international intellectual property 
policymaking arena that has “expanded horizontally, across more multilateral 
institutions, and . . . vertically, from the multilateral level to the most granular—
even down to individuals”); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs 
Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 
29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6–9 (2004) (describing bilateral agreements as part of 
“regime shifting” strategies of the United States and the European Union, both 
dissatisfied with the limitations of TRIPS); Drahos, supra note 4, at 7–9 
(describing the “waves” and “cycle(s)” of bilateral and multilateral standard setting 
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The first post-TRIPS forum shift by the United States was to 
bilateral agreements with a number of close allies and very small 
economies, beginning with the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement in 
2001. In each of the agreements, a central dynamic in the negotiation 
was the offer of increased market access by the United States in 
exchange for the other country accepting “TRIPS-plus” 
commitments on domestic intellectual property regulation (i.e., 
minimum standards in excess of those required by the TRIPS 
Agreement).8 The bilateral agenda was largely successful in terms of 
escalating intellectual property standards among the U.S. partners in 
 
phases that reinforce a general process of “ratcheting” of standards in the 
international IP system); Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (And Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 
64 SMU L. REV. 975, 977–78, 988–98 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six Secret Fears] 
(describing the plurilateral Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement as an effort by 
“like minded countries” to “consolidate the different protections that have already 
been developed through bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade and investment 
agreements” in the face of opposition to norm setting on the same issues at WTO 
and WIPO). 
 8. See Pedro Roffe & Christophe Spenneman, Intellectual Property Rights in 
Free Trade Agreements: Moving Beyond TRIPS Minimum Standards, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER 
WTO RULES 266, 273 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010) (discussing the proliferation of 
“TRIPS-plus” intellectual property standards in free trade agreements, particularly 
between developing countries and the United States); Susan K. Sell, The Global IP 
Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of 
Play, AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. L. PROG. INFO. JUSTICE & INTELL. PROP. (PIJIP 
Research Paper Series. No. 15, 2010), at 2–5, 15 [hereinafter Sell, Global IP 
Upward Ratchet], available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=research (discussing the development of an 
“enforcement agenda” of higher standards of IP protection in U.S.-sponsored 
bilateral and plurilateral agreements promoted by organized corporate lobbying); 
Daniel Gervais, Of Clusters and Assumptions: Innovation as Part of a Full TRIPS 
Implementation, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2353, 2359–60 (2009) (highlighting the 
recent trend of incorporating TRIPS-plus norms in bilateral and regional trade 
agreements signed by the United States and European Union); Morin, supra note 5, 
at 190 (2009) (describing the United States’ use of bilateral agreements to create “a 
more stringent patent protection system”). This stage included a small number of 
multi-country regional agreements as well, including the Central American and 
Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and the failed Free 
Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug 
Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity And Patent/Registration Linkage, 
34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303 (2008) (analyzing the efforts to obtain data monopolies 
through free trade agreements); Francisco Rossi, Free Trade Agreements and 
TRIPS-Plus Measures, 1 INT’L J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 150 (2006). 
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a number of areas left open by TRIPS. But accounting for just 8.5% 
of all U.S. trade (most of which was in three of the eleven FTA 
partners),9 the bilateral commitments were not an end goal. Rather, 
the bilateral agenda was making way for a next stage that would 
“expand the stronger IPR commitments found in these bilateral 
agreements to a broader set of countries” through plurilateral 
agreements.10  
A plurilateral stage in post-TRIPS forum shifting by the United 
States began with the negotiation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (“ACTA”) between a set of geographically diverse, but 
like-minded (and largely high-income), countries and regions: the 
United States, Japan, Korea, the European Union, Switzerland, 
Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Singapore, and Morocco. The goal 
was to establish a model that other countries could accede to—
creating the base for an ultimately global agreement. The process 
used for the negotiation, insisted upon by the United States, was the 
closed and secretive model of a bilateral negotiation, rather than the 
more open and transparent process of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (“WIPO”) or, to a lesser extent, the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”).11 The strategy appeared tailored to avoid an 
 
 9. The eleven post-WTO bilateral FTAs signed by the United States were 
with countries that together account for just 8.5% of overall trade with the United 
States—more than half of that occurring with just three of the FTA member states: 
Korea (2.7%), Singapore (1.4%), and Australia (1.0%). Figures based on 
calculations by Jimmy H. Koo, based on data from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. 
TRADE IN GOODS BY COUNTRY (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/ 
foreign-trade/balance/#S. 
 10. SHAYERAH ILIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41107, THE PROPOSED ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT: BACKGROUND & KEY ISSUES 6 (2010); see 
Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 7, at 1028–44. 
 11. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 7, at 998–1019 (describing the lack of 
transparency in and justifications for the ACTA process). For a comparison of 
transparency of international intellectual property lawmaking processes, see 
Jeremy Malcolm, Public Interest Representation in Global IP Policy Institutions, 
AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. L. PROG. INFO. JUSTICE & INTELL. PROP. (PIJIP Research 
Paper Series. No. 6, 2010), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=research. WIPO recently expanded the 
transparency of some of its negotiations by webcasting them live for anyone to 
follow. See Michael Palmedo, Infojustice Roundup July 23, 2012, 
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (July 27, 2012, 9:46 AM), http://infojustice.org/archives/26756 
(providing links to meeting documents and a live webcast of WIPO negotiations in 
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open debate over the standards being proposed in the agreement.12 
But the process ultimately backfired. A steady stream of leaks 
revealed proposals that alarmed public interest groups, academics, 
and many negotiating country legislatures.13 When the secretive 
agreement was completed and submitted to its first ratification 
process—in the EU Parliament—it was soundly rejected,14 stalling 
 
the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights). 
 12. Cf. Jean-Frederic Morin, Tripping up TRIPS Debates IP and Health in 
Bilateral Agreements, 1 INT’L J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 37 (2006) (describing a 
shift to less transparent negotiating forums as part of effort by powerful actors to 
“institutionalize new unequal norms in other forums, not yet challenged by social 
movements”); Sean Flynn, ACTA’s Constitutional Problem: The Treaty Is Not a 
Treaty, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 903 (2011) (describing the effort of the U.S. 
administration to push ACTA through as an executive agreement rather than 
through congressional ratification). 
 13. See, e.g., Sean Flynn, ACTA to Be Signed – But Can It Enter into Force?, 
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Sept. 29, 2011, 11:06 AM), http://infojustice.org/archives/5699 
(summarizing parliamentary controversies in Europe and Mexico); Text of Urgent 
ACTA Communique, AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. L. PROG. INFO. JUSTICE & INTELL. 
PROP. (June 23, 2010), http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique 
(concluding leaked ACTA text “is hostile to the public interest in at least seven 
critical areas of global public policy”); Over 75 Law Professors Call for Halt to 
ACTA, AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. L. PROG. INFO. JUSTICE & INTELL. PROP. (Oct. 28, 
2010), http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/academic-sign-on-letter-to-
obama-on-acta (criticizing the secretive process and concluding “ACTA would 
usurp congressional authority over intellectual property policy in a number of 
ways”); Opinion of European Academics on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 
2 JIPITEC 65 (2011), available at http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-2-1-
2011/2965 (noting that ACTA would be contrary to EU policy and the public 
interest); Rashmi Rangnath, Shhhh. The TPP Is Secret, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 21, 
2012), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/shhhh-tpp-secret (discussing a civil 
society statement criticizing ACTA secrecy); Nate Anderson, Secret ACTA Treaty 
Can’t Be Shown to Public, Just 42 Lawyers, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 15, 2009, 10:39 
AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/10/these-42-people-are-shaping-us-
internet-enforcement-policy/ (criticizing the lack of transparency during the ACTA 
negotiation process); Resolution on the Transparency and State of Play of the 
ACTA Negotiations, PARL. EUR. DOC. (SEC P7 TA (2010)0058) (Mar. 10, 2010) 
(stating that “deploring the calculated choice of the parties not to negotiate through 
well-established international bodies, such as WIPO and the WTO” and calling on 
the EU to release negotiating text and bring other developing countries into 
negotiation); Sean Flynn, Learning from ACTA: Toward a Positive Agenda for 
TPP, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Mar. 3, 2012, 4:57 PM), http://infojustice.org/archives/ 
8650 (summarizing social movement protests and parliamentary rejections of 
ACTA in Europe). 
 14. See Eric Pfanner, European Parliament Rejects Anti-piracy Treaty, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 4, 2012, at B5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
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the ratification process elsewhere, perhaps permanently.  
The fate of ACTA is uncertain, which has in turn called into 
question the viability of the plurilateral agenda’s expansionist goals. 
If Europe could not be convinced to adopt the kind of TRIPS-plus 
(but often U.S.-minus) standards for intellectual property protection, 
how would the agenda ever reach those actively opposed to the U.S. 
agenda in multilateral forums, such as China, India, and Brazil?  
There is one more ongoing forum in the U.S. plurilateral agenda—
in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) negotiation, which the 
United States joined long before the demise of ACTA. The genesis 
of the TPP was the 2005 “P-4” trade agreement among four 
geographically diverse members of Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (“APEC”): Brunei, Chile, Singapore, and New 
Zealand.15 Like ACTA, the P-4 had an expansionist goal: to create a 
“high standards agreement that could serve as a model for a broader 
APEC-wide agreement, and to which other APEC members could 
accede.”16 The P-4 thus offered some of the main elements of a 
plurilateral forum that the United States was seeking in ACTA—a 
geographically diverse coalition of like-minded countries seeking a 
“high standards” agreement with a model for expansion.17 But there 
was one big omission from the U.S. perspective—the P-4 agreement 
 
07/05/technology/european-parliament-rejects-anti-piracy-treaty.html?_r=0. 
 15. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or 
Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 29–35 (2011); IAN 
F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40502, THE TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, 1–4 (2010). The formal name of the P-4 
agreement is the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, the text 
of which is available at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-agreement/ 
transpacific/main-agreement.pdf. 
 16. Lewis, supra note 15, at 32–33. Specifically, the P-4 was meant to be a 
stepping stone toward a long-frustrated objective to create an APEC-wide Free 
Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), covering 40% of the world’s 
population and 50% of global gross domestic product. See Patrick Fazzone, The 
Trans-Pacific Partnership – Towards a Free Trade Agreement of Asia-Pacific?, 43 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 695 (2012) (describing P-4 and TPP as steps toward larger APEC-
wide strategy); BROCK R. WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42344, TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP) COUNTRIES: COMPARATIVE TRADE AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS, 2 (2012) (summarizing economic research on trade benefits in the 
region). 
 17. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 34. 
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has very little in the way of substantive TRIPS-plus commitments on 
intellectual property.18 Thus, when the United States announced in 
2008 that it would seek to join and expand the P-4 agreement into a 
Trans-Pacific Partnership,19 one of its main objectives could be easily 
surmised—to insert into the agreement a new “high standard” 
intellectual property chapter modeled on ACTA and the recently 
 
 18. The intellectual property chapter of the P-4 agreement is just three and half 
pages long, compared to the nearly thirty pages that make up ACTA. Compare 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement ch. 10 [hereinafter P-4], 
available at http://mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-agreement/transpacific/main-
agreement.pdf with Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Oct. 5, 2011 
[hereinafter ACTA], available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/ 
i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf. The scant provisions on intellectual property in 
the P-4 are largely devoted to reinforcing multilateral agreements and clarifying 
the application of limitations and exceptions to intellectual property rights, rather 
than the expansion of proprietor rights beyond the multilateral framework. See P-4, 
supra, art. 10.2(2) (recognizing the “need to achieve a balance between the rights 
of right holders and the legitimate interests of users and the community”); art. 
10.3(2) (stating that “[n]othing in this Chapter shall prevent a Party from adopting 
appropriate measures to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights” and 
“nothing in this Chapter shall prevent a Party from adopting measures necessary to 
prevent anti-competitive practices that may result from the abuse of intellectual 
property rights”); art. 10.3(3) (affirming that parties may “provide for the 
international exhaustion of intellectual property rights,” “establish that provisions 
in standard form non-negotiated licenses for products do not prevent consumers 
from exercising the limitations and exceptions recognised in domestic intellectual 
property laws,” “establish provisions to facilitate the exercise of permitted acts 
where technological measures have been applied,” and “establish appropriate 
measures to protect traditional knowledge.”); art. 10.3(4) (“The Parties may 
establish limitations and exceptions in their domestic laws as acceptable under the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971), the 
TRIPS Agreement, the WCT and the WPPT” and may “devise new exceptions and 
limitations that are appropriate in the digital environment”); art. 10.3(5) (“Subject 
to their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, each Party may limit the rights of 
the performers and producers of phonograms and broadcasting entities of the other 
Party to the rights its persons are accorded within the jurisdiction of the other 
Party”). The one TRIPS-plus provision in the agreement reinforces the multilateral 
system rather than substituting for it. TRIPS requires members to “provide for 
reproduction rights and communication to the public rights to copyright owners 
and phonogram producers that are consistent with the World Intellectual Property 
Organization Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)”—two post-TRIPS 
agreements dealing with copyright in the digital environment and negotiated 
through WIPO. P-4, supra, art. 10.3(5). 
 19. Lewis, supra note 15, at 34. 
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concluded U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement.20  
Like ACTA, the TPP—since expanded to include Australia, 
Malaysia, Peru, Vietnam, and, most recently, Mexico and Canada, 
 
 20. USTR officials said as much at many off-the-record briefings attended by 
the authors and others. Commentators often assumed the agenda from past 
practice. See Fergusson & Vaughn, supra note 15, at 11−12 (surmising the United 
States would seek “contentious” TRIPS-plus intellectual property rules in 
negotiation). The U.S. desire to achieve an agreement that could be expanded to 
other countries was often explicit. See President Barack Obama, Remarks in 
Meeting with Trans-Pacific Partnership (Nov. 12, 2011) (noting that “[i]n a larger 
sense, the TPP has the potential to be a model not only for the Asia Pacific but for 
future trade agreements”); Ambassador Demetrios J. Marantis, Testimony Before 
the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade on the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (Dec. 13, 2011) (emphasizing that “we hope that advances made in the 
TPP agreement will serve as a model for future trade pacts”); Ambassador 
Demetrios J. Marantis, Remarks at the Washington Council on International Trade 
on the Obama Administration’s Asia-Pacific Trade Policy (July 19, 2012) (stating 
that “[u]ltimately, our goal is to not just secure a high-standard agreement with our 
current TPP Partners, but to fulfill the vision of TPP as a platform for regional 
integration in the Asia-Pacific”); Letter from Members of Congress to Ambassador 
Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Representative (June 27, 2012) (explaining that “[a]ccording 
to USTR statements, the TPP membership could ultimately include half of the 
nations of the world”); Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, In Pacific Pact, 
Obama Aims to Shape 21st Century Trade (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/ 
about-us/press-office/blog/2010/march/-pacific-pact-obama-aims-shape-21st-
century-trade (noting that “[w]ith the TPP, the idea is to expand an agreement 
between New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei and Chile into a broader regional pact 
that advocates hope one day could also include China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan 
and other major economies on both sides of the Asia Pacific”); Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (Nov. 
12, 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/ 
outlines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement (highlighting “defining features that 
will make TPP a landmark, 21st-century trade agreement, setting a new standard 
for global trade . . .”); Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Trade Ministers’ Report to Leaders (Sept. 9, 2012) (commenting that 
“[w]e are pleased with our progress toward realizing each of the five defining 
features of this historic agreement, which we expect will set the standard for future 
trade agreements”); Ambassador Ron Kirk, Address in Singapore to the APEC 
CEO Summit (Nov. 13, 2009) (stating that “further engagement in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership gives us the opportunity to address gaps in our current 
agreements, and to set the standard for 21st-century trade agreements going 
forward”); Ambassador Ron Kirk, Address in Singapore Management University 
on U.S. Asia-Pacific Trade Policy (Apr. 26, 2012); Ambassador Ron Kirk, 
Remarks at the Washington International Trade Association (Dec. 15, 2009) 
(explaining that “we expect the TPP agreement to serve as a model for the future 
of American trade”). 
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in addition to the original P-4 countries and the United States—is 
being negotiated under intense secrecy, including an agreement 
among the parties that no text of any proposal in the negotiation 
will be released until four years after the end of the negotiation.21 
The use of such secretive forums for the making of international 
intellectual property law has been frequently criticized for being ill-
suited to taking into account the interests of the full range of 
stakeholders affected by such law.22 For international intellectual 
 
 21. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Rights Chapter (draft 
Feb. 10, 2011) [hereinafter TPP IP I], available at http://keionline.org/sites/ 
default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf (outlining, on the cover page of 
the leaked text, measures nations must take to keep the materials classified). 
 22. See GLOBAL CONG. ON INTELL. PROP. & THE PUB. INTEREST, Washington 
Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, 2 (2011) [hereinafter 
Washington Declaration], available at http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2011/09/Washington-Declaration-Print.pdf (declaring that because “international 
intellectual property policy affects a broad range of interests within society, not just 
those of rights holders . . . policy making should be conducted through mechanisms 
of transparency and openness that encourage broad public participation . . . [and] 
[n]ew rules should be made within the existing forums . . . [to ensure] both 
developed and developing countries have full representation, and . . . the texts of and 
forums for considering proposals are open.”); Sean Flynn, Law Professors Call for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Transparency, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (May 9, 2012, 
10:11 AM), http://infojustice.org/archives/21137 (maintaining that “if the goal [of 
the TPP process] is to create balanced law that stands the test of modern democratic 
theories and practices of public transparency, accountability and input,” then public 
participation and transparency measures comparable to that afforded in lawmaking in 
multilateral institutions or Congress is needed in the TPP negotiating process); Press 
Release, U.S. Senator Sherrod Brown, With Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations 
Set to Continue in California Next Week, Senators Call for Increased Transparency, 
Including Broader Consultation on Internet Freedom (June 25, 2012),  
available at http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/with-trans-
pacific-partnership-negotiations-set-to-continue-in-california-next-week-senators-
call-for-increased-transparency-including-broader-consultation-on-internet-freedom 
(highlighting the statement by Senator Ron Wyden expressing astonishment at the 
secrecy under which American TPP negotiators operate). See generally Press 
Release, U.S. Congresswoman Rosa Delauro, DeLauro, Miller Push for More 
Transparency, Congressional Consultation in Trade Negotiations (June 27, 2012), 
available at http://delauro.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article 
&id=997:delauro-miller-push-for-more-transparency-congressional-consultation-in-
trade-negotiations&catid=2:2012-press-releases&Itemid=21 (demanding “broader 
and deeper consultations with members of the full range of committees of Congress” 
and releases of negotiating text to the public, arguing that the “goal of making any 
TPP FTA a high-level agreement that serves as a model for the world . . . requires 
transparency and sustained, ongoing consultations with the many impacted 
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property scholars, the secrecy prevents analysis of the official 
proposals being considered in the negotiation. Partly for this reason, 
analysis of the TPP by such scholars has largely focused on its 
process rather than substance, including in studies of the more 
general trends in strategic forum shifting23 and in the turn to secrecy 
in international intellectual property lawmaking.24   
This article takes advantage of the breach in the TPP’s secrecy to 
contribute to a new and growing collection of published scholarship 
on leaked proposals for international intellectual property agreements 
as they are being negotiated.25 Leaked proposals in a confidential 
 
congressional committees and the public”). 
 23. See Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough, supra note 7, at 448 (discussing TPP 
as an example of “vertical” forum shifting in international intellectual property 
lawmaking). 
 24. David S. Levine, Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security and the 
Creation of International Intellectual Property Law, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 105 (discussing TPP as an example of the turn to secrecy in recent 
negotiations of international intellectual property agreements, which “prevent the 
public . . . from accessing information about the creation of international 
intellectual property law”). 
 25. See generally Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 7, at 975 (tracing the 
development of ACTA using both leaked and final text and predicting the 
consequences); James Love, Leak of TPP Text on Copyright Limitations and 
Exceptions, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Aug. 3, 2012, 7:10 PM), 
http://keionline.org/node/1516 (highlighting and analyzing leaked text from the 
TPP);  PIJIP Research Paper Series, AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. OF LAW PROGRAM 
ON INFO. JUSTICE & INTELL. PROP., http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ 
research/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2012) (containing a large collection of research 
papers on ACTA written by scholars from around the world throughout the 
secretive negotiation processes); KIMBERLEE G. WEATHERALL, An Australian 
Analysis of the February 2011 Leaked US TPPA IP Chapter Text – Copyright and 
Enforcement, in SELECTED WORKS OF KIMBERLEE G. WEATHERALL 1 (2011), 
available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context= 
kimweatherall (compiling a table of provisions from leaked February 2011 
proposals and noting that the proposal is a fusion of old agreements and ACTA); 
Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and the Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 385, 386–88 (2011) (presenting an 
overview of ACTA’s substantive provisions based on leaked text); Henning Grosse 
Ruse-Khan, From TRIPs to ACTA: Towards a New ‘Gold Standard’ in Criminal 
IP Enforcement?, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & 
COMPETITION LAW, 7–11 (Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop. & Competition Law 
Research Paper Series No. 10-06, 2010) [hereinafter Ruse-Khan, Gold Standard], 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592104## 
(analyzing leaked ACTA provisions on criminal IP enforcement). 
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international law negotiation are novel subjects for legal scholarship. 
But due to the formal secrecy of the negotiations, analysis of such 
text serves important public interests. These analyses contribute 
public commentary to aid policy makers and the public in 
understanding the potential import of lawmaking processes they 
cannot officially observe,26 and to provide an unofficial legislative 
history of the agreement for future legal interpreters and historians.27  
We focus our analysis on the public interest effects of leaked U.S. 
proposals for an intellectual property chapter in the TPP 
(collectively, “TPP proposal”).28 We use the term “public interest” to 
 
 26. As is the case in other bilateral agreements, as well as with the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, the TPP proposal seeks to put in place a major 
and consequential shift in international standards for domestic intellectual 
property, Internet, and health regulation with scant public process, on the one side, 
and a highly structured and consultative relationship with a limited range of 
commercial interests on the other. See Rangnath, supra note 13 (describing and 
criticizing the use of a confidential “trade advisory committee” system in which 
select industry executives can see and contribute comments on confidential draft 
documents not made available to the general public). This process denies TPP 
negotiators access to a full range of views and analysis that deliberation in a public 
forum would attract. See Drahos, supra note 4, at 11 (describing “a networked 
private nodal governance that is formally woven into US policy and law-making at 
the highest levels”); Washington Declaration, supra note 22, at 2 (advocating 
increased oversight and review of new intellectual property standards). Somewhat 
ironically, the closed-door process being used in TPP violates the standards 
included in the leaked chapters on “Regulatory Coherence” and “Transparency and 
Procedural Fairness for Healthcare Technologies,” for example. See generally 
Leaked Trans-Pacific Free Trade Agreement Texts Reveal U.S. Undermining 
Access to Medicine, CITIZENS TRADE CAMPAIGN (Oct. 22, 2011), 
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/blog/2011/10/22/leaked-trans-pacific-fta-texts-
reveal-u-s-undermining-access-to-medicine/ [hereinafter Leaked Trans-Pacific 
Free Trade Agreement Texts Reveal Demands] (discussing how the leaked draft 
text of the regulatory coherence chapter attempts to “impose a structure and set of 
procedures for domestic decisions on all forms of regulation in current and 
prospective Trans-Pacific FTA countries” and noting that some portions of the 
chapter are “conducive to well-informed and consistent good decision making”). 
 27. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (identifying the preparatory works surrounding a treaty as a 
secondary source of interpretation). The extent to which the kind of informal 
legislative history contained in leaked texts can be part of the interpretive resources 
available to a future dispute resolution body is beyond the scope of this article. 
 28. See TPP IP I, supra note 21; Trans-Pacific Partnership—Intellectual 
Property Rights Chapter (Selected Provisions), Sept. 2011 [hereinafter TPP IP II], 
available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/ 
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refer to the interests of the broad range of often diffuse and 
unorganized stakeholders, including consumers and users of 
intellectual property–protected information and products, who are 
affected by intellectual property laws but who do not have 
representatives formally included in the TPP lawmaking process.29 
 
TransPacificIP1.pdf. A previously released version of this article included analysis 
of additional chapters of the leaked U.S. proposals, including proposals on 
trademark, geographical indicators, and pharmaceutical pricing. See Sean Flynn et 
al., Public Interest Analysis of the US TPP Proposal for an IP Chapter, Am. Univ. 
Wash. Coll. of Law Program on Info. Justice & Intell. Prop. (PIJIP Research Paper 
Series No. 20, 2011), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ 
research/21/). 
 29. This definition is in accord with that used in the legal profession more 
broadly. Public interest lawyers are those who represent the underrepresented. In 
this case, the underrepresented are the majority, as is the case in consumer rights 
advocacy more generally. See generally Comment, The New Public Interest 
Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1069–71 n.3 (1970) (characterizing lawyers who 
represented social groups and interests that were underrepresented in the legal and 
political arenas, as “acting in the public interest”). We understand that some 
organizations representing consumers and other interests that we define as 
excluded from the formal process have been able to attend meetings with USTR 
negotiators, as well as with the negotiators with other countries, at TPP negotiating 
rounds, and elsewhere. This fact was raised by U.S. Trade Representative Ron 
Kirk in his description of the TPP as including “the most[] active outreach to all 
stakeholders relative to the TPP than in any FTA previously, including[] the 
proposed disciplines on intellectual property.” Sean Flynn, Kirk Responds to TPP 
Transparency Demands, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (May 10, 2012, 11:17 AM), 
http://infojustice.org/archives/21385. But this does not alter our conclusion that 
such groups are formally excluded from the process because, unlike the industry 
stakeholders, consumer groups are not granted access to the text of the proposals 
that the United States and other delegations are introducing in the lawmaking 
process. Through the Trade Advisory Committee system, a committee of fifteen 
industry representatives, chaired by a representative of the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America, receives notice and an opportunity to 
comment on confidential drafts of all USTR text proposals on intellectual property 
before they are made in the formal negotiation. See U.S. Department of Commerce 
and the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Charter of the United 
States Trade Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights, available at 
http://www.trade.gov/itac/committees/Charters/Intellectual_Property_Rights_ITA
C.pdf (defining the criteria for membership in the committee as not more than fifty 
members from the private sector); Industry Trade Advisory Committee on 
Intellectual Property Rights ITAC 15, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE & U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://ita.doc.gov/itac/committees/itac15.asp (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2012). Organizations representing consumer, health, library, small artist 
and other interests directly impacted by intellectual property law have no 
representation in the ITAC system and cannot officially view text of the proposals 
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We provide this analysis out of a conviction that if the emerging 
agreement in the TPP is to include provisions that adequately balance 
the interests of intellectual property owners, on the one side, and 
users and the larger community, on the other, we believe that the 
interests of those excluded from the formal process must be 
amplified.  
We begin with the general provisions of the agreement, which 
define its relationship to the multilateral system. We then progress to 
analysis of some of the most important copyright, patent and data 
protection, and enforcement sections of the proposal, before 
providing some concluding observations. Our ultimate conclusion is 
that the U.S. proposal, if adopted, would upset the current 
international framework balancing the interests of rights holders and 
the public. It would heighten standards of protection for rights 
holders well beyond that which the best available evidence or 
inclusive democratic processes support.30 It contains insufficient 
balancing provisions for users, consumers, and the public interest.31 
The provisions would be particularly harmful for developing 
 
until they are finished. 
 30. The TPP proposal includes many standards that far exceed agreements 
between some of the wealthiest countries of the world. See, e.g., Free Trade 
Agreement Between the United States and Republic of Korea, U.S.-Kor., June 30, 
2007, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-
text [hereinafter KORUS] (utilizing more modest standards to effectuate balance 
between users, consumers, and the public interest, contrary to leaked U.S. TPP 
proposal); ACTA, supra note 18 (purporting to address issues with international 
intellectual property rights “in a manner that balances the rights and interests of the 
relevant right holders, service providers, and users”). The dominant economic view 
is that such standards are not justified by any economic benefit to developing 
countries. 
 31. See Carsten Fink, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: an Economic 
Perspective, ICTSD PROGRAMME ON IPRS & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Intellectual 
Property and Sustainable Development Series, Issue Paper No. 22, 2008) at 7, 
available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/08/carsten-fink-enforcing-intellectual-
property-rights.pdf (noting that greater exclusive rights increase incentives to 
produce but also tend to increase the cost of goods beyond the cost of production, 
harming consumers); The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Your Guide to 
Copyright in the TPP, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, available at tppinfo.org (highlighting a 
number of U.S. proposals that would benefit rights owners but adversely affect 
consumers by, for example, giving rights owners copy protection and thereby 
exposing consumers to liability, or imposing far stricter criminal rules than U.S. 
criminal law). 
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countries, where the risks and effects of exclusionary pricing by 
intellectual property monopolists are often most acute.32 The general 
thrust of the proposal conflicts with the “development agenda” being 
debated in WIPO, which has a much stronger focus on the 
harmonization of limitations and flexibilities in international 
intellectual property law.33 The proposal also conflicts with the 
overwhelming trend in multilateral institutions toward protection of 
TRIPS flexibilities for developing countries to promote access to 
affordable medications.34 The proposal would make these changes in 
the context of a new and powerful dispute resolution system that 
would greatly expand the standing, venue, and causes of action that 
could be used to challenge domestic policies, including through 
actions by corporations directly against states.35 This is, in short, an 
incredibly unbalanced proposal emanating from an extraordinarily 
imbalanced process.  
 
 32. See Sean Flynn et al., An Economic Argument for Open Access to Medicine 
Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 184, 189–90 (2009) 
(arguing that intellectual property monopolies on essential goods in developing 
countries with high income inequality predictably lead to pricing practices that are 
far more exclusionary than similar rights in wealthier countries with lower income 
inequality); JOE KARAGANIS ed., MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 61 
(2011) [hereinafter MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES] (finding patterns of 
exclusionary pricing of copyrighted media content in a selection of middle-income 
developing countries). 
 33. See WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (WIPO), DEV. AGENDA FOR WIPO (2007), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/general/1015/wipo_pub_ 
l1015.pdf; see also Peter Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. 
L. REV. 465, 467 (2009) (comparing present and past intellectual property policy 
agendas led by developing countries). 
 34. See, e.g., UNDP HIV/AIDS GROUP, Global Commission on HIV and the 
Law: Rights, Risks, & Health, 1, 86 (2012), http://www.hivlawcommission.org/ 
resources/report/FinalReport-Risks,Rights&Health-EN.pdf (“High-income 
countries, including donors such as the United States . . . must immediately stop 
pressuring low- and middle-income countries to adopt or implement TRIPS-plus 
measures in trade agreements that impede access to life-saving treatment.”). 
 35. See TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 4.9. 
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SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS: RELATION TO MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS 
The U.S. TPP proposal begins with an article on general 
provisions, including proposed commitments of each country to enter 
a long list of multilateral intellectual property agreements.36 A key 
question for negotiators will be whether the intellectual property 
chapter should be restricted to this kind of reinforcement of the 
multilateral system, as exists in the original P-4 agreement37 and has 
been common in other trade agreements and proposals for them.38 
This is a particularly important question given the stated aim of the 
agreement to expand to all APEC countries, including countries such 
as China and Thailand, which may have very different ideas about 
intellectual property protection appropriate for their social and 
economic objectives.39 
 
 36. See id. art. 1 (requiring ratification of, in addition to other treaties, the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (1970), the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (1971), and the WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996)). 
 37. See P-4, supra note 18 (requiring countries to provide rights consistent with 
the post-TRIPS WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms treaties). 
 38. See Roffe & Spenneman, supra note 8, at 274–75 (describing the long 
policy of the EU, altered more recently, to limit IP commitments in its trade 
agreements to requirements to join certain multilateral IP treaties); see also 
Preliminary Considerations for TPP IP Chapter, General Provisions, CHILE TPP 
SUBMISSION [hereinafter CHILE TPP SUBMISSION], available at 
http://infojustice.org/download/tpp/tpp-texts/Chile%20Proposal%20for%20 
Intellectual%20Property%20Chapter,%20February%202011.pdf (last visited Sept. 
7, 2012) (calling for parties to provide for rights “consistent with” the WIPO 
Copyright and Performances and Phonograms treaties); Intellectual Property 
Chapter, NEW ZEALAND TPP SUBMISSION [hereinafter NEW ZEALAND TPP 
SUBMISSION], available at http://infojustice.org/download/tpp/tpp-texts/ 
New%20Zealand%20Proposal%20for%20Intellectual%20Property%20Chapter,%
20February%202011.pdf (committing members to support other members in 
joining the Patent Cooperation Treaty, Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement 
Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Singapore Treaty on the Law 
of Trademarks, and Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of 
Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks). 
 39. See Sean Flynn, Chilean Trade Officials Question #TPP Benefits at 
Seminar in Santiago, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Apr. 16, 2012, 12:01 PM), 
http://infojustice.org/archives/10712 (quoting Chilean politician Ricardo Lagos 
Weber, who expressed that a much greater benefit to the Latin American region 
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Including substantive intellectual property provisions in the 
agreement itself poses threats to the coherence of the international 
intellectual property legal system.40 Standard dispute resolution 
clauses in U.S. free trade agreements (“FTAs”) allow a complaining 
country to choose whether to bring a claim under the FTA’s dispute 
resolution process or under the multilateral agreement when the same 
norm is included in both.41 However, the agreements do not set up a 
hierarchy of interpretations—meaning that the same clause in two 
agreements could be interpreted differently, with no possibility of 
rectifying diverging decisions.42 The United States is also proposing 
to introduce new mechanisms of enforcement that are not present in 
the multilateral system. These include “investor-state” dispute 
proceedings, where corporations can sue member states directly for 
alleged infringements,43 and “non-violation complaints,” through 
 
would be opening a trade market with China, but that the United States’ proposed 
intellectual property chapter would make this eventuality nearly impossible). 
 40. See, e.g., Susy Frankel, WTO Application of “The Customary Rules of 
Interpretation of Public International Law” to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 365, 402–03 (2006) (discussing how incorporating multiple treaties into 
TRIPS can raise complexities in interpretation). 
 41. See Roffe & Spenneman, supra note 8, at 306. 
 42. This point was made with reference to the Berne Convention and the TPP. 
See Letter from James Love et al., Knowledge Ecology Int’l, to Barbara Weisel, 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (June 26, 2012), available at 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/TPP_Copyright_KEI2Weisel_26june2012.pd
f  (“We note that [the Berne Convention’s] inclusion in a trade agreement such as 
the TPPA could result in multiple, differing interpretations on the meaning of its 
provisions. An existing and developing WTO jurisprudence exists on the Berne 
Convention which could come into conflict with the outcome of any dispute 
resolution under the TPPA.”). See generally Susy Frankel, WTO Application of 
“The Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law” to 
Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 402–03 (2006). 
 43. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, Leaked Investment Chapter Art. 12.2 (2011), 
available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/ 
tppinvestment.pdf (listing intellectual property as a definition of “investment” 
alongside others such as derivatives, debt securities, and bonds); see also Newly 
Leaked TPP Investment Chapter Contains Special Rights for Corporations, 
CITIZENS TRADE CAMPAIGN (June 13, 2012, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/blog/2012/06/13/newly-leaked-tpp-investment-
chapter-contains-special-rights-for-corporations/ (providing context for the leaked 
proposal). The TRIPS Agreement, and the rest of the WTO accords, do not permit 
investors to sue states, but rather require that all complaints be brought by member 
states. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development: An 
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which complaints not alleging violation of any specific clause of an 
agreement can be brought under a frustrated-expectations theory.44 
Such provisions increase the “proliferation of international tribunals 
that subordinate the role of national legal systems in resolving 
disputes”45 and increase the potential for international litigation 
challenging local policy decisions. 
The TPP could use its opportunity to reinforce, rather than detract 
from, multilateral dispute resolution. The agreement could, for 
example, include a ban on unilateral adjudication of trade disputes, 
which remain prevalent in intellectual property matters through the 
U.S. “Special 301” program.46 Under Special 301, the United States 
uses an administrative adjudication to make unilateral findings on 
compliance of other countries with TRIPS and other agreements, 
resulting in listings on “watch lists” that many countries fear affect 
foreign investment. A WTO panel prohibited the use of similar 
 
Authoritative and Practical Guide to the TRIPS Agreement 651 (2005) [hereinafter 
UNCTAD-ICTSD], available at http://www.ictsd.org/i/ip/11572/ (describing 
dispute settlement as arising only from complaints “by another Member”). 
 44. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 64.2, Background and the current 
situation (describing non-violation complaints as existing “even when an 
agreement has not been violated” where a government alleges that “it has been 
deprived of an expected benefit because of another government’s action, or 
because of any other situation that exists”). Such complaints are not currently 
permitted under TRIPS. See id., art. 64 (providing a moratorium on non-violation 
complaints). But arguably the WTO has been willing to entertain such complaints 
in any case. See Daniel Gervais, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 549, 549 (2009) 
(arguing that the WTO panel decision in the U.S.–China case “blurred both the 
traditional distinction between ‘as such’ and ‘as applied’ claims and the line 
separating TRIPS violations from non-violations”); Susy Frankel, Challenging 
TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 1023, 1059 (2009) (“Given the lack of detail in the enforcement 
provisions the U.S. argument was really more of a non-violation complaint. The 
essence of what the U.S.A. was really complaining about was that a benefit it 
expected from the TRIPS Agreement was better levels of enforcement.”). 
 45. See B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A 
Manifesto, 8 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 3, 12 (2006). 
 46. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006); see also Sean Flynn, Special 301 of the Trade 
Act of 1974 and Global Access to Medicine, 7 J. GENERIC MED. 309, 310 (2010) 
[hereinafter Flynn, Special 301] (noting that the Special 301 program has restricted 
access to generic medicines in the least developed nations). 
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threats and sanctions for general trade issues covered by the WTO.47 
But the United States has continued to use Special 301 without ever 
invoking multilateral dispute resolution processes.48 Countries 
looking for a key concession from the United States within the 
intellectual property chapter could demand a halt of the use of such 
unilateral adjudication processes with respect to TPP member states.  
II. COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS  
With the rapid technological evolution of the Internet into a 
primary means through which many communicate and engage in 
economic trade, the threat and promise of nearly free and ubiquitous 
digital copying of informational goods has brought the public interest 
effects of copyright into stark relief. Countries around the world are 
experimenting with different policies to strike the balance between 
the legitimate interests of artists and rights holders to be 
compensated for the use of their works, and the public interest in 
expanding access to information and media content in the digital era. 
U.S. law reflects an attempt to strike this balance, which is far from 
universally accepted. It mixes very strong proprietor rights and 
enforcement avenues, on the one side, with an open and robust set of 
user rights—including a flexible “fair use” right—on the other. The 
U.S. international agenda seeks to harmonize only the proprietor side 
of this equation. It insists on increasing the duration, scope, and 
 
 47. Panel Report, United States-Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 
7.89, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) (noting that “Members faced with a threat of 
unilateral action, especially when it emanates from an economically powerful 
Member, may in effect be forced to give in to the demands imposed by the 
Member exerting the threat . . . [and] merely carrying a big stick is, in many cases, 
as effective a means to having one’s way as actually using the stick. The threat 
alone of conduct prohibited by the WTO would enable the Member concerned to 
exert undue leverage on other Members. It would disrupt the very stability and 
equilibrium which multilateral dispute resolution was meant to foster and 
consequently establish, namely equal protection of both large and small, powerful 
and less powerful Members through the consistent application of a set of rules and 
procedures”). 
 48. The Special 301 program is an “informal agency adjudication” under the 
U.S. Administrative Procedures Act, Section 37. See Flynn, Special 301, supra 
note 46, at 312, 326 (explaining that the manner in which Special 301 has been 
utilized in the United States has had the effect of adjudicating other countries’ 
compliance with WTO standards). 
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enforcement of copyrights, especially on the Internet and through 
intermediaries, but it does so most frequently without any correlative 
expansions of limitations, exceptions, and user rights. The TPP 
proposal reflects this general and long-standing trend in U.S. post-
TRIPS FTAs, and as such would disadvantage the public interest in 
appropriately balanced copyright systems.  
A. Exclusive Reproduction Rights for Temporary Electronic Copies 
Art. 4.1. Each Party shall provide that authors, performers, and producers of 
phonograms have the right to authorize or prohibit all reproductions of their 
works, performances, and phonograms, in any manner or form, permanent 
or temporary (including temporary storage in electronic form).49 
The extension of copyright protection to temporary electronic 
copies in the random access memory of computers and on the 
networks of telephone and Internet service providers has been a long-
standing objective of the U.S. “digital agenda.”50 The United States 
pushed the agenda during the negotiation of the 1996 WIPO Internet 
Treaties.51 During that negotiation, the United States supported 
proposed language extending the reproduction right in Article 9(1) of 
the Berne Convention to include “direct and indirect reproduction of 
their works, whether permanent or temporary, in any manner or 
form.”52 To stave off concerns that the provision would be radically 
overbroad,53 the proposal was linked to a specific authorization of 
limitation and exceptions for “transient or incidental” copies: 
Subject to the provisions of Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, it shall 
be a matter for legislation in Contracting Parties to limit the right of 
reproduction in cases where a temporary reproduction has the sole 
purpose of making the work perceptible or where the reproduction is of a 
transient or incidental nature, provided that such reproduction takes place 
in the course of use of the work that is authorized by the author or 
 
 49. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 4.1, nn.8–10 (footnote numbers omitted). 
 50. Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 
369, 378–84 (1997). 
 51. The term “WIPO Internet Treaties” is commonly used, and used herein, to 
collectively describe the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). 
 52. Samuelson, U.S. Digital Agenda, supra note 50, at 384. 
 53. Id. at 385. 
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permitted by law.54 
Presented in an open forum subject to observation and participation 
by a broad range of stakeholders, the WIPO proposal generated 
significant opposition from consumers, libraries, and technology 
companies within the United States and abroad. Opponents argued, for 
example, that the clause would relieve “telephone companies or online 
service providers from potential liability for temporary copies of 
infringing material made in company equipment as the material passed 
through their systems en route from sender to recipient.”55 An Ad Hoc 
Alliance for a Digital Future, which later became the Digital Future 
Coalition, suggested a broader set of limitations, including:  
where such reproductions (i) have the purpose of making perceptible an 
otherwise perceptible work; (ii) are of a transient or incidental nature; or 
(iii) facilitate transmission of a work and have no economic value 
independent from facilitating transmission; these being special cases 
where such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the author.56 
The coalition also advocated for a clause permitting additional 
limitations and exceptions to the temporary copy provision that 
otherwise complies with the three-step test in Berne Article 9(2).57  
Considerable opposition emerged to the temporary copy provision 
at the diplomatic conference on the Internet Treaties, and ultimately 
the provision was dropped.58 The WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”) provides performers and producers of 
phonograms the exclusive right of authorizing the “direct or indirect 
reproductions” of work “fixed in phonograms, in any manner or 
form.”59 But it leaves countries free to define when a temporary 
 
 54. Id. at 384–85. 
 55. Id. at 385 (describing submissions by Netscape and other opponents of the 
proposal). 
 56. Id. at 386. 
 57. For further explanation of the three-step test, see infra Part II.E, discussing 
the limitations and exceptions provisions of the TPP proposal. 
 58. Samuelson, supra note 50, at 388−90. 
 59. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 
36 ILM 76, art. 7 (1997) [hereinafter WPPT], available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
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electronic copy will be considered sufficiently “fixed” so as to merit 
copyright protection. And an agreed statement on the application of 
the clause clarifies that parties may “carry forward and appropriately 
extend into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in 
their national laws which have been considered acceptable under the 
Berne Convention” and to “devise new exceptions and limitations 
that are appropriate in the digital network environment.”60  
The U.S. proposal for the TPP on temporary copies replicates the 
most controversial aspects of the Internet Treaties proposal, without 
any of the (imperfect) tempering language for limitations and 
exceptions that was linked to it. The proposal arrives at a time when 
there are multiple examples of legal standards, including in the United 
States, that appear far more attentive to needs for accommodating 
temporary copies in a digital world. In a provision of U.S. law not 
included in its TPP proposal, for example, copies are only considered 
adequately fixed so as to merit protection where they are 
“communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”61 Fuller  
exceptions to the right of reproduction for temporary electronic copies 
that have “no independent economic significance,”62 “are necessary 
 
export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/wppt/pdf/trtdocs_wo034.pdf; id. art. 11 
(incorporating the right of reproduction for producers of phonograms); Rome 
Convention, International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers 
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations art. 4, Oct. 26, 1961, 19 ILM 1492 
[hereinafter Rome Convention], available at http://www.wipo.int/export/ 
sites/www/treaties/en/ip/rome/pdf/trtdocs_wo024.pdf (conditioning protection 
requirements on the performance being “incorporated in a phonogram” or 
broadcast). 
 60. Agreed Statement to Article 10 of WIPO Copyright Treaty, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/statements.html; Agreed Statement to 
Article 16 of the WPPT, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/ 
statements.html (providing that the agreed statement to WCT Article 10 applies 
mutatis mutandis to the WPPT). 
 61. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “[c]opies” as “material objects, other than 
phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later 
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device . . . [that] 
includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first 
fixed”); see Cartoon Network LP, LLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129 
(2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that buffer copies that remained in computer memory 
for a few seconds were too transitory to be entitled protection). 
 62. European Parliament & Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5.1, 2001 O.J. 
(L 167) 10, 16 (EC) (protecting “temporary acts of reproduction” with “no 
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for the use of the computer program,”63 or are “required for the 
viewing, listening, or utilization of the said work”64 have similarly 
become commonplace in recent copyright law reform.65 Notably, the 
agreed statement on flexibility in the digital environment from the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (“WCT”) was included in the Chile-U.S. 
FTA66 but is not reproduced in the U.S. TPP proposal.  
This is one of many provisions where the U.S. proposal reflects 
the extreme imbalance in influence in the U.S. policy-making 
process. There are large and influential interests in the United 
States, such as the Hollywood content industry, that would benefit 
from an extension of copyright protection to the electronic copies 
necessary for streaming and other content delivery services over the 
Internet. But other large and influential industries would have their 
business models threatened by such protection—including some of 
 
independent economic significance”). 
 63. European Parliament & Council Directive 2009/24/EC. art. 5.1, 2009 O.J. 
(L 111) 16, 18 (EC) (providing that acts of reproduction of a computer program 
“shall not require authorisation by the rightholder where they are necessary for the 
use of the computer program by the lawful acquirer in accordance with its intended 
purpose, including for error correction”). 
 64. Copyright (Amendment) Act of 2012 (Malay.) sec. 9(b), Act A1420 
(adding exception for “the making of a transient and incidental electronic copy of a 
work made available on a network if the making of such copy is required for the 
viewing, listening, or utilization of the said work”). 
 65. See also Copyright Act of 1987 (Rev. Jan. 31, 2006) (Sing.) sec. 38A, 
available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/home.w3p (type “63” in the text box next 
to “Cap. or Act No.” and click “Search”; then scroll to find section 38A in the left 
pane) (permitting temporary or transient reproductions made in the course of 
communication); Copyright Act 1968 (Austl.) sec. 43A, available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00265/Html/Text#_Toc317846224 
(permitting temporary reproductions as part of making or receiving a 
communication or as a necessary part of using a work); Copyright Act 1994 (N.Z.) 
sec. 43A, available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1994/0143/latest/ 
whole.html (permitting transient or incidental reproductions). 
 66. Free Trade Agreement Between the United States and Chile art. 17.7(3) 
n.17, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/chile-fta/final-text [hereinafter Chile FTA] (“For works, other than 
computer software, and other subject matter, such exceptions and limitations may 
include temporary acts of reproduction which are transient or incidental and an 
integral and essential part of a technological process and whose sole purpose is to 
enable (a) a lawful transmission in a network between third parties by an 
intermediary; or (b) a lawful use of a work or other subject-matter to be made; and 
which have no independent economic significance.”). 
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the fastest-growing Internet and technology companies in the 
world. When similar language was promoted in the open forum of 
WIPO, where every official proposal by a state is part of the 
contemporaneous public record, the concerns of those most acutely 
affected were raised, listened to, and ultimately validated through a 
defeat of the proposal. But those same interests are highly 
unrepresented in the FTA advising process. The Industry Advisory 
Committee that has the most influence over U.S. international 
intellectual property policy does not have a single representative of 
a streaming service of the kind most reliant on transitory copying 
for their business models.67  
Chile’s initial position in the TPP negotiation provides an 
alternative approach for promoting copyright standards in the digital 
environment that would avoid many of the pitfalls of the U.S. 
language. That proposal would require members of the TPP to 
implement the reproduction right of the WCT and the WPPT, with its 
built-in exceptions and clarifications in the agreed statements, and 
without the U.S. proposed extension of the right to temporary 
electronic copies.68 The negotiators of the TPP should do no more on 
such a controversial issue in a secretive and unrepresentative process. 
The alternative course, currently being pressed by the Consumers 
and Communications Industry Association, is to fully express 
limitations and exceptions on the temporary right that are needed to 
support and enable digital commerce.69   
 
 67. Charter of the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property 
Rights, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & THE OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Feb.  
19, 2010), http://www.trade.gov/itac/committees/ITAC15.IntellectualProperty 
Rights.asp. 
 68. See CHILE TPP SUBMISSION, supra note 38. 
 69. See Computer & Communications Industry Associations, Internet 
Proposals for TPP, Copyright Exceptions, 1, 2 (2012), http://infojustice.org/ 
download/tpp/tpp-industry/CCIA-positive-proposal.pdf (proposing language for 
the TPP that “exceptions and limitations shall include temporary acts of 
reproduction which are transient or incidental and an integral and essential part of 
a technological process and whose sole purpose is to enable (a) a lawful 
transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary; or (b) a lawful 
use of a work or other subjectmatter to be made; and which have no independent 
economic significance, in that the reproductions are of short duration or are not 
perceptible to the user”). 
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B. Exhaustion of Rights and Parallel Importation 
4.2. Each Party shall provide to authors, performers, and producers of 
phonograms the right to authorize or prohibit the importation into that 
Party’s territory of copies of the work, performance, or phonogram made 
without authorization, or made outside that Party’s territory with the 
authorization of the author, performer, or producer of the phonogram. 
With respect to copies of works and phonograms that have been placed on 
the market by the relevant right holder, the obligations described in 
Article [4.2] apply only to books, journals, sheet music, sound recordings, 
computer programs, and audio and visual works (i.e., categories of 
products in which the value of the copyrighted material represents 
substantially all of the value of the product). Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, each Party may provide the protection described in Article 
[4.2] to a broader range of goods.70 
TPP article 4.2 would create a new international legal requirement 
to provide copyright owners an exclusive right to block the parallel 
trade of broad categories of copyrighted works.  
The U.S. proposal is directly contrary to the dominant multilateral 
rule in international intellectual property agreements protecting the 
ability of domestic law to determine when copyrights and other 
intellectual property rights “exhaust.”71 By determining that a right is 
exhausted upon the first sale of the protected product by the right 
holder in any country (or in a specific region), countries can permit 
the “parallel importation” of protected products from other 
countries—that is, the importation of the protected product from 
another country where the same product is lawfully placed on the 
market by the right holder.72  
 
 70. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 4.2, n.11 (footnote number omitted). 
 71. See WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 6(2), Dec. 20, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) (“Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the freedom of 
Contracting Parties to determine the conditions, if any, under which the exhaustion 
of the right in paragraph (1) applies after the first sale or other transfer of 
ownership of the original or a copy of the work with the authorization of the 
author.”); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 6 (“[N]othing in this Agreement 
shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights.”). 
 72. Such trade is referred to as “parallel” because the goods sought to be 
accessed are protected by similar (aka “parallel”) rights in each country. This 
distinguishes such trade from the importation of lawful, but unauthorized, copies 
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Without an international exhaustion regime, rights owners can 
segment markets and determine their own prices and policies for 
entry into each market. Many countries are disadvantaged by such 
practices, particularly where they lack a sufficient consumer base to 
attract market entry at the lowest possible prices. In small markets 
like New Zealand and Australia, for example, and in many 
developing countries, copyrighted books and other works are often 
unavailable, or they are available only at higher prices than those 
found in larger markets.73 Consumers in the United States as well 
may benefit from parallel importation, such as in the case where the 
same textbooks are sold at lower prices abroad than they are at 
home.74  
There is no clear provision in the U.S. Copyright Act determining 
whether copyright owners can prevent the parallel importation of 
protected goods into the United States from other countries. The 
issue was presented to the Supreme Court in Costco Wholesale Corp. 
v. Omega, S.A., but the Court divided equally on the question, 
resulting in a decision with no precedential value.75 At the time of 
this writing, the Supreme Court has heard another case raising this 
 
from another country, e.g., because the good is not protected in the second country. 
 73. See WEATHERALL, supra note 25, at 5 (explaining that “Australia’s 
Productivity Commission has produced numerous reports in favour of more 
parallel importation of copyright works,” to respond to “a history of experiencing 
higher prices for copyright works than markets such as the US and UK”). For 
discussions of pricing problems in developing countries, see generally Flynn et al., 
Economic Argument for Open Access, supra note 32 (discussing medicines); 
MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, supra note 32 (discussing media 
products); Alberto Cerda, USTR New Exclusive Right for Copyright Holders: 
Importation Provision in the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (July 5, 2011, 10:00 PM), http://keionline.org/ 
node/1176 (discussing parallel trade). 
 74. This is the fact pattern in the Kirtsaeng case before the Supreme Court, 
where a student imported books from Thailand to sell to U.S. students through E-
Bay. See Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Case on Imported Textbooks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 29, 2012, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/business/ 
supreme-court-hears-copyright-case-on-imported-textbooks.html?_r=0. 
 75. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 984–85 (9th Cir. 
2008), aff’d per curiam 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2010) (applying the “first-sale” doctrine 
codified in Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act to prevent diverted sales of 
foreign-made products). 
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interpretive question, but no decision has yet been issued.76 And 
whatever the outcome of that case, Congress would have the last 
word on the subject and could make clear the U.S. rule as it sees fit. 
Thus, this is an area where the U.S. negotiators are proposing 
harmonization of international law to a rule that does not exist in the 
United States—usurping domestic policy-making authority.77  
Even if Congress refuses to change any U.S. statutes in response to 
the signing of the TPP, as is normally the case in FTA-implementing 
legislation,78 it could nevertheless have the practical effect of altering 
U.S. law. Under the so-called Charming Betsy principle, “an act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if 
any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never 
be construed . . . further than is warranted by the law of nations as 
understood in this country.”79 Trade agreements, as part of our binding 
international obligations, can thus be used to interpret open questions 
in the United States. Furthermore, subsequent agreements can be used 
as lobbying tools, bolstering arguments that Congress must act in a 
certain way because its international obligations compel it to do so. 
The best route to maintain the existing flexibility in U.S. law, as 
well as for the economic position of most countries in the TPP, 
would be to insist on safeguarding the multilateral rule that countries 
 
 76. See John Wiley & Sons v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 222 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(holding that the first-sale doctrine does not apply to copies manufactured outside 
of the United States). 
 77. See Letter from Professors Peter Jaszi, Michael Carroll, and Sean Flynn to 
USTR Ron Kirk on Limitations and Exceptions to Copyright in the TPP (Sept. 8, 
2002), http://infojustice.org/archives/27183 [hereinafter Jaszi, Carroll, & Flynn 
Letter] (citing parallel importation as well as proposed provisions prohibiting 
statutory licensing on television retransmission on the Internet as problematic 
examples where the USTR “describes its proposals and past FTA language as 
being ‘consistent with,’ and as ‘coloring within the lines of,’ U.S. law, even when 
its proposals constrain Congressional choices on matters that are currently the 
subject of discussion or concern”). 
 78. See, e.g., United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-41, § 102, 125 Stat. 428 (2011) (noting that no application of the 
provision to discrete facts that are inconsistent with existing U.S. law shall have 
effect). 
 79. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) 
(noting that, not only national legislation, but also the law of nations should be 
considered in determining the legality of the capture of the Charming Betsy). 
  
2012] U.S. PROPOSAL FOR IP CHAPTER FOR TPP 133 
 
remain free to establish their own exhaustion rules. 
C. Hierarchy of Rights 
4.4. In order to ensure that no hierarchy is established between rights of 
authors, on the one hand, and rights of performers and producers of 
phonograms, on the other hand, each Party shall provide that in cases 
where authorization is needed from both the author of a work embodied in 
a phonogram and a performer or producer owning rights in the 
phonogram, the need for the authorization of the author does not cease to 
exist because the authorization of the performer or producer is also 
required. Likewise, each Party shall provide that in cases where 
authorization is needed from both the author of a work embodied in a 
phonogram and a performer or producer owning rights in the phonogram, 
the need for the authorization of the performer or producer does not cease 
to exist because the authorization of the author is also required.80 
The U.S. proposal to eliminate any “hierarchy” among copyright 
holders does not have an analogue in any multilateral agreement. 
Historically, there existed a hierarchy of rights in international 
intellectual property law. The first multilateral copyright treaty, the 
Berne convention, limited its protections to the literary and artistic 
work of authors. Later, the Rome Convention established some 
minimum standards for its members (which did not include the 
United States) on the rights of “related” entities, including 
performers and producers of phonograms. But the levels of 
protection were different from those for authors.81 The reason for all 
the differentiation was a perception in many countries “that works 
protected under related rights do not meet the same requirement of 
personal intellectual creativity as literary and artistic works.”82  
The U.S. hierarchy of rights proposal can be seen as a reflection of 
the growing trend in international law toward the harmonization of 
rights of authors with those of related or neighboring rights holders, 
reflected in the 1996 WPPT83 and the recently signed, but not yet in 
 
 80. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 4.4. 
 81. See Rome Convention, supra note 59, art. 14 (allowing for twenty-year 
terms for related rights). 
 82. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 43, at 199. 
 83. WPPT, supra note 59 (expanding international minimum standards on 
“related” and “neighboring” rights for performers and phonograms to fifty-year 
  
134 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:1 
 
effect, Beijing Treaty on Performers’ Rights in Audiovisual 
Productions.84 The rule that licenses are required of each rights 
holder for a protected use is the background rule in most, if not all, 
copyright legal systems. However, a prohibition of any hierarchy of 
rights, such that independent licensing is always required of each, 
may prohibit some beneficial policies. There a number of problems 
with the U.S. formulation of the three-step test and its inclusion in 
the TPP. A country may desire to speed licensing of some works by 
allowing one group of rights holders (e.g., the author) to license their 
rights while providing for compulsory licensing or other disposition 
of the rights of any remaining rights holders. Such a system could be 
necessary, for example, to allow music authors to participate in 
online auctions for music licensing, such as proposed by Ivan 
Reidel.85 Recognizing some hierarchy of rights with mandatory 
disposition of others may also be necessary to promote public access 
to the so-called “orphan works,” where some rights holders are 
unknown or no longer exist.86  
D. Copyright Term Extensions 
Article 4.5 of the U.S. proposal for TPP would raise the minimum 
requirement for a copyright term from the current multilateral 
standard of 50 years after the author’s death87 to the current U.S. 
 
terms of protection, equal to that of authors). 
 84. See Press Release, WIPO, WIPO Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual 
Performances is Concluded (June 26, 2012), available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
pressroom/en/articles/2012/article_0013.html (reporting on the conclusion of the 
treaty to harmonize the international rights system for audiovisual performers with 
that of other related rights holders). 
 85. See Ivan Reidel, The Taylor Swift Paradox: Superstardom, Excessive 
Advertising and Blanket Licenses, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 731, 805–08 (2011) 
(proposing an auction system in which recording artists could bid the royalties they 
would be willing to sell for radio play, thus allowing smaller artists to compete 
with more heavily resourced competitors on price). 
 86. See generally UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN 
WORKS 15 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-
report-full.pdf (elaborating on the difficulties presented when trying to promote 
access to such “orphan works”). 
 87. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 
7, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 and 
amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention] 
(recognizing the term of protection as the life of the author plus fifty years); WIPO 
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standard of 70 years from death of the author, 95 years from 
publication, or 120 years from the making of unpublished works.88 
Length of copyright terms is an area of law where the U.S. model 
should not be considered an appropriate standard for the rest of the 
world.  
The latest terms in the United States are the result of the 
controversial and much-criticized “Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act” of 1998. As a coalition of law professors reported to 
Congress in opposition to that act at the time, the lengthening of 
copyright terms “impose[s] severe costs . . . without providing any 
public benefit” while supplying “a windfall to the heirs and assignees 
of dead authors” and “depriv[ing] living authors of the ability to 
build on the cultural legacy of the past.89  
 
Copyright Treaty, supra note 71, art. 1(4) (incorporating articles 1 through 21 of 
the Berne Convention); WPPT, supra note 59, art. 17 (indicating the term of 
protection for performers to be fifty years after the performance was first fixed in a 
phonogram). 
 88. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 4.5; see 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (specifying the 
duration of copyright for works created on or after January 1, 1978). Although 
these requirements are generally consistent with the U.S. Copyright Act, it is 
noteworthy that the TPP proposal, like other FTAs, lacks some of the moderating 
principles contained in U.S. law, including presumptions of the death of authors 
and the definition of maximum, instead of minimum, terms. See Jodie Griffin, 
Inconsistencies Between the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and US Law, 
PUB. KNOWLEDGE (2011), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/ 
Jodie's%20analysis.pdf (noting that, although TPP sets the specified terms as the 
minimum level of protection, U.S. law sets the term as a limit, and the TPP 
proposal fails to incorporate the presumption in 17 U.S.C. § 302(e) that after 95 
years from first publication or 120 years after creation, an author’s death is 
presumed). 
 89. Dennis K. Karjala et al., Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property 
Law Professors on the Public Harm from Copyright Extension, OPPOSING 
COPYRIGHT EXTENSION (last visited Oct. 5, 2012), http://homepages.law.asu.edu/ 
~dkarjala/opposingcopyrightextension/commentary/opedltr.html; see also J.H. 
Reichman, The Duration of Copyright and the Limits of Cultural Policy, 14 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625, 640 (1996) (decrying the alignment of terms of 
protection by noting that it might lead to unexpected results); Douglas Gomery, 
Research Report: The Economics of Term Extension for Motion Pictures, 
OPPOSING COPYRIGHT EXTENSION (Nov. 26, 1993), http://www.public.asu.edu/ 
~dkarjala/commentary/gomery.html (suggesting that extending copyright 
protection for works for hire will not lead to greater distribution of works); Marci 
A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655, 657 (1996) (noting the lack of evidence on how 
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The disproportionate costs associated with lengthening copyright 
terms in the other TPP member states are likely to be even higher 
than in the United States. Either because of the small size of their 
markets or high levels of poverty or income inequality in their 
consumer base, the non-U.S. members to TPP likely face higher 
barriers to accessing copyrighted works and are therefore more 
dependent on the public domain for accessing information and 
knowledge. 
The negative impacts of the proposed copyright term extension are 
compounded by the U.S. proposal in Article 4.6 that they be applied 
back to existing works.90 As described above, the local economic 
benefit from lengthened copyright terms is minimal when applied to 
future works. With respect to existing works—works already created 
under the then-applicable system—the economic benefit from longer 
terms is literally zero. You cannot incentivize the creation of a work 
that already exists.91 And thus copyright term extensions for existing 
 
exactly copyright protection furthers public welfare); Dennis S. Karjala, The Term 
of Copyright, in Growing Pains: Adapting Copyright for Libraries, Education, and 
Society (Laura N. Gasaway ed., 1997), available at http://www.public.asu.edu/ 
~dkarjala/commentary/term-of-protection.html; Cecil C. Kuhne, III, The Steadily 
Shrinking Public Domain: Inefficiencies of Existing Copyright Law in the Modern 
Technology Age, 50 LOY. L. REV. 549, 560 (2004) (contending that present 
copyright law inhibits the protection of works that do not have great value); 
EDWARD RAPPAPORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R98-144E, COPYRIGHT TERM 
EXTENSION: ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC VALUES 4 (May 11, 1998) (noting that 
adding twenty years to the current term of protection would be miniscule compared 
to the current incentive); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study 
of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 
281, 324 (1970) (opposing what became the 1976 extensions). 
 90. See TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 4.6 (“Each Party shall apply Article 18 of 
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971) 
(Berne Convention) and Article 14.6 of the TRIPS Agreement, mutatis mutandis, 
to the subject matter, rights, and obligations in this Article and Articles [5] and 
[6].”); see also Berne Convention, supra note 87, art. 18 (“Convention shall apply 
to all works which, at the moment of its coming into force, have not yet fallen into 
the public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the term of 
protection.”). 
 91. See Dennis S. Karjala et al., Statement of Copyright and Intellectual 
Property Law Professors in Opposition to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505 “The 
Copyright Term Extension Act,” OPPOSING COPYRIGHT EXTENSION 3–4 (Jan. 28, 
1998), available at http://www.public.asu.edu/~dkarjala/legmats/1998 
Statement.html (“Except in special cases, the economically efficient term of 
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works only give a windfall to existing proprietors, with no 
correlative benefit to the public at large. 
E. Limitations and Exceptions and the Promotion of “Balance” 
1. With respect to this Article (Article 4 on copyright) and Article 5 and 6 
(which deal with copyright and related rights section and the related rights 
section)], each Party shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive 
rights to certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work, performance, or phonogram, and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder. 
2. Subject to and consistent with paragraph (1), each Party shall seek to 
achieve an appropriate balance in providing limitations or exceptions, 
including those for the digital environment, giving due consideration to 
legitimate purposes such as, but no [sic] limited to, criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching, scholarship and research. 
For purposes of greater clarity, a use that has commercial aspects may in 
appropriate circumstances be considered to have a legitimate purpose 
under paragraph 2.92 
The U.S. proposal for a limitations and exceptions article in the 
TPP has two parts. The first part applies a controversial version of a 
“three-step test” to “confine” domestic flexibility in crafting 
limitations and exceptions.93 The second part requires countries to 
“seek to achieve balance” in copyright systems, which is being 
offered for the first time by the United States in any trade 
agreement.94  
The “three-step test” arises from the clause in Article 9.2 of the 
Berne Convention, added in 1967, which was meant to enable 
limitations and exceptions to the right of reproduction. That clause 
states:  
“It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to 
 
intellectual property protection for works already in existence is zero, because by 
definition intellectual property is not depleted by use”). 
 92. Leak of TPP Text on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, KNOWLEDGE 
ECOLOGY INT’L (Aug. 3, 2012), http://keionline.org/node/1516. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided 
that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the author.”95  
Although the article has long been interpreted to include both a 
confining and enabling component, there was little real potential to 
use the test to restrict limitations and exceptions as a practical matter 
prior to the TRIPS Agreement; the Berne Convention was for all 
intents and purposes unenforceable.96 The inclusion of Berne 
Convention mandates in TRIPS, including a separate rephrasing of 
the three-step test,97 was a key element of a U.S. agenda to exert 
stronger disciplines on the ability of countries to craft broad 
limitations and exceptions to copyrights.98  
In later iterations of the three-step test in the WPPT and WCT, the 
three-step test was crafted with separate enabling and confining 
clauses. Article 10(1) of the WCT, for example, provides that:  
Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, provide for 
limitations of or exceptions to the rights granted to authors of literary and 
artistic works under this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the author.99  
Article 10(2) introduces the confining formulation:  
Contracting Parties shall, when applying the Berne Convention, confine 
any limitations of or exceptions to rights provided for therein to certain 
 
 95. See P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT 
16–17 (2008), available at http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/hugenholtz/ 
finalreport2008.pdf (discussing history and expansion to other instruments). 
 96. See Samuelson, supra note 50, at 404 (describing the GATT prohibition on 
retaliation with tariffs or other trade measures for violation of the Berne 
Convention prior to TRIPS and the use of TRIPS to add “teeth” to the Berne 
Convention mandates). 
 97. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 13 (“Members shall confine 
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the right holder.”). 
 98. Samuelson, supra note 50, at 398–409. 
 99. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 71, art. 10(1). 
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special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work 
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author.100  
In the U.S. FTA model, reflected in the TPP, there is only the 
confining language.101  
There are a number of problems with the U.S. formulation of the 
three-step test and its inclusion in the TPP. First, unlike in the Berne 
Convention, but similar to Article 13 of TRIPS, the clause in the TPP 
proposal applies to all limitations and exceptions to rights, including 
categories of limitations and exceptions, such as the quotation right, 
that the Berne three-step convention exempts from its coverage.102 
This raises the question of whether the clause is meant to further 
restrict domestic flexibility to implement other exceptions that are 
permitted or required under the Berne Convention. The United States 
claims no such intent.103 But it has conspicuously omitted the 
language of the agreed statement to the WCT that would make that 
more clear.104  
 
 100. Id., art. 10(2). 
 101. See, e.g., Chile FTA, supra note 66, art. 17.5. 
 102. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 87, art. 10: 
(1) It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been 
lawfully made available to the public, provided that their making is compatible with 
fair practice, and their extent does not exceed that justified by the purpose, including 
quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries. 
(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union, and for special 
agreements existing or to be concluded between them, to permit the utilization, to the 
extent justified by the purpose, of literary or artistic works by way of illustration in 
publications, broadcasts or sound or visual recordings for teaching, provided such 
utilization is compatible with fair practice. 
(3) Where use is made of works in accordance with the preceding paragraphs of this 
Article, mention shall be made of the source, and of the name of the author, if it 
appears thereon. 
See also Love, Leak of TPP Text on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, supra 
note 25 (“Articles: 2(4,7), 2.bis, 10, 11, 11.bis(2-3), 13(1-2) and the Appendix are 
not subject to the 3-step test, and neither are the first sale doctrine (Article 6 of the 
TRIPS) or the control of anticompetitive practices in contracts (Article 40 of the 
TRIPS). Article 15(1) of the Rome Convention is also not subject to the three step 
test. Will the secret TPPA text change this?”). 
 103. See Jaszi, Carroll, & Flynn Letter, supra note 77 (reporting from meetings with 
government officials that the United States does not intend to restrict further the so-called 
“small exceptions” under the Berne Convention that are not subject to the three-step test). 
 104. See Agreed Statement to Article 10 of WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 
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Second, there is the important issue of interpretation of the clause. 
How are interpreters of the agreement to construe the conscious 
decision to include only the most restrictive, “shall confine,” version 
of the three-step test, and not the more permissive enabling versions 
of that same test that appear in the post-TRIPS WIPO Internet 
Treaties? This issue may be particularly important in interpreting 
whether the clause is meant to include the clarifications of the three-
step test in the agreed statements to Internet Treaties, especially 
those that permit parties to “carry forward” limitations and 
exceptions into the digital environment, and “devise new exceptions 
and limitations that are appropriate in the digital network 
environment.”105 Some of these problems could be lessened by 
including the Agreed Statement on Article 10 of the WCT in the TPP 
text, as was included in the U.S.-Chile FTA.106 
Finally, there are problems with the three-step test as it has been 
interpreted by WTO panels. Recent WTO panels have required that 
the three-step test be applied in a “cumulative” fashion—such that 
the general balance of interests in the third “step” of the clause can 
only be considered after an analysis of whether the policy passes the 
first two “steps.”107 Following from this formulaic and much 
criticized interpretation,108 some have raised questions as to whether 
 
60 (“It is also understood that Article 10(2) neither reduces nor extends the scope 
of applicability of the limitations and exceptions permitted by the Berne 
Convention.”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Chile FTA, supra note 66, art. 17.7(3) n.17. 
 107. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright 
Act, ¶ 6.74, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000). 
 108. For academic criticism of the WTO’s approach, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie 
& Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property 
Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 95, 99−100 (2004) (contending that 
WTO’s “discrete approach to adjudication . . . can produce perverse 
consequences”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike 
Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 22 (2004) (noting the problems arising from the 
“three-part” test bifurcated system, which “permits members to expand intellectual 
property rights, but makes them subject to challenge before the WTO when they 
reduce any of the incidents of protection”); Christophe Geiger, Exploring the 
Flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement’s Provisions on Limitations and Exceptions, 
in THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 
296–97 (Annette Kur & Vytautas Mizaras eds., 2011) (predicting dangerous 
repercussions based upon how the WTO Panel interpreted the three-step test); 
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the first step of the test—requiring that limitations and exceptions be 
limited to “certain special cases”—prohibits countries from adopting 
limitations and exceptions that, like U.S. fair use rights, turn on more 
abstract and flexible balancing criteria applied.109 The clause could 
 
Daniel Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse 
Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 27−29 (2004) (proposing a 
reversal of the “three-part” test, arguing that what the test does not allow is “what 
in fact copyright intended to protect”); Annette Kur, Of Oceans, Islands, and 
Inland Water – How Much Room for Exceptions and Limitations Under the Three-
Step Test?, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 287, 311 (2009) (critiquing the length but 
lack of substance in the panel reports that have addressed the three-step test); Ruth 
Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and the Sources of (International) Copyright 
Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 585 (2001); MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, 
LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE STEP TEST 110 (P. Bernt Hugenholz ed., 2004) 
(downplaying the significance of the WTO’s interpretation of the three-step tests 
as merely a supplemental means of interpretation); see also SOUTH CENTRE, THE 
TRIPS AGREEMENT: A GUIDE FOR THE SOUTH: THE URUGUAY ROUND 
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1997), 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=87& 
Itemid=67. 
 109. See WIPO, Comm. on Copyright & Related Rights, WIPO Study on 
Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital 
Environment, 9th sess., June 23–27, 2003, WIPO Doc. SCCR/9/7 (Apr. 5, 2003) 
(concluding that “it is unlikely that the indeterminate ‘other purposes’ that are 
covered by Section 107 meet the requirements of the first step of the three-step 
test, although it is always possible that, in any given case, they will find support 
under other provisions of Berne, such as Articles 10 and 10bis”); William Patry, 
Fair Use, the Three-Step Test, and the Counter-Reformation, PATRY COPYRIGHT 
BLOG (Apr. 2, 2008, 2:44 PM), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2008/04/fair-use-
three-step-test-and-european.html (responding to a “counter-reformation 
movement . . . presently at the stage of a whispering campaign, in which ministries 
in countries are told that fair use (and by extension possible liberal fair dealing 
provisions) violate the ‘three-step’ test”); Martin Senftleben, Overprotection and 
Protection Overlaps in Intellectual Property Law – The Need for Horizontal Fair 
Use Defences, in THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE 
SIZE FIT ALL?, supra note 108, at 133−45 (discussing certain special cases and 
rejecting the quantitative concept of the WTO). The lack of such flexibility is a 
problem in many countries with “closed-list” systems with specifically 
enumerated, and often very narrow, limitations. Many such closed lists lack 
exceptions clearly applicable to the digital age or evolving technology or practices. 
PIJIP and the Institute on Information Law (IVIR) in Amsterdam hosted a recent 
workshop where they reviewed the laws of fourteen countries from around the 
world and found that nearly every one of them, in the opinion of copyright scholars 
from their countries, lacked exceptions that comfortably addressed important 
modern digital activities, such as the making available of digital copies of library 
collections and creation and dissemination of user-generated content that 
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be helpful in combating the formalistic “cumulative” interpretation 
of the three-step test by WTO panels if it adopted language following 
the Max Planck Institute’s recommendation that the factors in the test 
“are to be considered together and as a whole in a comprehensive 
overall assessment.”110  
The second part of the U.S. proposal—encouraging “balance” in 
copyright systems—is new to the U.S. FTA template.111 This 
“balance” proposal can be seen as a first response to the growing 
chorus of calls for increased attention to the need for international 
harmonization of mandatory minimum limitations and exceptions to 
intellectual property rights. The Washington Declaration on 
Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, for example, described 
limitations and exceptions as vital components of intellectual 
property doctrine, often serving the same innovation and creativity-
enhancing purposes as intellectual property protection itself: 
Limitations and exceptions are positive enabling doctrines that function to 
ensure that intellectual property law fulfills its ultimate purpose of 
promoting essential aspects of the public interest. By limiting the private 
right, limitations and exceptions enable the public to engage in a wide 
range of socially beneficial uses of information otherwise covered by 
intellectual property rights — which in turn contribute directly to new 
innovation and economic development. Limitations and exceptions are 
woven into the fabric of intellectual property law not only as specific 
exceptional doctrines (“fair use” or “fair dealing,” “specific exemptions,” 
etc.), but also as structural restrictions on the scope of rights, such as 
 
transforms copyrighted work into a new independent work not competing with the 
copyright holder. See Washington Declaration, supra note 22, at 3 (calling for 
“discussion of employing ‘open-ended’ limitations in national copyright 
legislation, in addition to specific exceptions”). 
 110. The Max Plank Institute, DECLARATION: A BALANCED INTERPRETATION OF 
THE “THREE-STEP TEST” IN COPYRIGHT LAW 4, http://www.ip.mpg.de/files/pdf2/ 
declaration_three_step_test_final_english1.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). 
 111. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR 
Introduces New Copyright Exceptions and Limitations Provision at San Diego TPP 
Talks (July 3, 2012), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-is/press-office/ 
blog/2012/july/ustr-introduces-new-copyright-exceptions-limitations-provision 
(announcing that USTR was proposing, for “the first time in any U.S. trade 
agreement,” a provision “that will obligate Parties to seek to achieve an 
appropriate balance in their copyright systems”). 
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provisions for compulsory licensing of patents for needed medicines.112 
To counter the growing trend of using international trade and other 
agreements to enact highly specific and enforceable proprietor rights 
standards, with little positive attention to commensurate limitations 
and exceptions, the Washington Declaration voiced broader calls in 
the academic and advocacy communities for “efforts to defend and 
expand as appropriate the operation of limitations and exceptions in 
the years to come,” including through “the development of binding 
international agreements providing for mandatory minimum 
limitations and exceptions.”113 
As a first step toward accepting the calls for more attention to 
mandatory limitations and exceptions in international intellectual 
property law, the U.S. proposal may have a number of positive 
impacts. It may help such interest communities advocate for 
appropriate limitations and exceptions as a necessary part of FTA 
implementation legislation. A similar clause may have been helpful 
in Colombia, for example, where a highly unbalanced 
implementation of the U.S.-Colombia FTA has led to a constitutional 
 
 112. Washington Declaration, supra note 22, at 3. 
 113. Id. For other calls for mandatory minimum limitations and exceptions, see 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Remarks: ‘One Size Fits All’: Consolidation and 
Difference in Intellectual Property Law, in THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE SIZE FIT ALL? supra note 108, at 13 (“[T]he substantive 
pressures created by minimum standards that are more real and less minimal need 
to be countered by ceilings that constrain in the other direction.”); Senftleben, 
Overprotection and Protection Overlaps in Intellectual Property Law, supra note 
109, at 136–37, 144 (arguing that the increased expansion of proprietor rights has 
created a need for flexible “fair use” rights in copyright and patent law); see also 
Dreyfuss, supra note 108, at 21−22 (2004) (advocating the use of explicit user 
rights); European Copyright Code, http://www.copyrightcode.eu/Wittem_ 
European_copyright_code_21%20april%202010.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) 
(including a draft code of mandatory minimum limitations and exceptions for 
Europe); HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 95, at 3 (positing that limitations 
and exceptions are needed to “open up rapid advances in information and 
communication technologies that are fundamentally transforming the processes of 
production, dissemination and storage of information”); COMPUTER & COMMC’NS 
INDUS. ASS’N., INTERNET INDUSTRY PROPOSALS FOR TPP, http://infojustice.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2012/03/CCIA-positive-proposal.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 
2012) (proposing exceptions to copyright that would facilitate the “smooth 
functioning of the Internet”). 
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challenge of the law.114 But the framing of the provision as a 
requirement only to “seek to achieve” balance, rather than actually 
provide such balance, dilutes the positive potential of the clause to 
blunt overly expansive framing of proprietor rights. The P-4 
agreement recognizes a “need to achieve a balance between the 
rights of right holders and the legitimate interests of users and the 
community.”115 Neither balancing statement appears framed as an 
operative requirement that could be used in dispute resolution to 
challenge imbalances too far in the way of overly expansive 
proprietor rights. 
The U.S. proposal may be helpful in countering the trend toward 
restrictive interpretations of the three-step test as applied to flexible 
limitations and exceptions. The U.S. proposal’s encouragement of 
“balance,” and explicit reference to elements of the balance in the 
U.S. fair use doctrine, may provide some evidence that flexible 
limitations and exceptions are not intended to be prohibited by the 
“special cases” prong of the three-step test.  
The U.S. proposal may positively affect ongoing and future 
international negotiations. The provision signals openness of the 
United States to accepting expansions of mandatory limitations and 
exceptions in international intellectual property law—a key focus of 
the development agenda in the World Intellectual Property 
Organization. This shift in policy may aid the negotiations of binding 
treaties on limitations and exceptions for the blind, for libraries, and 
for educational institutions at WIPO, as well as supporting the 
inclusion of mandatory limitations and exceptions in other 
 
 114. See Mary Cecelia Bittner, Lawsuit Filed Against New FTA Copyright Laws, 
COLOMBIA REPORTS (Apr. 27, 2012, 8:19 AM), http://colombiareports.com/ 
colombia-news/news/23732-lawsuit-filed-against-new-fta-copyright-laws.html 
(discussing the constitutional challenge to Colombia’s law implementing the FTA, 
noting the bill’s stringent penalties and extended copyright protection); Letter from 
Peter Jaszi et al., Program on Info. Justice & Intell. Prop., to Presidents of the 
Senate & House of Representatives, Republic of Colombia (Apr. 9, 2012), 
available at http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Colombia-Sign-On-
Letter-with-Signatures-April-2012.pdf (criticizing Colombia for failing to “fully 
take into account the importance of balance in a healthy copyright system” in its 
implementation of the FTA). 
 115. P-4, supra note 18, art. 10.2(2). 
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instruments.116  
F. Technological Protection Measures 
4.9. In order to provide adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures 
that authors, performers and producers of phonograms use in connection 
with the exercise of their rights and that restrict unauthorized acts in 
respect of their works, performances, and phonograms, each Party shall 
provide that any person who: 
(i) circumvents without authority any effective technological measure 
that controls access to a protected work, performance, phonogram, or 
other subject matter; or 
(ii) manufactures, imports, distributes, offers to the public, provides, 
or otherwise traffics in devices, products, or components, or offers to 
the public or provides services, that: 
(A) are promoted, advertised, or marketed by that person, or by 
another person acting in concert with that person and with that 
person’s knowledge, for the purpose of circumvention of any 
effective technological measure, 
(B) have only a limited commercially significant purpose or use 
other than to circumvent any effective technological measure, or 
(C) are primarily designed, produced, or performed for the 
purpose of enabling or facilitating the circumvention of any 
effective technological measure, 
shall be liable and subject to [criminal] remedies  
. . .  
(c) Each Party shall provide that a violation of a measure implementing 
this paragraph is a separate cause of action, independent of any 
infringement that might occur under the Party’s law on copyright and 
 
 116. See Manon Res, Positive Agenda on Copyright, at the WIPO SCCR, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Aug. 27, 2011), http://keionline.org/node/1204 
(speculating that the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights 
(SCCR) may tackle the limitation and exceptions field of copyright and suggest 
new best practices). 
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related rights. 
(d) Each Party shall confine exceptions and limitations to measures 
implementing subparagraph (a) to the following activities,117  
. . .  
(viii) noninfringing uses of a work, performance, or phonogram in a 
particular class of works, performances, or phonograms when an actual 
or likely adverse impact on those noninfringing uses is demonstrated in 
a legislative or administrative proceeding by substantial evidence; 
provided that any limitation or exception adopted in reliance upon this 
clause shall have effect for a renewable period of not more than three 
years from the date of conclusion of such proceeding.118 
The United States proposes that all TPP countries adopt nearly 
identical language on the circumvention of technological protection 
measures (“TPMs,” or “digital locks”), as are found in the U.S. Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). As such, the clause represents 
a kind of double move in policy laundering through international 
agreements—through an international agreement to the U.S. Congress, 
and now back again into new international agreements.  
The issue arises from the desires of the movie industry, first, and 
later the music and other industries, to be able to use encryption and 
other technologies to prevent the copying of digital media and other 
content. Because what can be encrypted can also be unencrypted, the 
industries pressed for new criminal law remedies against those who 
circumvent encryption technologies or who sell devices and software 
that enable such circumvention.119 Industries first took the issue to the 
 
 117. The provision lists specific activities in sections (i) through (vii), including 
reverse-engineering activities of a computer program “for the sole purpose of 
achieving interoperability”; activities by a researcher on flaws and vulnerabilities 
of technologies for scrambling and descrambling; preventing access of minors to 
inappropriate online content; testing, investigating, or correcting the security of 
that computer, computer system, or computer network; disabling a capability to 
carry out undisclosed collection or dissemination of personally identifying 
information; law enforcement, intelligence, essential security, and the like; and 
nonprofit library, archive, or educational institution for the sole purpose of making 
acquisition decisions. 
 118. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 4.9. 
 119. See Samuelson, supra note 50, at 410; see also Nicholas E. Sciorra, Self-
  
2012] U.S. PROPOSAL FOR IP CHAPTER FOR TPP 147 
 
U.S. Congress, which was unresponsive to early calls for new anti-
circumvention remedies. U.S. international negotiators nevertheless 
proposed such remedies in WIPO negotiations as an international 
standard that would bind the United States. Reflecting much of a 
proposal offered by U.S. negotiators, the Chairman’s draft of the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty included a provision requiring that parties:  
shall make unlawful the importation, manufacture or distribution of 
protection-defeating devices, or the offer or performance of any service 
having the same effect, by any person knowing or having reasonable 
grounds to know that the device or service will be used for, or in the 
course of, the exercise of rights provided under this Treaty that is not 
authorized by the right holder or the law.120  
The draft differed from the U.S. proposal in including a 
“knowing” requirement—preventing strict liability as the U.S. 
proposed—and adding an express exception for circumvention 
authorized “by law,” rather than only by the rights holder.121 One key 
objective of the WIPO draft was to ensure that countries would be 
free to implement the mandate in ways that would avoid impeding 
“lawful practices and the lawful use of subject matter that is in the 
public domain.”122 The final language, adopted in the WCT, was 
even more flexible, requiring only that members provide:  
“adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the 
circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by 
authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or 
the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, 
which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by 
law.”123  
The WCT thus requires remedies for circumvention of digital 
locks only “in connection with the exercise of [authors’] rights,” and 
only to prevent acts not “permitted by law.” A country can 
implement this obligation with an exception for the circumvention of 
 
Help and Contributory Infringement: The Law and Legal Thought Behind a Little 
“Black Box,” 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 905 (1993). 
 120. Samuelson, supra note 50, at 412. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 413. 
 123. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 71, art. 11. 
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locks for any purpose protected by limitations and exceptions to 
copyright. The WCT also does not require that the remedies provided 
be through criminal law.124 
The U.S. proposal for the TPP imposes disciplines on domestic 
policy far in excess of those required by the WCT, and also in excess 
of the effort by ACTA to escalate the WCT standard. ACTA, like the 
original WCT proposal, would have required remedies only for a 
circumvention that occurs “knowingly or [with] reasonable grounds 
to know” that the action is illegal.125 ACTA would broadly permit 
parties to “adopt or maintain appropriate limitations or exceptions” 
to anti-circumvention liability, and was made “without prejudice to 
the rights, limitations, exceptions, or defences to copyright or related 
rights infringement under a Party’s law.”126 None of these protections 
are replicated in the TPP proposal. Nor does the TPP include the 
proviso in ACTA that the minimum standards apply only to anti-
circumvention measures “to the extent provided by its law.”   
The U.S. proposal is not a pure reflection of U.S. law. For 
example, the proposal does not include the principle in U.S. judicial 
interpretations that there must be “a reasonable relationship between 
the circumvention at issue and a use relating to a property right for 
which the Copyright Act permits the copyright owner to withhold 
authorization.”127 The TPP proposal is drafted to “confine” statutory 
 
 124. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 43 (explaining that “adequate legal 
protection” under WCT Article 11 “is to be determined by national legislation, 
according to national preferences” and therefore it is up to each country “to judge 
in which degree encryption technologies are justified, and to which extent cases of 
fair use should prevail”). 
 125. See ACTA, supra note 18, art. 27.6(a)(i) (prohibiting “the unauthorized 
circumvention of an effective technological measure carried out knowingly or with 
reasonable grounds to know”). 
 126. Id. art. 27.8. The U.S. proposal for a parallel discipline on punishing the 
alteration of rights management information is even more restrictive. The proposed 
TPP Article 4.10 provides for only one exception—for law enforcement 
purposes—to a requirement to criminalize the alteration of rights management 
information. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 4.10(a)–(b). ACTA, on the other hand, 
allows the protection of rights management information to be subject to the full 
scope of limitations and exceptions recognized under the parties’ copyright laws. 
ACTA, supra note 18, art. 27.8. 
 127. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). But see MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 
  
2012] U.S. PROPOSAL FOR IP CHAPTER FOR TPP 149 
 
limitations and exceptions to a specific list of examples, with others 
permitted to be added only on a temporary basis through a regulatory 
process.128 Although the listed statutory exceptions are those from the 
DMCA, there is nothing in present U.S. law that would prohibit 
Congress from adopting new permanent statutory limitations and 
exceptions. The regulatory process described for recognizing new 
temporary limitations and exceptions is also more restrictive than in 
U.S. law. TPP Article 4.9(d)(viii), for example, requires that there be 
“substantial evidence” of an adverse effect on a protected activity to 
recognize an exception,129 whereas no such evidentiary threshold 
exists in current U.S. law.130  
The U.S. proposal implicates numerous public interest concerns.131 
The lack of a knowledge requirement would allow consumers to be 
held criminally liable for circumventing a TPM if they had no 
knowledge they were doing so, for example, when playing a 
regionally coded DVD on a multi-region player.132 The ban on the 
making and selling of circumvention tools could make it practically 
impossible for users to circumvent a TPM, even when they have 
every right to.133 The recognition of a separate cause of action for 
 
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that finding of circumvention under the DMCA does not 
require a nexus between circumvention and actual copyright infringement).  See 
generally EFF Analysis of the TPM Provisions in the U.S. February 2011 
Proposal for the TPP Intellectual Property Chapter, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode//EFF%20TPP%20TPM%20Analysi
s.pdf [hereinafter EFF Analysis] (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). 
 128. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 4.9(d). 
 129. See id. art. 4.9(d)(viii) (permitting exceptions for “noninfringing uses of a 
work, performance, or phonogram in a particular class of works, performances, or 
phonograms when an actual or likely adverse impact on those noninfringing uses is 
demonstrated in a legislative or administrative proceeding by substantial evidence; 
provided that any limitation or exception adopted in reliance upon this clause shall 
have effect for a renewable period of not more than three years from the date of 
conclusion of such proceeding”). 
 130. See Griffin, supra note 88, at 4–5 (noting that the U.S. Library of Congress 
grants exemptions where there is “sufficient evidence” of a substantial adverse 
effect on non-infringing uses, but that “how much evidence is sufficient will vary” 
and “is never the only consideration in the rulemaking process”). 
 131. See generally EFF Analysis, supra note 127 (summarizing experiences 
under the U.S. DMCA). 
 132. Id. at 9. 
 133. See id. at 9–14 (noting that the U.S. DMCA provides certain exemptions 
that the TPM includes, such as permitting the use of copyrighted material for 
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circumvention liability would restrict the range of materials in the 
public domain, permitting publishers to cut off access to material to 
which they have no right under copyright to exclude others from.134 
And the extension of protection to objects that contain a copyrighted 
element, rather than for circumvention that itself commits copyright 
infringement, permits the standard to be used to limit the creation of 
interoperable consumer electronics—an anticompetitive effect not 
intended by copyright laws.135  
III. PATENTS AND DATA PROTECTION 
Some of the most controversial issues in the TPP intellectual 
property proposal are located in its patents and data protection 
provisions. This issue holds so much resonance in the international 
community that it led to the first and only TRIPS Council 
Declaration—The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health—
and the first proposed amendment to the WTO Agreement.136 
During the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement, concerns about the 
potential impact of harmonized minimum standards on patents on 
access to medicines were a primary issue for many countries. As a 
 
educational purposes and proposing that legislators and regulators set a burden-of-
proof requirement for those seeking exemptions). 
 134. See id. at 11–15 (providing that these issues could be easily addressed by 
changing the scope of the provision to include language that is inclusive of 
circumvention and infringement). 
 135. See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (action to prevent competitors from making interoperable garage 
openers); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 
943 (E.D. Ky. 2003), vacated and remanded on other grounds 387 F.3d 522 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (use of anti-circumvention prohibitions to gain exclusive rights to 
printer cartridges); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, 
421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (action to protect computer maintenance software 
program); TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. SOL Wireless Grp., Inc., No. 05-23279-CIV-
Altonaga/Turnoff (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/posthearing/granick-e.pdf (action to prevent 
the provision of cell phone unlocking). 
 136. See General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Corr. 1 
(Sept. 1, 2003) (providing means for developing countries to import generic 
medicines); World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001) (acknowledging the 
prevalence of public health epidemics that disproportionately affect developing 
countries, such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria). 
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result, the agreement was carefully crafted with numerous 
“flexibilities” that could be used in implementation to avoid an 
iron-clad one-size-fits-all patent policy for every WTO member.137 
These include both the flexibility to domestically define and 
implement undefined terms, such as the criteria for “novelty” and 
“inventive step” needed to obtain a patent, as well as the 
enablement of specific limitations and exceptions to patent rights, 
such as the freedom to grant compulsory licenses.138 
USTR’s initial post-TRIPS efforts to use the Special 301 program 
and bilateral free trade agreements to escalate patent and other 
pharmaceutical-related standards in developing countries generated 
opposition within the United States,139 as well as from international 
 
 137. For objections to the idea that a “One-Size-Fits-All” standard is appropriate 
for all countries of the world, see Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and 
Development Policy, COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, 155 (2002), 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf; Mattias 
Ganslandt et al., Developing and Distributing Essential Medicines to Poor 
Countries: The DEFEND Proposal, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 207, 215 (Carsten 
Fink & Keith Maskus eds., 2005); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Intellectual-Property Rights 
and Wrongs, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Aug. 5, 2005), http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz61/English. 
 138. See generally Flynn, Special 301, supra note 46 (identifying a fuller 
catalogue of existing flexibilities); Sisule Musungu & Cecilia Oh, The Use of 
Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries: Can They Promote Access to 
Medicines?, CIPIH STUDIES (Aug. 2005), http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/ 
studies/TRIPS_flexibilities/en/index.html (same). 
 139. See, e.g., S. Res. 241, 110th Cong. (2007) (advocating that the United 
States should reaffirm its commitment to the Doha Declaration and engage in 
“trade policies that promote access to affordable medicines”); see also H.R. Res. 
525, 110th Cong. (2007) (calling on the USTR to “honor” the Doha Declaration’s 
affirmation of the rights “to use ‘to the full’ the flexibilities” in TRIPS and “not 
place countries on the ‘Special 301’ Priority Watch List . . . for exercising the 
flexibilities on public health provided for in the TRIPS Agreement”); MINORITY 
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 109TH CONG., REP. ON TRADE 
AGREEMENTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICATIONS UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, 
at ii (2005) [hereinafter H. REP. ON TRADE AGREEMENTS] (prepared at the request 
of Rep. Henry Waxman) (asserting that TRIPS-plus provisions on pharmaceuticals 
are “[c]ontrary to the principles of the Doha Declaration,” because they “will 
significantly impede the ability of developing countries to obtain access to 
inexpensive, lifesaving medications”). For a discussion of civil society 
mobilizations around the issue of promoting and protecting access to affordable 
medicine in developing countries, see generally ELLEN F.M. ‘T HOEN, THE 
GLOBAL POLITICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY POWER (2009); Susan K. Sell, 
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agencies and organizations.140 The opposition led to notable changes 
in official U.S. policy. An executive order signed by President 
Clinton in 2000, which is still in effect today, bans the USTR and 
other parts of the U.S. government from seeking “through 
negotiation or otherwise, the revocation or revision” of any TRIPS-
compliant intellectual property law or policy of a beneficiary sub-
Saharan African country that promotes “access to HIV/AIDS 
pharmaceuticals or medical technologies.”141 The Kennedy 
Amendment to the 2002 Trade Promotion Authority legislation 
required trade policy to respect the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health.142 In May 2007, a bipartisan group of Congressional 
 
TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 481 (2002). 
 140. See, e.g., Global Commission on HIV and the Law, supra note 34 
(recommending a moratorium on inclusion of any new IP provisions in any 
international treaty that would limit countries’ abilities to retain policy options for 
reducing the costs of AIDS medicines); Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Promotion and Protection of All Human 
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Including the Right 
to Development, ¶¶ 26–27, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/12 (Mar. 31, 2009) (by Anand 
Grover) (recommending how developing and less-developed countries may amend 
their own laws to incorporate TRIPS flexibilities); see also U.N. Secretary-
General, The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Physical and Mental Health: Rep. of the Special Rapporteur, ¶ 64, 
U.N. Doc. A/61/338 (Sept. 13, 2006) (“[N]o rich State should encourage a 
developing country to accept intellectual property standards that do not take into 
account the safeguards and flexibilities included under the TRIPS Agreement. In 
other words, developed States should not encourage a developing country to accept 
‘TRIPS-plus’ standards.”); COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & 
PUB. HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH: INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 145 (2006) (“Bilateral trade agreements should not seek to incorporate 
TRIPS-plus protection in ways that may reduce access to medicines in developing 
countries.”); World Health Org., Globalization, TRIPS and Access to 
Pharmaceuticals, 3 WHO POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON MEDS. 5 (Mar. 2001) 
(“[P]oorer populations in developing countries should not be expected to pay the 
same price as do the wealthy for newer essential drugs. TRIPS-compliant 
mechanisms can be used to lower drug prices.”). See generally UNDP/UNAIDS, 
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH (2012) 
(explaining the constraints and flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement). 
 141. Exec. Order No. 13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521 (May 12, 2000). 
 142. See Trade Promotion Authority and HIV/AIDS, CONSUMER PROJECT ON 
TECH., http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/trade/kennedy.html (last visited Sept. 5, 
2012) (providing the arguments for the Kennedy amendment prior to the adoption 
of the Trade Promotion Agreement). 
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leaders and the Bush Administration negotiated a “New Trade Policy 
for America,” which limited the use of TRIPS-plus measures that 
impact access to medicines in pending agreements with developing 
countries.143 And, following the 2008 election campaign, then-
President-elect Obama pledged to “break the stranglehold that a few 
big drug and insurance companies have on these life-saving drugs” 
and to support “the rights of sovereign nations to access quality-
assured, low-cost generic medication to meet their pressing public 
health needs under the WTO’s Declaration on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).”144 
The U.S. TPP proposal represents a substantial backtrack on these 
concerns, policies, and commitments. It attempts to harmonize 
substantive patent and data protection law in the TPP membership to 
U.S. standards on multiple controversial topics, including broadening 
scope of patentability, lengthening patent terms, imposing data 
exclusivity and patent/registration “linkage” requirements, and 
restraining numerous flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement. These 
provisions would have predictable negative effects on the availability 
of affordable medicines in developing countries—a topic we focus 
on in these comments. But the repercussions will go further. Overly 
broad patent and data protection rights will raise the price of inputs 
into economies across a broad spectrum of industries. Additionally, 
they may “threaten the ability of innovators, especially in developing 
countries, to engage in research and development (R&D) through 
reverse engineering and the creation of functional generic 
equivalents and improvements.”145  
 
 143. See generally A New Trade Policy for America, H. COMM. ON WAYS & 
MEANS, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/NewTradePolicy.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2012). 
 144. The Obama-Biden Plan to Combat Global HIV/AIDS, OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT-ELECT, http://change.gov/pages/the_obama_biden_plan_to_combat_ 
global_hiv_aids/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2012). 
 145. Roffe & Spenneman, supra note 8, at 279–80; see also Integrating 
Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, supra note 137, at 20–26, 
111–36 (discussing impacts of patents on various social and economic policy 
concerns in addition to access to medicines). 
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A. Scope of Patentability  
8.1. Each Party shall make patents available for any invention, whether a 
product or process, in all fields of technology, provided that the invention 
is new, involves an inventive step, and is capable of industrial application. 
In addition, the Parties confirm that: patents shall be available for any new 
forms, uses, or methods of using a known product; and a new form, use, 
or method of using a known product may satisfy the criteria for 
patentability, even if such invention does not result in the enhancement of 
the known efficacy of that product.146 
The U.S. TPP proposal would require the extension of 
patentability standards far beyond the definition of patentability 
contained in TRIPS Article 27.1. Although the U.S. proposal is 
inconsistent with the laws of other TPP negotiating countries,147 its 
prime target—India—is not part of the TPP negotiation.148 The TPP 
proposal is clearly drafted to counter the policy embodied in the 
2005 Amended India Patents Act Section 3(d),149 which prohibits the 
 
 146. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 8.1 (footnote omitted). 
 147. The proposal would be contrary to the laws of Australia, Malaysia, and 
Vietnam. BURCU KILIÇ & PETER MAYBARDUK, PUB. CITIZEN, DANGERS FOR 
ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROPOSAL AND 
AUSTRALIAN LAW 4 (2011) [hereinafter KILIÇ & MAYBARDUK, AUSTRALIAN LAW 
COMPARISON], available at http://www.citizen.org/Australia-TPPA-
Chart#!prettyPhoto (noting that Australia’s patent act precludes patentability of a 
new use of a known substance that takes advantage of a known property); BURCU 
KILIÇ & PETER MAYBARDUK, PUB. CITIZEN, DANGERS FOR ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 
U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROPOSAL AND MALAYSIAN LAW (2011), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Malaysia-chart.pdf [hereinafter KILIÇ & 
MAYBARDUK, MALAYSIAN LAW COMPARISON] (noting that the current practice in 
Malaysia is to provide patent protection to first and second/subsequent uses of 
known products); VIETNAM AND THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: 
ACCESS TO MEDICINES RISKS FOR A PEPFAR PARTNER, PUB. CITIZEN (2011), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Vietnam-and-the-Trans-Pacific-Partnership-
Agreement.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN TPP VIETNAM MEMO] (explaining that 
the U.S. proposal would “[lower] Vietnam’s patentability standards and [require] 
patentability of new uses and minor variations of older, known drugs”). 
 148. RISKS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT FOR ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES: ANALYSIS OF THE LEAKED U.S. PAPER ON ELIMINATING PATENT PRE-
GRANT OPPOSITION, PUB. CITIZEN 2 (2011) [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF U.S. PAPER]. 
 149. Compare The Patents (Amendment) Act § 3(d), No. 15 of 2005, INDIA 
CODE (2005) [hereinafter INDIA CODE], available at http://indiacode.nic.in, with 
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granting of patents for “the mere discovery of a new form of a 
known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the 
known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new 
property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a 
known process, machine or apparatus unless such process results in a 
new product or employs at least one new reactant.”150  
During the TRIPS negotiation, India was one of the leaders of a 
developing country coalition that actively resisted TRIPS, especially 
its requirement in Article 27 to grant patents on pharmaceutical 
products. When the initiation of negotiations over what was to 
become the TRIPS agreement began, there were around fifty 
countries that did not grant patents on pharmaceutical products.151 
Accordingly, Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement, which stated that 
“patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology provided that they are new, 
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application,”152 required major changes in the laws of many countries 
and was one of the most controversial requirements of TRIPS. 
“Particular concerns have been expressed with regard to the 
availability and pricing of medicines after product patents are 
introduced in compliance with TRIPS,” as well as that “strengthened 
exclusive rights will limit the scope for early legitimate imitation by 
local firms.”153  
Article 8.1 would further expand patentability to require countries to 
permit patent applications on modifications or variations of new forms 
of existing chemical entities; new uses or methods of using existing 
 
RONALD KIRK, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2012 SPECIAL 301 
REPORT, 35 (2012) (“The United States continues to encourage India to promote a 
stable and predictable patent system that can nurture domestic innovation, 
including by resolving concerns with respect to the prohibition on patents for 
certain chemical forms absent a showing of increased efficacy.”). 
 150. INDIA CODE, supra note 149, § 3(d). 
 151. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 43, at 353. 
 152. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 27.1. TPP Article 8.1 also goes 
beyond the free trade agreement between the United States and Republic of Korea, 
which altered that TRIPS standard by adding “each Party confirms that patents 
shall be available for any uses or methods of using a known product.” See 
KORUS, supra note 30, art. 18.8.1. 
 153. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 43, at 364. 
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medicines;154 and new formulations, dosages, and combinations.155 
Countries would be required to do so even if there is no enhancement 
of therapeutic efficacy; indeed, efficacy could decrease and still receive 
protection. Each new patent on new forms, uses, or formulations of an 
existing medical product will result in a new twenty-year patent 
running from the date of patent application, thereby “evergreening” 
monopoly rights on the underlying medical product.156 
India’s Section 3(d) was explicitly crafted to take advantage of 
flexibilities in the interpretation of patent scope obligations that TRIPS 
left in place. TRIPS does not require either “use” or “form” patents.157 
India’s law was enacted to reduce evergreening of pharmaceutical 
patents and is widely recognized as a pro–public health and TRIPS-
compliant exception to patentability.158 Indeed, the World Bank has 
 
 154. See, e.g., Graciela Andrei et al., Topical Tenofovir, a Microbicide Effective 
Against HIV, Inhibits Herpes Simplex Virus-2 Replication, 10 CELL HOST & 
MICROBE 379 (2011) (describing the use of HIV drug Topical Tenofovir to treat 
hepatitis for herpes simplex virus-2 prophylaxis). 
 155. See Carlos Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and 
Compulsory Licensing, SOUTH CENTRE RESEARCH PAPER 41 (2011), 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download
&gid=2071&Itemid=182&lang=en. 
 156. See WIPO, PATENT LANDSCAPE REPORT ON RITONAVIR (2011), available 
at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/patents/946/wipo_pub_946.pdf 
(discussing how, since the filing of the original patent application on Ritonavir, 
more than 800 families of evergreening patent applications have been filed, most 
in the United States). Those patent applications filed in 2009 will extend the 
exclusivity period from the original 2000 date to 2029—twenty-nine extra years 
and counting. Note that some of the Ritonavir patents filed are process patents 
rather than product patents. 
 157. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 43, at 356–57 (describing the lack of 
TRIPS obligations on use patents); id. at 360 (describing options for developing 
countries to adopt high standards of inventiveness that would block U.S.-style 
patents on “minor or trivial developments”). 
 158. See Carlos Correa, Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical 
Patents: Developing a Public Health Perspective 6–25 (WHO-ICTSD-UNCTAD, 
Working Paper, 2007), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/ 
Correa_Patentability%20Guidelines.pdf (drawing on Section 3(d) and 
recommending that developing countries adopt comparable strict patentability 
standards, such as treating new formulations, compositions, salt patents, and 
enantiomers as obvious and/or as exceptions to patentability); How the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement Threatens Access to Medicines, DOCTORS 
WITHOUT BORDERS (Sept. 2011), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/ 
2011/MSF-TPP-Issue-Brief.pdf [hereinafter MSF TPP Issue Brief] (discussing the 
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recommended provisions like India’s, which suggests that developing 
countries “set high standards for the inventive step, thereby preventing 
routine discoveries from being patented.”159  
India’s Section 3(d) has been repeatedly challenged by the drug 
company Novartis, both in an unsuccessful constitutional and TRIPS-
based challenge against Section 3(d)160 and in an appeal of a denial of a 
patent on the beta crystalline form of imatinibmesylate, the active 
ingredient in its cancer medicine Glivec.161 The U.S. proposal on new 
forms and new uses is best seen as the latest challenge to India’s law in 
a new forum—here as part of a long-term campaign to implement new 
international standards that will ultimately be globalized to include 
India. But the strong opposition to the standard by countries like India 
suggests that inclusion of it in the final TPP agreement may be a major 
obstacle to TPP’s expansion.  
 
flexibility TRIPS affords governments to determine which innovations warrant 
patent protection, and noting how the U.S. proposal will significantly limit the 
ability of each individual country to exercise its discretion); SUDIP CHAUDHURI ET 
AL., UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, FIVE YEARS INTO THE PRODUCT PATENT 
REGIME: INDIA’S RESPONSE (2010), available at http://apps.who.int/ 
medicinedocs/documents/s17761en/s17761en.pdf. See generally Amy Kapczynski, 
Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in 
India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571 (2009) (examining how 
India’s pharmaceutical industry has utilized TRIPS flexibilities); Janice M. 
Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent 
System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 
(2007) (chronicling and analyzing India’s implementation of pharmaceutical 
patents). 
 159. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 143, (2001), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP/Resources/ 
335315-1257199011315/GEP2001_FullText.pdf. 
 160. See Novartis AG v. Union of India, W.P. No. 24759 of 2006 [2007] 
INTHC 2604 (6 August 2007), available at http://www.liiofindia.org/in/ 
cases/tn/INTNHC/2007/2604.html; see also Linda L. Lee, Trials and TRIPS-
ulations: Indian Patent Law and Novartis AG v. Union of India, 23 BERKELEY 
TECH. L. J. 281, 312 (2008) (examining India’s patent law changes for TRIPS 
compliance, the Novartis litigation, and Section 3(d)). 
 161. See Rachel Marusak Hermann, Novartis Before India’s Supreme Court: 
What’s Really at Stake?, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 3, 2012, 12:05 PM), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/03/02/novartis-before-india’s-supreme-court-
what’s-really-at-stake (examining the possible consequences of Novartis’s 
litigation with regard to India’s public health clause of Section 3(d)). 
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B. Exclusions from Patentability  
8.2. Each Party shall make patents available for inventions for the 
following: 
(a) plants and animals, and 
(b) diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of 
humans or animals.162 
8.3. Each Party may only exclude from patentability inventions, the 
prevention within its territory of the commercial exploitation of which is 
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, 
animal, or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the 
environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the 
exploitation is prohibited by law.163 
Read together, proposed Articles 8.2 and 8.3 limit the discretion of 
domestic policies to provide for exceptions to patentability on one 
ground: where preventing the commercial exploitation of the 
invention “is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including 
to protect human, animal, or plant life or health or to avoid serious 
prejudice to the environment.”164 TPP Article 8.2 specifically 
requires parties to grant patents for plants, animals, and “diagnostic, 
therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or 
animals.”165 The application of patents to these areas, mirrored in 
KORUS Article 18.8.2,166 is expressly contrary to the right to 
exclude patents on such subject matter found in TRIPS Article 
27.3.167 TPP Article 8.2 is also contrary to the actual practice of U.S. 
law, which allows patents on medical procedures but precludes use 
 
 162. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 8.2. 
 163. Id. art. 8.3. 
 164. Id. art. 8.2, 8.3. 
 165. Id. art. 8.2. 
 166. KORUS, supra note 30, art. 18.8.2 (preventing the exclusion of 
“diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical procedures for the treatment of humans or 
animals”). 
 167. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 27.3 (providing that “[m]embers may 
also exclude from patentability: (a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for 
the treatment of humans or animals; (b) plants and animals other than micro-
organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes” (emphasis added)). 
  
2012] U.S. PROPOSAL FOR IP CHAPTER FOR TPP 159 
 
of such patents to seek remedies against medical practitioners.168  
The proposal runs counter to the current law in several TPP 
member countries.169 It is also counter to a much broader trend to 
deem therapeutic, surgical, and diagnostic methods that affect human 
or animal bodies as “not patentable because of non-compliance with 
the industrial applicability requirement provided for in most patent 
laws, even in the absence of a specific exception.”170 TPP Article 8.2 
would prohibit this common-sense application, in effect redefining 
the industrial applicability standard in its member countries.  
The social and economic implications of treatment and related-
method patents could be pronounced. It could, for example, require 
licensing to practice a new treatment procedure domestically, thereby 
raising its local cost and producing scarcity of medical treatments. 
The provision could also be a back-door way to force recognition of 
“use” patents for pharmaceuticals, also proposed by the United States 
to be required in Article 8.1.171  
The public ordre or morality exception, which mirrors TRIPS 
Article 27.2, is an exceptionally narrow one. Although some plant, 
animal, and treatment-method patents required by TPP Article 8.2 
could potentially be excluded on “morality” grounds by virtue of 8.3, 
exclusions under TPP Article 8.3 are subject to an important 
condition: patentability may only be denied if commercial 
exploitation of the invention is prohibited. “This excludes the 
 
 168. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006) (providing that an infringement under this 
section is not enforceable against a practitioner or entity, and defining terms in 
accordance with the exemption). 
 169. See KILIÇ & MAYBARDUK, AUSTRALIAN LAW COMPARISON, supra note 
147, at 4 (noting that the proposed language would eliminate a flexibility 
recognized by Article 17.9.2 of AUSFTA); KILIÇ & MAYBARDUK, MALAYSIAN 
LAW COMPARISON, supra note 147, at 3 (explaining that Section 13(1) of 
Malaysia’s Patents Act of 291 of 1983 “expressly excludes treatment by surgery or 
therapy and diagnostic methods on the living human or animal body from patent 
protection”); PUBLIC CITIZEN TPP VIETNAM MEMO, supra note 147, at 3 (noting 
that the laws in “Vietnam and many other countries exclude diagnostic, therapeutic 
and surgical methods from patentability”). 
 170. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 43, at 384. 
 171. See id. at 387 (“In effect, there is no real difference between patent claims 
relating to the use of a substance and those relating to a therapeutic method: in 
both cases a new medical activity is claimed, i.e., a new way of using one or more 
known products.”) 
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possibility of applying such exceptions when, for instance, it would 
be in the interest of public health to promote the diffusion of an 
invention (e.g., a medicinal product), since a Member cannot refuse a 
patent on ordre public or morality grounds and, at the same time, 
permit the commercialization of the invention.”172 Thus, for example, 
a country could ban patents on animal clones if it also banned the 
sale of animal clones. But it could not use TPP Article 8.3 to justify 
an exclusion of surgical-method patents while allowing the surgical 
method to be practiced, nor could it ban patents on plant varieties or 
seeds while allowing such plants to be sold.  
C. Patent Term Extensions  
8.6. (a) Each Party shall make best efforts to process patent applications 
and marketing approval applications expeditiously with a view to 
avoiding unreasonable or unnecessary delays. 
(b) Each Party, at the request of the patent owner, shall adjust the term of 
a patent to compensate for unreasonable delays that occur in the granting 
of the patent. For purposes of this subparagraph, an unreasonable delay at 
least shall include a delay in the issuance of the patent of more than four 
years from the date of filing of the application in the territory of the Party, 
or two years after a request for examination of the application has been 
made, whichever is later. Periods attributable to actions of the patent 
applicant need not be included in the determination of such delays. 
(c) Each Party, at the request of the patent owner, shall make available an 
adjustment of the patent term of a patent which covers a new 
pharmaceutical product or a patent that covers a method of making or 
using a pharmaceutical product, to compensate that patent owner for 
unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent term as a result of the 
marketing approval process. 
(d) In implementing subparagraph 6(c), a Party may: 
(i) limit the applicability of subparagraph 6(c) to a single patent term 
adjustment for each new pharmaceutical product that is being 
reviewed for marketing approval; 
(ii) require the basis for the adjustment to be the first marketing 
 
 172. Id. at 376. 
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approval granted to the new pharmaceutical product in that Party; and 
(iii) limit the period of the adjustment to no more than 5 years.173 
TPP Article 8.6 would require TPP member states to grant 
extensions of patent terms beyond the TRIPS twenty-year minimum 
patent term to compensate for delays both in patenting and in 
granting marketing approval.174 TRIPS Article 33 requires a patent 
term of twenty years. TRIPS does not require extensions beyond the 
twenty-year life of a patent for delays in granting a patent or 
marketing approval. The twenty-year standard was developed in 
recognition of the known delays encountered through the 
examination process.  
Mandatory patent term extensions have been a highly 
controversial aspect of the post-TRIPS U.S. trade agenda on 
pharmaceutical policy.175 As part of the May 10, 2007, New Trade 
Deal, implemented in the U.S.-Peru FTA, patent term extensions for 
any reason were made optional rather than mandatory.176 The U.S.-
 
 173. TPP IP II, supra note 28, art. 8.6. 
 174. The so-called “Access Window” features of TPP Article 8.6(e) are subject 
to TPP Article 9.2(b) or (d), which are discussed further below. See id., art. 9.2(e) 
(“In implementing subparagraph 6(c), and as a condition for providing the 
adjustment set forth in subparagraph 6(c) for a new pharmaceutical product 
approved consistent with Article 9.2(b) or Article 9.2(d), a Party may require an 
applicant that has submitted an application for marketing approval consistent with 
Article 9.2(b) or Article 9.2(d) to commence the process of obtaining marketing 
approval for that new pharmaceutical product in the Party within [6] years of the 
date of first marketing approval of the same pharmaceutical product in another 
Party.”). The term “access window” was coined in the USTR press release 
describing the general outlines of the proposal to the public. See Press Release, 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Goals to 
Enhance Access to Medicines (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/september/trade-enhancing-access-
medicines. 
 175. See, e.g., H. REP. ON TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 139, at 8–9 (noting 
that the mandatory extensions do not take into account patent extension limitations 
in an individual country’s laws, and thus may ultimately delay access to generic 
drugs). 
 176. See United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Ch. 16, art. 16.9.6, 
U.S.-Peru, June 29, 2007, http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1031; see also 
Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy, USTR (May 2007), http://www.ustr.gov/ 
sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file945_11283.pdf (last 
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Peru FTA allowed both countries to exempt pharmaceutical products 
from patent extension requirements. The U.S. TPP proposal would 
require patent extensions for unreasonable delays in product 
registration or issuance of a patent without the May 10 exemption, 
specifically removing the flexibility that Peru only recently received.  
The TPP proposal also contains changes from previous FTA 
language on the topic. TPP Article 8.6 requires an increase in patent 
terms beyond twenty years to compensate for “unreasonable” delay 
in the granting of a patent, defined as a delay of more than four years 
from the date of filing of the application—the same as KORUS—or 
two years after a request for examination—one year shorter than 
KORUS.177 This requirement is broadly consistent with U.S. law, 
which has a three-year window.178 In addition, TPP Article 8.6 
requires additional term extensions for regulatory delays in 
approving marketing of pharmaceutical products, including for 
patents that merely cover a new method of making or using a 
pharmaceutical product. As in other areas of TPP, although patent 
term extensions are mandatory, the limitation of patent term 
extensions—e.g., to a maximum of five years and no more than one 
extension (both attributes of current U.S. law179)—are permissive.180  
The predictable impact of patent term extensions is to lengthen 
monopolies and, thereby, raise the medicines bill for member 
countries. Moreover, the time pressure of early patent examination 
and early marketing approval might result in over-extended patent 
offices granting invalid patents and in harried drug-regulatory 
 
visited Aug. 5, 2012) (providing that U.S. Congressional leadership will implement 
“a more flexible approach” to patent extensions and include provisions requiring 
trading parties to “make best efforts to process patent and marketing applications 
expeditiously”). 
 177. KORUS, supra note 30, art. 18.8.6(a). 
 178. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(B) (2006) (explaining that, if the USPTO fails to 
issue a patent within three years from the actual U.S. filing date, it must extend the 
patent term one day for each day beyond the three-year period). 
 179. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006) (stating that the period of restoration extends 
from the original expiration date of the patent; however, the total patent term, with 
restoration, following FDA market approval may not exceed fourteen years). 
 180. TPP IP II, supra note 28, art. 8.6(d) (permitting regulatory-delay patent 
term extensions to be limited to a single adjustment for each new pharmaceutical 
product and for the basis of the adjustment to be the first marketing approval 
granted to a new pharmaceutical product). 
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registering of unsafe or inefficacious medicines. This is especially a 
problem as the international volume of pharmaceutical patent 
applications and marketing approval applications grows, thereby 
overwhelming countries, especially developing countries, with weak 
regulatory capacity. 
D. Revocation and Oppositions 
8.7. Each Party shall provide that a patent may be revoked only on 
grounds that would have justified a refusal to grant the patent. A Party 
may also provide that fraud, misrepresentation or inequitable conduct may 
be the basis for revoking a patent or holding a patent unenforceable. 
Where a Party provides proceedings that permit a third party to oppose 
the grant of a patent, a Party shall not make such proceedings available 
before the grant of the patent.181 
TPP Article 8.7 contains restrictions on the grounds for patent 
revocation and on processes for permitting pre-grant opposition of 
patent applications. The U.S. TPP proposal would require a change 
in Australia’s law, which already includes a pre-grant opposition 
system.182 As in other areas of the TPP, the clearest target of the 
proposal may be India. Adopting this proposal would prevent the 
countries of the TPP from adopting the kind of pre-grant opposition 
processes that India has found useful.183  
The U.S. proposal restricting the grounds for revocation represents 
an attempt to overturn a specific issue negotiated and rejected in the 
TRIPS negotiations. During the TRIPS negotiations, “attempts were 
made to limit revocation to cases where a patent had failed to meet 
the criteria for grant but this position did not find sufficient 
 
 181. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 8.7. 
 182. See KILIÇ & MAYBARDUK, AUSTRALIAN LAW COMPARISON, supra note 
147, at 2 (commenting that the TPP proposal would proscribe the “pre-grant 
opposition [process] in Australia [which] improves patent quality with minimal 
interference to well-drafted patent applications”). 
 183. See Peter Drahos, The Jewel in the Crown: India’s Patent Office and 
Patent-based Innovation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM 80, 95 
(Christopher Arup & William van Caenegem eds., 2009) (noting 150 pre-grant 
oppositions filed by Indian generic industry since 2005); Shamnad Basheer, 
India’s Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, 1 INDIA. J. L. & 
TECH. 15, 26 (2005) (describing how one may bring a pre-grant opposition claim 
under India’s 1970 patent act). 
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support.”184 Thus, under TRIPS, members may authorize revocation 
of patents on a wide variety of grounds, including “on grounds of 
public interest.”185 Many countries, for example, authorize the 
revocation of patents for a failure to pay maintenance fees.186 Some 
countries (e.g., Andean Group, Costa Rica) allow for the revocation 
of patents based on a failure to disclose the origin of biological 
materials.187  
There is no restriction on the grounds that may be used to revoke a 
patent under TRIPS. TRIPS Article 32 requires only that countries 
provide “[a]n opportunity for judicial review of any decision to 
revoke or forfeit a patent.” This provision “only establishes a 
procedural requirement (the availability of judicial review), and does 
not stipulate the grounds or other substantive conditions for such acts 
to take place, thereby leaving considerable leeway to Members to 
legislate on the matter.”188 Likewise, under the earlier Paris 
Convention, revocation of a patent may be authorized to remedy any 
“abuse” of the patent, including for insufficient “working” of the 
patent, but only “in cases where the grant of compulsory licences 
would not have been sufficient to prevent the said abuses,” and only 
after “expiration of two years from the grant of the first compulsory 
licence.”189 
TPP Article 8.7 additionally bans the use of pre-grant 
oppositions. Pre-grant oppositions allow opportunities to contest a 
patent as it is filed, providing a potentially important source of 
information to patent examiners and generally improving patent 
quality.190 The United States has justified this restriction (in a 
 
 184. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 43, at 423. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 423 n.773. 
 188. Id. at 414. 
 189. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5(A)(3), as 
last revised at Lisbon, Oct. 31, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
 190. Dietmar Harhoff et al., Citations, Family Size, Opposition and the Value of 
Patent Rights, 32 RESEARCH POLICY 1343, 1358−59 (2003); see also Tahir Amin 
et al., Expert Review of Drug Patent Applications: Improving Health in the 
Developing World, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 948, 951–52 (2009), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/5/w948.full.pdf+html (arguing that pre-
grant opposition systems lead to efficiency gains without causing problems of 
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leaked memorandum) as being in the interest of patent offices.191 
But the proposal, especially when viewed in conjunction with the 
U.S. proposal to require countries to permit unlimited amendments 
to patent applications,192 will be directly counter to the interests of 
most patents offices. The interests of many patent offices will be 
best served by maximizing pre-grant oppositions and minimizing 
opportunities to amend patent claims after they are filed. In such a 
system, companies have incentives to file only their strongest 
claims, leading to a lower volume of weak applications and 
stronger overall patent value.193  
E. Disclosure  
8.10. Each Party shall provide that a disclosure of a claimed invention 
shall be considered to be sufficiently clear and complete if it provides 
information that allows the invention to be made and used by a person 
skilled in the art, without undue experimentation, as of the filing date.194 
8.11. Each Party shall provide that a claimed invention is sufficiently 
supported by its disclosure if the disclosure reasonably conveys to a 
 
abuse of the system or rising costs of delay). 
 191. See Pre-Grant Opposition, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/ 
documents/Leaked-US-TPPA-paper-on-eliminating-pre-grant-opposition.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2012) (“A lengthy or onerous pre-grant patent opposition system 
can place undue burdens on patent applicants and create additional costs to patent 
offices, thereby causing uncertainty and deterring innovators and enterprises that 
would otherwise bring innovative products and services to TPP partners.”). 
 192. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 8.9 (“Each Party shall provide patent 
applicants with at least one opportunity to make amendments, corrections, and 
observations in connection with their applications. Each Party shall permit 
applicants to make amendments to their patent claims prior to receipt of a first 
patent office action or communication on the merits.”). 
 193. See, e.g., Harhoff et al., supra note 190, at 1358 (finding that patents that 
are upheld in opposition procedures are particularly valuable); ANALYSIS OF U.S. 
PAPER, supra note 148; see also K.M. Gopakumar & Sanya R. Smith, IPR 
Provisions in FTAs: Implications for Access to Medicines, in WHO, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES: PAPERS AND PERSPECTIVES 
141, 144 (2010) (criticizing the elimination of pre-grant opposition in U.S. FTAs 
as removing an important tool for “preventing patent applicants from gaining 
patent monopolies based on weak or erroneous information, for improving the 
quality and efficiency of patent office examinations, and for safeguarding access to 
medicines”). 
 194. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 8.10. 
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person skilled in the art that the applicant was in possession of the 
claimed invention as of the filing date.195 
TPP Articles 8.10 and 8.11 reduce flexibility that countries have 
under TRIPS to design domestic patent disclosure standards to 
promote a number of important public interest concerns. For 
example, TPP proposal’s mandate that the disclosure be considered 
“complete” when the disclosure allows the invention to be “made 
and used” appears to ban best mode requirements, explicitly 
authorized in Article 29.1 of TRIPS, that would go beyond this 
threshold to require disclosure of the best mode of making and using 
the invention. A country might also require, for example, that the 
description be sufficient to allow a person skilled in the art to be able 
to apply the technology in the country of the application. Or a 
country might want to condition approval of the application on 
disclosure of use of any traditional knowledge or genetic resources in 
order to facilitate access and benefit sharing.196 Finally, a country 
might require disclosure of the generic name of a pharmaceutical 
product that incorporates the subject matter of the patent application 
to ease patent searches on medicines. All of these valid public 
interest goals in a patent disclosure policy are permitted by TRIPS197 
but could be prohibited under the U.S. proposal.  
F. Industrial Applicability/Utility  
8.12. Each Party shall provide that a claimed invention is industrially 
applicable if it has a specific, substantial, and credible utility.198 
TPP Article 8.12 proposes to adopt a U.S.-centric definition of 
“industrial applicability” on TPP member states. The provision 
 
 195. Id. art. 8.11. 
 196. See generally IUCN/ICTSD, DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS: ENSURING 
MUTUAL SUPPORTIVENESS BETWEEN THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE CBD 
(2005), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Disclosure_req_ 
book.pdf (examining, analyzing, and offering proposals on means to implement 
disclosure requirements that are compliant with international and national 
standards). 
 197. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 29.2 (permitting the requirement 
of “information concerning the applicant’s foreign applications and grants”). 
 198. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 8.12. 
  
2012] U.S. PROPOSAL FOR IP CHAPTER FOR TPP 167 
 
appears to be designed to foreclose stricter standards in some 
jurisdictions that require a showing that the invention will result in 
an actual industrial product.199 By ridding patentability standards 
from the link to industrial activity, the standard opens the possibility 
for patenting life forms and medical treatment methods, including 
new uses of existing medicines or devices, that have no link to 
industrial activity per se. The standard may also open the door to 
patenting methods of doing business that do not result in any 
product. 
The parties to the TRIPS negotiation considered and rejected this 
result. TRIPS Article 27.1 footnote 5 permits, but does not require, 
members to define “industrial application” to be synonymous with 
the term “useful.”200 TRIPS does not impose any other definition on 
the term. This was included to permit the United States to continue to 
implement its own more lax standard on this element of the test for 
patentability without requiring other countries to adhere to the same 
standard.201 TPP Article 8.12 goes further, potentially exporting the 
lax U.S. standard to all TPP member states.202  
G. Data Exclusivity 
9.2. (a) If a Party requires or permits, as a condition for granting 
marketing approval for a new pharmaceutical product, the submission of 
information concerning the safety or efficacy of the product, the 
origination of which involves a considerable effort, the Party shall not, 
without the consent of a person previously submitting such safety or 
efficacy information to obtain marketing approval in the territory of the 
Party, authorize a third person to market a same or a similar product based 
on: 
 
 199. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 43, at 361 (noting that the United States’ 
broad standard of patentability is at least partly responsible for the high number of 
patents on businesses’ trade secrets in the United States). 
 200. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 27.1 n.5. 
 201. See KILIÇ & MAYBARDUK, MALAYSIAN LAW COMPARISON, supra note 
147, at 2 (stating that TPP Article 8.12 seeks to “impose the U.S. patentability test . 
. . [which is] broad enough to cover inventions without true industrial 
application”); PUBLIC CITIZEN TPP VIETNAM MEMO, supra note 147, at 3 
(commenting that the “U.S. patentability standard of specific, substantial and 
credible utility is more lenient than the industrial applicability standard used by 
Vietnam and many other countries”). 
 202. This language is similar to KORUS, supra note 30, art. 18.8.10(b). 
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(i) the safety or efficacy information previously submitted in support 
of the marketing approval; or 
(ii) evidence of the existence of the marketing approval for at least 
five years from the date of marketing approval of the new 
pharmaceutical product in the territory of the Party. 203 
9.3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 above, a Party may take measures to 
protect public health in accordance with: 
(a) the Declaration of the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
(WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2) (the “Declaration”); 
(b) any waiver of any provision of the TRIPS Agreement granted by 
WTO Members in accordance with the WTO Agreement to 
implement the Declaration and in force between the Parties; and 
(c) any amendment of the TRIPS Agreement to implement the 
Declaration that enters into force with respect to the Parties.204 
9.7. Where a Party provides for a period of data protection for a 
pharmaceutical product of more than [5+Y] years pursuant to 
subparagraph 2(a) or 2(b) of this Article, that Party is not required to 
implement for that pharmaceutical product subparagraphs 2(c), 2(d) (3-
year data protection in connection with submission of new clinical 
information), 5(b)(i) (automatic delay of marketing approval) or 5(d) of 
this Article (reward for the successful challenge of the validity or 
applicability of a patent).205 
TPP Article 9.2 requires implementation of a policy known as 
“data exclusivity,” which is a prohibition of the use of clinical trial 
data submitted to the government to approve marketing of an initial 
applicant pharmaceutical product for the subsequent expedited 
approval of a subsequent product. The issue of access to 
pharmaceutical test data arises because of requirements that 
manufacturers must prove the safety, efficacy, and quality of 
medicines through clinical trials or other data. When a generic 
manufacturer subsequently attempts to obtain marketing approval for 
 
 203. TPP IP II, supra note 28, art. 9.2. 
 204. Id. art. 9.3. 
 205. Id. art. 9.7. 
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a therapeutically equivalent medicine, it is normally required to 
prove only bioequivalence to the already approved drug and Good 
Manufacturing Practice. In this way, the generic firm relies on the 
original safety and efficacy data that the regulator has already 
reviewed and approved, rather than repeating animal and human 
trials, which would be prohibitively costly, time consuming, and 
ethically troublesome.206 
Data exclusivity is not required by TRIPS.207 During the 
negotiation of TRIPS, a U.S. proposal to require data exclusivity was 
 
 206. Repetition of clinical trials on human subjects would violate international 
ethical standards for clinical trials, which forbid doctors to continue experiments 
on humans when there is already “conclusive proof of positive and beneficial 
results.” World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles 
for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 18TH WMA GENERAL ASSEMB. 
art. 20 (June 1964), http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/17c.pdf; 
see also WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GLOBAL STRATEGY AND PLAN OF 
ACTION ON PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (May 
24, 2008), www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf (committing to 
“[p]romote ethical principles for clinical trials involving human beings as a 
requirement of registration of medicines and health-related technologies, with 
reference to the Declaration of Helsinki”); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, 
Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: Protection 
of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPs Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
443, 448 (2004) (criticizing data exclusivity by commenting that “[a]llowing later 
registrants to free ride on the initial registration prevents wasteful repetition of 
testing that has already been performed and facilitates rapid development of 
competition in drug markets”); MSF TPP Issue Brief, supra note 158, at 5 
(explaining that data protection or data exclusivity is a “TRIPS-plus provision that 
restricts access to essential clinical trial data . . . [and] prevent[s] generic 
manufacturers from using existing clinical research to gain regulatory approval of 
their medicines, forcing them to perform duplicate clinical trials or wait for the 
‘data monopoly’ period to end”). 
 207. See, e.g., Fellmeth, supra note 206, at 459 (explaining that despite the 
argument pursued by the United States and the EU, “data exclusivity per se is not 
required by the plain terms of [TRIPS] Article 39.3” and that “[t]he United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development and the World Health Organization 
(WHO) have adopted consonant interpretations of Article 39.3 as well”); 
MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, DATA EXCLUSIVITY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: WHAT CONSEQUENCES FOR ACCESS TO MEDICINES? 3 (2004), 
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/DataExclusivityMay04.pdf 
(explaining that although TRIPS Article 39.3 says that “WTO Members should 
protect ‘undisclosed test or data’ against ‘unfair commercial use’ and ‘disclosure’ 
[n]owhere does TRIPS state that countries should provide exclusive rights to the 
originator of the data for a given period”). 
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specifically considered and rejected by the negotiating parties.208 As 
a result, TRIPS Article 39.3 requires protection only against the 
“unfair commercial use” of “undisclosed” data required to be 
submitted for marketing approval of “new chemical entities.”209  
TPP Article 9.2(a) and (b), patterned on KORUS Article 18.9.1, 
abandons the inherent flexibilities in TRIPS Article 39.3 and imposes 
U.S.-style data monopolies. Rather than banning only the unfair 
commercial use of information, the data exclusivity proposal bans 
reference and reliance registration of any new product “based on” 
safety and efficacy information submitted to it or to another country 
for an originator product.210 This language would appear to foreclose 
the flexibility in TRIPS that would allow traditional uses of 
registration data to approve generic medicines as not being an “unfair 
commercial use” of that data.211  
 
 208. See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS, 182–85 (1998) (explaining the more restrictive draft provisions with 
regard to data exclusivity, including definitions that broaden the number of acts 
that are considered to be in violation of the provision); MSF TPP Issue Brief, 
supra note 158, at 5 (stating that the United States continuously advocates for data 
exclusivity measures to be implemented with a minimum term of five years, and 
may lobby for up to twelve). 
 209. Thus, test data under TRIPS must be protected only if: (1) national 
authorities require its submission; (2) it is undisclosed and not already public, (as 
many clinical trial results in the United States are by virtue of state and local 
clinical trial registry laws); and (3) it concerns a new chemical entity, i.e., the 
undisclosed data is “the result of significant investment,” proof that could be 
required. 
 210. See TPP IP II, supra note 28, art. 9.2(b) (stipulating that the drug regulatory 
authority may neither reference previously submitted clinical trial data nor rely on 
evidence that the product was previously approved either domestically or in 
another territory without consent). 
 211. Carlos Correa, Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the Standards of the Trips Agreement, SOUTH 
CENTRE/WHO at 5 (2002), available at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/ 
h3009ae/h3009ae.pdf (explaining that “[c]ountries can meet their obligations . . . 
under Article 39.3 by barring ‘dishonest’ uses of test data”); see also Carlos M. 
Correa, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products 
Under Free Trade Agreements, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 81, 84–85 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) 
(explaining that, under TRIPS, the reliance on prior reviewed data by a regulation 
authority to approve a generic version of the same drug need not be considered a 
“commercial use” of the data). See generally Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug 
Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 
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The data exclusivity provision abandons the TRIPS provision that 
protection only be required for “undisclosed” information, instead 
requiring protection for all data. Often, clinical trial data is made 
public by various entities, including funders, registration authorities, 
and academic publication. Thus, the proposal would require granting 
of exclusive rights for information that is already in the public 
domain and is in no sense a trade secret.  
The data exclusivity proposal also abandons the TRIPS rule that 
requires protection only for “new chemical entities,” instead 
requiring protection of new pharmaceutical products that might 
incorporate existing chemical entities.212 In addition, TPP Article 
9.2(c) and (d) both require an additional three-year term of 
exclusivity for data submitted for approval of a new use or form of 
an approved chemical entity.213 As in U.S. law, the proposal permits 
successive three-year data exclusivity extensions, meaning that data 
exclusivity, like patents, can be evergreened. 
The U.S. proposal abandons many data-exclusivity flexibilities 
adopted in the 2007 New Trade Policy214 and, thereafter, granted to 
Peru and Colombia in their FTAs with the United States.215 Like 
 
34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303 (2008) (discussing the U.S. pharmaceutical industry’s 
pursuit to establish protection of rights related to drug registration, the 
consequences, and recommending steps developing countries and Congress should 
take to ensure broad access to life-saving medicines); Musungu & Oh, supra note 
138, 65–67 (Aug. 2005); Judit Rius-Sanjuan, James Love, & Robert Weissman, 
Protection of Pharmaceutical Test Data: A Policy Proposal, CONSUMER PROJECT 
ON TECH. (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/data/CPTech-
Test-Data.pdf. 
 212. TPP IP II, supra note 28, art. 9.2(a)–(b). 
 213. Id. art. 9.2(c)–(d); see also KORUS, supra note 30, art. 18.9.2 (providing a 
three-year exclusivity term from the date of marketing approval and new clinical 
information for pharmaceuticals, as well as a ten-year exclusivity term for 
agricultural chemical products). 
 214. See Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy, supra note 176, at 3 (clarifying 
that “the period of protection for test data for pharmaceuticals by developing 
country FTA partners will generally not extend beyond the period that such 
protection is available for the same product in the United States, coupled with a 
provision that will encourage our partners to process marketing approval 
applications for innovative drugs in a timely manner”). 
 215. Trade Promotion Agreement art. 16.10.2, U.S.-Colom., Nov. 22, 2006, 
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1336 [hereinafter U.S.-Colombia FTA]; United 
States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 176, art. 16.10.2. This early 
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TRIPS Article 39.3, the Peru and Colombia FTAs’ data exclusivity 
provisions are limited to new chemical entities and are required to 
run only for a “reasonable period,” which “shall normally mean five 
years.”216 The U.S. TPP proposal applies to “new products” and must 
run for “at least” five years. The Peru and Colombia FTAs also 
included a use-it-or-lose-it restriction on data exclusivity, whereby if 
a Party relies on marketing approval granted by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration and if the Party grants approval within six 
months of an application for marketing approval, the five-year data 
exclusivity period begins when the drug was first approved in the 
United States.217 This flexibility can help thwart the common 
experience, where a company files for registration in a third country 
only after the original term of data exclusivity has lapsed in the 
United States—effectively making the monopoly in the third country 
run beyond the same period of exclusivity in the United States. All of 
these data-exclusivity flexibilities are missing from the U.S. TPP 
proposal. 
TPP Article 9.7 contains another provision new to U.S. FTAs 
encouraging even longer periods of data exclusivity. The provision 
states that parties would be exempted from the three-year data 
protection terms for submission of new clinical information, 
automatic delays of marketing approval in their patent/registration 
linkage mechanisms, and rewards for successful challenges to patent 
rights if they adopt periods of data exclusivity for new 
pharmaceutical products for an undefined duration (“Y”) in excess of 
five years. If TPP provisions allow pharmaceutical companies to get 
substantially longer data exclusivity—particularly through 
mechanisms for evergreening exclusivity, such as the twelve years of 
exclusivity granted in the United States for biologics—companies 
won’t have to rely on patent protections to obtain effective marketing 
 
filing requirement applied only if Peru or Colombia granted marketing approval 
based in whole or in part on evidence of marketing approval in the United States. 
See Charles B. Rangel, Moving Forward: A New, Bipartisan Trade Policy That 
Reflects American Values, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 377, 404 (2008) (describing 
changes to data exclusivity demands required by the New Trade Policy). 
 216. U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 215, art. 16.10.2(a); United States-Peru 
Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 176, art. 16.10.2(a). 
 217. U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 215, art. 16.10.2(c); United States-Peru 
Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 176, art. 16.10.2(c). 
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monopolies. In fact, data monopolies of sufficient length will be 
superior to patents from the perspective of pharmaceutical firms 
because data monopolies give the same, or higher, level of monopoly 
protection without the requirements and expenses associated with 
proving that a product meets the relatively high standards for 
patentability.  
The TPP proposal does include one flexibility from the U.S.-Peru 
and U.S.-Colombia FTAs. TPP proposed Article 9.3 provides 
authority for countries to adopt exceptions to data exclusivity 
requirements “to protect public health in accordance with” the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health including, any waiver or 
amendment of TRIPS to facilitate the Declaration.218 This provision 
is modeled on the amendment to the Peru and Colombia FTAs after 
the 2007 New Trade Policy.219 The provision is potentially helpful in 
providing for a broad public health exception to any data exclusivity 
requirement included in the agreement. Particularly, as interpreted in 
the context of the May 2007 Agreement that the Peru language was 
meant to effectuate,220 the provision should be read to provide for 
rights to override data exclusivity either (1) to ensure rights to obtain 
marketing approval when a compulsory license or government use 
license is issued, or (2) to have a compulsory license-like exception 
to data exclusivity and patent/registration linkage, even if no patent 
bar is in place. However, those rights were explicitly and textually 
granted in the Peru and Columbia FTAs but only implied in the TPP 
exception. 
H. Access Window  
9.4. A Party that requires or permits an applicant to obtain approval for 
marketing a new pharmaceutical product in its territory by relying, in 
whole or in part, on the prior approval of the pharmaceutical product by 
the regulatory authority in another territory may, as a condition for 
providing the period of data protection specified in subparagraph 2(b) or 
 
 218. TPP IP II, supra note 28, art. 9.3. 
 219. E.g., United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 176, art. 
16.10(2)(e). 
 220. See United States Trade Representative, TRADE FACTS: BIPARTISAN TRADE 
DEAL 3 (May 2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/ 
factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file127_11319.pdf. 
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2(d), require an applicant that has submitted an application for marketing 
approval consistent with said subparagraphs to commence the process of 
obtaining marketing approval for that pharmaceutical product within [X] 
years of the date of first marketing approval of the same pharmaceutical 
product in another Party.221 
Sometime before the leak of the medicines provisions of the U.S. 
proposal, the USTR issued a press release describing a Trade-
Enhancing Access to Medicines proposal, including what it called an 
“Access Window” policy.222 The memo stated that the Access 
Window was “designed to deploy the tools of trade policy to 
promote trade in, and reduce obstacles to, access to both innovative 
and generic medicines, while supporting the innovation and 
intellectual property protection that is vital to developing new 
medicines and achieving other medical breakthroughs.”223 The memo 
immediately became the subject of criticism for both its obfuscation 
of substance and its non-transparent process.224 Now that the actual 
text of the Access Window has been leaked, it is clear that its main 
impact will be to revoke added flexibilities endorsed by the May 
2007 New Trade Policy and ease registration access for innovators, 
with no real benefit for access to generic medicines.  
As discussed above, the general rule under the TPP proposal is 
that members must grant patent extensions for regulatory delays, 
exclusivity periods for clinical trial data used to approve 
pharmaceuticals, and (as discussed below) the “linkage” of patent 
and registration processes to block marketing of a competing 
medicine whenever a patent is claimed. The Access Window policy 
provides countries with the option of having marketing approval 
procedures that rely, in whole or in part, on the fact of marketing 
approval/registration in another country.225 This makes registration 
 
 221. TPP IP II, supra note 28, art. 9.4. 
 222. Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Goals to Enhance Access to Medicines, 
supra note 174. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See Leaked Trans-Pacific Free Trade Agreement Texts Reveal Demands, 
supra note 26 (stating that the leaked proposal allows a broadening of 
pharmaceutical companies’ exclusive rights to clinical trial data, lengthens periods 
of exclusivity, and weakens regulation of goods and services). 
 225. See TPP IP II, supra note 28, arts. 8.6(e), 9.4, 9.6 (noting that countries are 
not required to create the TEAM Access Window, but they may do so in a narrow 
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much easier in the “reliance” countries, since complete dossiers of 
safety and efficacy information would not be required. To further 
incentivize the speedy use of such processes, the policy limits the 
grant of patent term extensions, data protection, and 
patent/registration linkage (hereinafter “TRIPS-plus medicines 
provisions”) for applicants who use the reliance mechanism and fail 
to register their products in the country within a yet-to-be-determined 
number of years from the first registration in another member 
state.226   
Paradoxically, speedier registration of brand name drugs will not 
do anything to increase the affordability of medicines in TPP 
member countries. In this sense, the U.S. proposal and “access to 
medicines” advocates use very different definitions of the term 
“access.” For the latter, the term is used primarily to refer to the 
presence of affordable medications within the health system, 
primarily in the form of low cost generic medicines. The United 
States uses the term to refer the presence of any medication for a 
specific condition in the subject country, even if that medication is 
unaffordable to most patients. Indeed, the proposal will hamper 
affordability concerns by granting additional TRIPS-plus medicines 
provisions that will elongate exclusivity periods, thereby keeping 
generic medicines out of the market for longer periods of time.  
There are potential benefits to countries that want to provide 
inducements to pharmaceutical companies to bring their new 
medicines to market more quickly. To the extent that differential 
registration standards and processes have disincentivized innovators 
from quickly launching new products, simplification might speed up 
market entry. Pharmaceutical companies have long chafed over the 
 
subset of cases—where the party “requires or permits an applicant to obtain 
approval for marketing a new pharmaceutical product in its territory by relying, in 
whole or in part, on the prior approval of the pharmaceutical product by the 
regulatory authority in another county”). 
 226. See id. art. 8.6(e) (applying Access Window restrictions only with respect 
to article 8.6(c) extensions—those caused by unreasonable delays in the marketing 
approval process); id. art. 8.6(e) n.2 (claiming that the length of the TEAM Access 
Window should enhance certainty, provide incentive for the diffusion of 
pharmaceutical products, respect commercial consideration, and account for 
challenges faced by smaller or lesser experienced applicants or the time needed to 
assess country-specific safety and efficacy issues). 
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lack of harmonization of drug regulatory authorities’ marketing 
approval requirements, standards, and processes. The multinational 
pharmaceutical industry would like a registration process that is 
similar to what the WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty provides: an 
easy-to-use, standardized mechanism to initiate marketing approval 
applications before national drug regulatory authorities.227 Article 
9.8(a) provides the industry with the easy-to-use, fast-track 
mechanism it has desired. But the desirability of earlier product 
introduction should have nothing to do with a tradeoff involving 
greater IP protections that extend and strengthen drug company 
patent and data-related monopolies. The Access Window is 
promoted as benefitting TPP parties, but it is clear that the true 
beneficiaries are innovator companies.228 
The proposal is hampered by a large number of drafting and 
conceptual problems. To begin with, the proposal gives the 
unilateral ultimate power of whether to utilize the U.S. “Access 
 
 227. Indeed, there is a separate annex on pharmaceutical regulatory 
harmonization in the U.S. TPP proposals. Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP]—U.S. 
Introduction to Proposed TBT Annexes on Medical Devices, Pharmaceutical 
Products and Cosmetic Products (Mar. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/TransPacificTBTw 
MedicalAnnexes.pdf (extending the industry’s intentions and interests); id. annex 
IV ¶¶ 8–9 (seeking TPP partners’ agreement to use the ICD Common Technical 
Document as the standardized harmonized form to initiate marketing approval 
requests). 
 228. The problem is not simply making a big deal out of very minor processes; 
the Access Window provisions are also likely to result in pressure from the United 
States and Big Pharma for what is essentially a harmonized global registration 
system, such as those suggested in the Proposed TBT Chapter Annex on 
Pharmaceutical Products. We can now see that the United Sates is arguing with 
trade partners that they should vicariously grant registration in their countries 
based on prior marketing approval by drug regulators in the United States, Europe, 
or Japan. If countries are tempted to adopt full-scale reliance registration, there is a 
risk that they will have reduced ability to assess medicines in light of the particular 
patient risks and benefits in their countries. Although reliance registration may 
have certain advantages for countries with weak regulatory authorities, and 
although lack of procedural harmonization adversely affects both innovator 
companies and generics, countries are being asked to give up far too much TRIPS-
plus territory for a quick-registration Access Window that doesn’t require fast 
completion and prosecution of registration applications and that results in greater 
and longer monopoly protections that will inevitably lead to higher prices and 
reduced generic competition. 
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Window” to patent holding pharmaceutical companies. Under the 
proposal, the pharmaceutical company seeking initial registration 
can decide to apply for marketing approval by submitting a full 
registration dossier that does not rely, in whole or in part, on the 
fact of prior registration elsewhere, so long as such an option is 
provided for under national law. In such cases, they would receive 
the full benefits of the TRIPS-plus medicines provisions whether or 
not they applied for registration approval within the Access 
Window. Alternatively, they can rely in whole or in part on the fact 
of registration elsewhere and get the full benefit of the TRIPS-plus 
medicines provisions merely by initiating a filing within the time 
period of the Access Window. 
The latest proposal from the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) to the U.S. trade negotiators is 
that the “window” period within which applications must be filed be 
a full six years.229 This lengthy time period would effectively negate 
any real advantages from the Access Window in terms of speeding 
up registration. PhRMA proposed this protracted window based on a 
study of registration data from fifteen emerging economies, which 
found that 93% of companies register new medicines in all the 
countries within six years of their first registration (normally in the 
United States).230 Negotiating partners could wonder why it is 
appropriate to rely on the history of delayed registration practices 
when the Access Window is advertised as being designed to speed 
up registration. More to the point, the proposed six-year window 
term would allow pharmaceutical countries to continue to game 
product introduction primarily for commercial reasons, at the 
expense of patient access. 
TPP Article 9.8(a) additionally requires the TPP country to 
consider the Access Window to be met through mere initiation of 
 
 229. PhRMA Engages with USTR, Congress to Justify TPP Access Window 
Proposal, WORLD TRADE ONLINE (May 3, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/ 
201205032397788/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/phrma-engages-with-ustr-
congress-to-justify-tpp-access-window-proposal/menu-id-948.html (explaining 
that, of the fifteen countries—which include Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, Russia, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, 
and Taiwan—only Singapore and Malaysia are engaged in the TPP talks). 
 230. See id. 
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marketing registration. A company may take advantage of the 
window even if it does no more than submit to a TPP member state 
“evidence of prior approval of the product in another Party.”231 This 
is an extremely low threshold, permitting a registration application to 
be deemed filed even if it does not contain sufficient information to 
actually approve the drug. 
Ultimately, this proposal appears to have little chance of entering 
the final agreement. There have been reports of widespread 
dissatisfaction with the proposal among TPP negotiating partners. 
Even the United States’ strongest ally, Australia, has rejected the 
offer. Accordingly, the issue of whether the TPP will include the 
most controversial TRIPS-plus requirements on medicines beyond 
the modifications of the U.S. standard FTA proposals by the May 
2007 New Trade Policy remains an open question. 
I. Patent/Registration Linkage 
9.5. Where a Party requires or permits, as a condition of approving the 
marketing of a pharmaceutical product, persons, other than the person 
originally submitting safety or efficacy information, to rely on that 
information or on evidence concerning safety or efficacy information for 
a product that was previously approved, such as evidence of prior 
marketing approval in another territory, each Party shall: 
(a) provide a transparent and effective system to: 
(i) identify a patent or patents covering an approved 
pharmaceutical product or its approved method of use; and 
(ii) provide notice to a patent holder of the identity of another 
person who intends to market, during the term of the identified 
patent or patents, a product that is the same as, or similar to, the 
approved pharmaceutical product referenced in subparagraph 
5(a)(i). 
(b) unless such other person agrees to defer the marketing of the 
product until after the expiration of an identified patent, ensure that a 
patent holder may seek, prior to granting of marketing approval to an 
allegedly infringing product, available remedies by providing: 
 
 231. TPP IP II, supra note 28, art. 9.8.2(a). 
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(i) an automatic delay of the grant of marketing approval that 
remains in place for a period of time designed to ensure 
sufficient opportunity to adjudicate disputes concerning the 
validity or infringement of allegedly infringed patents; and 
(ii) judicial or administrative procedures, including effective 
provisional measures, to allow for the timely adjudication of 
disputes concerning the validity or infringement of an allegedly 
infringed patent. 
(c) if such other person’s product has been found to infringe a valid 
patent identified pursuant to subparagraph (a), provide measures that 
operate to prohibit the unauthorized marketing of that product prior to 
the expiration of the patent. 
(d) when a Party delays the grant of marketing approval consistent 
with subparagraph 5(b)(i), provide an effective reward, consistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement, for the successful challenge of 
the validity or applicability of the patent.232 
TPP Article 9.5 contains a TRIPS-plus proposal on what is called 
patent/registration linkage. Although patent/registration linkage is 
not mentioned in TRIPS and is not required in many countries, 
including most TPP negotiating countries,233 it has become a 
common and contested feature of U.S. FTAs.234  
“Linkage” refers to requirements that safety and efficacy marketing 
authorities (e.g., the U.S. Food and Drug Administration) do not 
register generic copies of medicines for which there is a patent claimed 
by another supplier. This is an added enforcement process favored by 
patent holders. It permits them to use patent claims to block the 
 
 232. Id. art. 9.5. 
 233. See PUBLIC CITIZEN TPP VIETNAM MEMO, supra note 147 (explaining that 
“Vietnamese law contains no provision that links the patent system to the drug 
marketing approval process” and that many U.S. FTAs require patent linkage, 
which “shifts burdens of early patent enforcement to drug regulatory authorities”); 
see also KILIÇ & MAYBARDUK, MALAYSIAN LAW COMPARISON, supra note 147 
(“Malaysian law contains no provision that links the patent system to marketing 
approval process.”); cf. KILIÇ & MAYBARDUK, AUSTRALIAN LAW COMPARISON, 
supra note 147 (explaining that although AUSFTA introduced patent linkage in 
Australia, Australia sought to limit its effect through statutory measures imposing 
penalties for linkage evergreening). 
 234. See, e.g., KORUS, supra note 30, art. 18.9.5. 
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marketing of products without the need to sue the alleged infringer in 
courts to enforce the patent rights. Generics will then be required to 
challenge the patent claims in court and wait until the completion of the 
challenge (for each claim) in order to reach the market, which may take 
many years. The costs of litigation and delay may be so high as to 
provide an effective deterrent to generic companies entering a market 
where there are claimed patents—even where underlying patents are 
clearly invalid. Without linkage, the patent holder would normally be 
required to wait until the generic company marketed a product in order 
to bring an enforcement action in court, and the court could permit the 
generic to remain on the market until any challenges are completed. 
Linkage systems reverse the onus, forcing the generic company, 
blocked from access to the market, to affirmatively sue the patent 
holder in order to gain market access.  
Patent/registration linkage turns drug regulatory authorities into 
patent-policing agents, who aid patent holders in the enforcement of 
their private rights. Moreover, the automatic stays can be abusive. 
The introduction of linkage systems in the United States in the 1980s 
led to gaming by patent holders through the filing of new (often 
baseless) applications for patents to use automatic stays of 
registration to block generic entry.235 In response to these 
evergreening strategies, U.S. law now limits patent holders to one 
automatic stay to litigate any patent claims236—a requirement not 
included in the TPP proposal.  
Linkage systems might interfere with the effective use of 
compulsory licenses. This is because licensees could be prevented 
from marketing their generic equivalents after receiving a license on 
 
 235. See Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent 
Expiration: An FTC Study (2002), www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf; 
see also Robert Weissman, The Evergreen Patent System: Pharmaceutical 
Company Tactics to Extend Patent Protections, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, June 
2002; Marc Kaufman, Drug Firms’ Deals Allowing Exclusivity—Makers of 
Generics Being Paid to Drop Patent Challenges, FTC Review Finds, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 25, 2006; Federal Trade Commission, Agreements Filed with the Federal 
Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003: Summary of Agreements Filed in FY 2005—A Report 
by the Bureau of Competition (2006), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2006/04/ 
fy2005drugsettlementsrpt.pdf. 
 236. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2), (j)(5) (2012). 
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some patent claims, by virtue of the linkage provisions preventing 
product registration.  
Serious questions have been raised as to what would be an 
effective reward for challenging the validity of a patent in TPP 
member countries. In the United States, a 180-day period of generic 
exclusivity is given to the first successful challenger of a patent, 
enabling the generic firm to be the only competitor with the branded 
drug during that time, which permits the generic firm to charge 
higher prices than are possible in a truly competitive market.237 For 
the policy to work to incentivize patent challenges, the period of 
exclusivity must provide sufficient income, at least, to offset the 
added litigation costs associated with challenging patents. However, 
generic firms in Australia and other TPP member countries have 
presented analyses to TPP negotiators showing that the same policies 
would not work in TPP member countries because their small size 
would yield far lower rewards from periods of market exclusivity.238 
J. Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
Article [X].  
1. The Parties affirm their commitment to the Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2). 
2. The Parties have reached the following understandings regarding this 
Chapter: 
(a) The obligations of this Chapter do not and should not prevent a 
Party from taking measures to protect public health by promoting 
access to medicines for all, in particular concerning cases such as 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics as well as 
circumstances of extreme urgency or national emergency. 
Accordingly, while reiterating their commitment to this Chapter, the 
Parties affirm that this Chapter can and should be interpreted and 
 
 237. See generally Federal Trade Commission, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: 
SHORT-TERM EFFECTS & LONG-TERM IMPACT 98 (Aug. 2011) (analyzing the 
relationship between relative drug price and the number of manufacturers with 
exclusivity). 
 238. See Sean Flynn, Intellectual Property TPP Talks Stall in Melbourne, 
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Mar. 12, 2012), http://infojustice.org/archives/8847 (describing 
presentations by generic firms and including a link to presentation slides). 
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implemented in a manner supportive of each Party’s right to protect 
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. 
(b) In recognition of the commitment to access to medicines that are 
supplied in accordance with the Decision of the General Council of 
30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph Six of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (WT/L/540) 
and the WTO General Council Chairman’s statement accompanying 
the Decision (JOB(03)/177, WT/GC/M/82) (collectively, the 
“TRIPS/health solution”), this Chapter does not and should not 
prevent the effective utilization of the TRIPS/health solution. 
(c) With respect to the aforementioned matters, if an amendment of 
the TRIPS Agreement enters into force with respect to the Parties and 
a Party’s application of a measure in conformity with that amendment 
violates this Chapter, the Parties shall immediately consult in order to 
adapt this Chapter as appropriate in the light of the amendment.239 
The U.S. proposal contains an overarching Article [X] which 
references the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health.240 Although it is standard in boilerplate language to 
acknowledge a unanimous WTO commitment made nearly ten years 
ago, and although acknowledgement is superior to exclusion or 
rejection, the boilerplate does not make up for an absence of specific 
clarifying commitments about how countries can operationalize 
Doha to overcome the many TRIPS-plus provisions in the TPP 
proposal. 
It is important that any affirmation of the Doha Declaration not be 
limited to certain infectious disease epidemics and to a narrow subset 
of public health needs that can be classified as matters of “extreme 
urgency” or “national emergency.” The burden of non-
communicable chronic diseases is escalating throughout the world, 
particularly in low- and middle-income countries, where the cost of 
many chronic disease medicines, including those for cancers, 
 
 239. TPP IP II, supra note 28, art. [X]. 
 240. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001) [hereinafter 
Doha Declaration] (explaining in paragraph 4 that the Parties “reaffirm the right of 
WTO members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which 
provide flexibility for this purpose”). 
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psychiatric illnesses, and other illnesses, is too expensive for 
individual patients, insurers, and governments.241 Likewise, many 
developing countries face a persistent crisis with respect to neglected 
tropical diseases where newer, more expensive medicines might 
again be priced at unaffordable levels.242 The United States’ intent to 
purposefully exclude non-infectious chronic disease can be inferred 
from its efforts at the UN High Level Meeting on Non-
Communicable Diseases to ensure that they were not described as an 
“epidemic” or “emergency” and that no mention of the Doha 
Declaration appeared in the meeting’s outcome.243 
The affirmation that the U.S. TPP proposals on medicines do 
not prevent a Party from taking measures to promote access to 
medicines may set a dangerous precedent for the interpretation of the 
Doha Declaration.244 As described throughout this article, there are 
numerous TRIPS-plus standards in the TPP proposal that will 
predictably lead to higher prices and lower availability of 
 
 241. See, e.g., FELICIA MARIE KNAUL ET AL., CLOSING THE CANCER DIVIDE: A 
BLUEPRINT TO EXPAND ACCESS IN LOW & MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES: A REPORT 
OF THE GLOBAL TASK FORCE ON EXPANDED ACCESS TO CANCER CARE AND 
CONTROL 164 (2d ed. 2011), available at http://ghsm.hms.harvard.edu/uploads/ 
pdf/ccd_report_111027.pdf (estimating the costs of covering chemotherapy for 
unmet needs of several cancers, including a breakdown between the costs for high- 
versus low-income counties); World Health Organization [WHO], 
NONCOMMUNICABLE DISEASES COUNTRY PROFILES 2011 5–9 (2011), available at 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789241502283_eng.pdf. 
 242. See WHO, WORKING TO OVERCOME THE GLOBAL IMPACT OF NEGLECTED 
TROPICAL DISEASES, at iv (2011), available at http://www.who.int/neglected_ 
diseases/2010report/WHO_NTD_report_update_2011.pdf (noting, for example, 
that dracunculiasis is on the verge of being eradicated thanks to sizeable donations 
from the Government of the United Kingdom, and that the introduction of 
antibiotic therapy has reduced by 30% the need for people affected by Buruli ulcer 
to get surgery). 
 243. William New, Questions Arise over UN Policy on Non-Communicable 
Diseases and IP Rights, 2–3 IP-WATCH.ORG (Sept. 16, 2011, 10:47 PM), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/09/16/questions-arise-over-un-policy-on-
non-communicable-diseases-and-ip-rights/ (these efforts were ultimately 
successful, though there were two references to countries’ need to use intellectual 
property flexibilities to access NCD medicines); see U.N. President of the G.A., 
Draft G.A. Res., Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General 
Assembly on the Prevention and Control of Non-communicable Diseases, U.N. 
Doc. A/66/L.1 (Sept. 16, 2011). 
 244. TPP IP II, supra note 28, art. [X].2(a). 
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pharmaceutical products, especially in developing 
countries.245 Implicitly defining these standards as compliant with the 
Doha Declaration significantly limits the express statement in the 
Declaration that TRIPS flexibilities can and should be available “to 
the full.”246 Doha should be read to prevent the proposal or adoption 
of any TRIPS-plus measure that would positively affect public health 
and access to medicines for all.247 A better provision fully embracing 
Doha would create an explicit and operational exception to any TPP 
provision, on the basis that the member country concludes that the 
provision would impede access to affordable medicines or the 
promotion of public health objectives.  
The declaration that the agreement “does not and should not prevent 
the effective utilization of the TRIPS/health solution” is also 
exceedingly narrow.248 What the United States refers to as the 
TRIPS/health solution is a current waiver of provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement that allows the export and import of medicines produced 
under special compulsory licenses to a country with little or no 
manufacturing capacity.249 Calling this “the TRIPS/health solution” is a 
 
 245. Chief among them may be: (1) lowered patent standards, presumptions of 
valid patent status, and express obligations to grant patents for new uses and new 
forms of existing products; (2) elimination of rights of pre-grant opposition; (3) 
extension of patent terms beyond the TRIPS requirement of twenty years to 
compensate for delays in granting patents and/or in granting marketing approval; 
(4) five-year data exclusivity following the first registration of a new 
pharmaceutical product with rights to evergreen data exclusivity for an additional 
three years whenever new clinical trial data is submitted; (5) mandatory 
patent/registration linkage giving patent holders a right to prevent registration of 
alleged patent-infringing products no matter how weak the patent claim is; (6) 
unconscionable restrictions on government price control and therapeutic formulary 
policies; and (7) multiple TRIPS-plus enforcement measures. 
 246. Doha Declaration, supra note 240, ¶ 4. 
 247. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 27, 33, 39.3 (adopting strict 
patentability criteria under TRIPS Article 27, avoiding patent extensions beyond 
twenty years in implementing TRIPS Article 33, avoidance of data exclusivity in 
the implementation of TRIPS Article 39.3, and the avoidance of any other TRIPS-
plus protection or enforcement measure that will increase market power of brand-
name pharmaceutical companies). 
 248. TPP IP II, supra note 28, art. [X].(b). 
 249. Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration required the development of a quick 
and expeditious mechanism allowing the export/import of medicines to countries 
that had insufficient pharmaceutical capacity locally to either produce medicines 
that were not patented or those authorized pursuant to a properly issued 
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misnomer. It is an effort to address only part of the problem that the 
globalization of patents on pharmaceutical products causes for public 
health and access to medicine, especially in developing countries. The 
TRIPS waiver narrowly focuses on the problem caused by TRIPS 
Article 31(f)’s requirement that a compulsory license be used for the 
predominant supply of a domestic market, rather than for export. Its 
provisions are unduly complex,250 and have been used only once, as a 
trial run between two countries that have not used it again.251 There is 
no evidence that the proposed TRIPS/health solution, if finally 
adopted, will in fact promote global access to medicines, a fact 
articulated by Ecuador at the most recent TRIPS Council meeting.252 
Many TPP member states may desire to maintain flexibilities to 
explore other options for meeting the particular challenges of supplying 
non-producing countries, including: (1) export of unlimited quantities 
through compulsory licenses issued on competition grounds (TRIPS 
 
compulsory license or government use order. Doha Declaration, supra note 240, ¶ 
6. Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement had created a major barrier for these non-
producing importers because it restricted the quantity of medicines produced 
pursuant to a compulsory license that could be exported to other countries to “non-
predominant” amounts, presumably less than 50% of output. TRIPS Agreement, 
supra note 3, art. 45. Unfortunately, the TRIPS/Health solution that was adopted 
on August 30, 2003, is painfully complex. See Fredrick M. Abbott, The WTO 
Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public 
Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317, 317 n.5 (2005) (“Officially, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) applauded the [TRIPS/Health solution], noting that the key 
to success lay in its implementation . . . . Privately, some individuals in the 
Essential Drugs and Medicines Police (EDM) Division worried about the 
bureaucratic complications involved in using it.”). 
 250. See Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: 
Analysis of WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 613, 617 
(2003) (noting that, for many countries, “local production is impossible and 
importation from exporters is increasingly restricted because of a requirement in 
TRIPS that countries bypassing patent rights for particular medicines must produce 
predominately for their own domestic markets rather than for export”). 
 251. See South Centre, The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health Ten 
Years Later: The State of Implementation, http://www.southcentre.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1657%3Asb58&catid=144%3A
south-bulletin-individual-articles&Itemid=287&lang=en (last visited Nov. 29, 
2012) (discussing constraints of using the so-called “August 30 Decision”). 
 252. See Review of “Para 6” System, ACTA Feature at TRIPS Council, THIRD 
WORLD NETWORK (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/intellectual_ 
property/info.service/2011/ipr.info.111101.htm. 
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Article 31(k); (2) export of non-predominant quantities pursuant to an 
ordinary TRIPS Article 31 license; or (3) export to non-producing 
countries through an easy-to-use TRIPS Article 30 limited exception.   
IV. ENFORCEMENT 
The TPP is the latest front in the “enforcement agenda.”253 The 
enforcement agenda grows out of perceptions of incredibly high 
intellectual property infringement rates in many countries, 
particularly with respect to digital copyright “piracy.”254 Intellectual 
property−intensive industries have been pressing for heightened 
international rules that would raise the value of their rights by 
“making enforcement of intellectual property rights in courts, at 
borders, by the government and by private parties easier, less costly 
and more ‘deterrent’ in the level of penalties.”255 By doing so, the 
enforcement agenda implicates public interest concerns in at least 
two major ways. First, the lowering of evidentiary and other 
thresholds needed for government-sanctioned penalties (from the 
seizure of property to the implementation of criminal penalties) 
implicates due process and other procedural protections against 
unwarranted deprivations of liberty and property. The raising of such 
risks, harmful in its own right, may deter lawful competition and 
expression. Second, the enforcement agenda often builds itself upon 
a set of substantive rules that are unbalanced and incentivize the 
exclusionary pricing of intellectual property−protected goods. Such 
pricing is itself a major cause of piracy, counterfeiting, and other 
intellectual property infringement that the rules attempt to combat.256  
 
 253. See generally Sell, Global IP Upward Ratchet, supra note 8 (providing an 
overview of the “IP Maximalist” enforcement agenda and current forums said 
industries currently turn to in advancing IP protection). 
 254. See generally MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, supra note 32. 
 255. Sean Flynn & Bijan Madhani, ACTA and Access to Medicines, AM. UNIV. 
WASH. COLL. OF PROGRAM ON INFO. JUSTICE & INTELL. PROP. (PIJIP Research 
Paper Ser. No. 22, 2011), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=research. 
 256. See MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, supra note 32, at i (linking 
incredibly high piracy rates in many middle-income countries to exclusionary 
pricing or protected content); Kevin Outterson & Ryan Smith, Counterfeit Drugs: 
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 525, 526 (2006) 
(identifying “the underlying cause of drug counterfeiting as the legal system of 
intellectual property laws”). 
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A. General Obligations  
10.1 The Parties understand that a decision that a Party makes on the 
distribution of enforcement resources shall not excuse that Party from 
complying with this Chapter.257 
In the TRIPS negotiations, a major point of contention was a 
resistance by many countries, including many developing countries, 
to force countries to shift more resources toward intellectual property 
enforcement. The concern led to the adoption of Article 41.5 in 
TRIPS, originally offered by the Indian delegation,258 stating: 
It is understood that this Part does not create any obligation to put in place 
a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect 
the capacity of Members to enforce their law in general. Nothing in this 
Part creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as 
between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the enforcement 
of law in general.259 
The U.S.-proposed Article 10.1 for TPP does not revoke or amend 
TRIPS Article 41.5, but it shifts its focus quite dramatically. Instead 
of making it clear that the agreement “creates no obligation to shift 
resources” toward intellectual property enforcement,260 the U.S. 
proposal appears to suggest that some minimum amount of resource 
shifting may be required—providing that resource-allocation 
problems “shall not excuse that Party from complying with this 
Chapter.”261 
The public interest concern arises here because “resources needed 
for enforcing IPRs are invariably scarce.”262 Decisions to escalate 
public resource expenditures on intellectual property enforcement can 
take away from other law enforcement priorities or public investment 
priorities. Such choices are particularly “difficult in developing 
 
 257. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 10.1. 
 258. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra 43, at 585 (describing the article as “one of the 
few provisions in Part III where developing countries’ views made a difference”). 
 259. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 41.5. 
 260. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 43, at 634. 
 261. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 10.1. 
 262. Fink, supra note 31, at 5. 
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countries, where many public goods are underprovided and 
enforcement challenges exist in many areas of law—fighting violence, 
guaranteeing real property rights, upholding contracts, stopping illegal 
logging of endangered forests, regulating traffic, and so on.”263 
B. Injunctions and Border Suspensions
12.2. Each Party shall provide for injunctive relief consistent with Article 
44 of the TRIPS Agreement, and shall also make injunctions available to 
prevent the exportation of infringing goods.264 
14.4. Each Party shall provide that its competent authorities may initiate 
border measures ex officio with respect to imported, exported, or in-transit 
merchandise, or merchandise in free trade zones, that is suspected of 
being counterfeit or confusingly similar trademark goods, or pirated 
copyright goods.265 
The TRIPS provisions on injunctions and border measures to 
restrain trade of intellectual property–infringing goods are limited. 
TRIPS obliges WTO members to grant injunctions only “to 
prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in their 
jurisdiction of imported goods that involve the infringement of an 
intellectual property right.”266 The border measures provisions of 
TRIPS require border officials to suspend only “the importation” 
of goods, and only in cases where there is prima facie evidence 
that the goods are “counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright 
goods.”267  
The limitation of the trade-injunction provisions in TRIPS is 
important for domestic sovereignty and free trade concerns. 
Because intellectual property laws are territorial, a good that 
violates the intellectual property law in one country may not violate 
the laws of another. Applying injunctions or border provisions to 
halt exports or in-transit shipments to countries where those goods 
may be lawfully received in effect allows one country to pass on 
263. Id.
264. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 12.2.
265. Id. art. 14.4.
266. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 44.1 (emphasis added).
267. Id. art. 51.
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the domestic regulatory decisions of another.268 The restriction of 
border seizure mandates on suspected counterfeit and copyright 
piracy goods is similarly important because such goods “may 
generally be determined with certain ease, on the basis of the visual 
inspection of an imported good, since infringement will be apparent 
‘on its face.’”269   
A significant hazard associated with expanding these standards 
was displayed in a large number of European seizures of generic 
medicines in transit beginning in 2008. As described by Henning 
Grosse Ruse-Kahn: 
Starting in 2008, Dutch authorities decided to seize, delay, and return 
several shipments of generic drugs transiting E.U. ports en route to 
destinations in South America and Africa on account of suspected patent 
infringements. The shipments predominantly originated in India and were 
all destined for developing countries such as Brazil, Venezuela, 
Colombia, Peru, or Nigeria. The drugs at issue were protected in the E.U., 
but apparently not in the countries of origin or destination. Citing 
complaints of suspected infringement from alleged owners of patents or 
supplementary protection certificates, customs authorities in the 
Netherlands have detained a substantial amount of generic medicines in 
transit through the Netherlands. These consignments were initially 
detained and subsequently destroyed, returned to the country of origin, or, 
in a few cases, permitted to proceed to the destination country after 
considerable delay.270 
A string of European seizures were implemented pursuant to a 
European Council regulation providing that customs authorities with 
“sufficient grounds for suspecting that goods infringe an intellectual 
property right, . . . may suspend the release of the goods” at the 
border.271 Dutch law interpreted this authority to include seizures of 
in-transit goods by adopting a “manufacturing fiction”—it assumed 
 
 268. See Frederick M. Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit, 
2009 WIPO J.  1, 44–46. 
 269. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 43, at 610. 
 270. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to 
International Trade?: ACTA Border Measures and Goods in Transit, 26 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 645, 648 (2011) [hereinafter Ruse-Khan, Creating Barriers to 
International Trade]. 
 271. European Communities Council Regulation No. 1383/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 
196) 7 (EC). 
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for purposes of application of Dutch patent law that transit of a good 
through the Netherlands would violate a patent if the manufacturing 
of the same good in Netherlands would violate the patent.272 The 
generic drugs in question were patented in the Netherlands, and 
therefore were considered to be in violation of the Netherlands patent 
law by virtue of their transit through the country, even though they 
were not subject to patents in their source or destination countries. 
Meanwhile, Germany seized a shipment of generic drugs based on 
suspicions that a generic medicine was using a name that was 
“confusingly similar” to a brand, although the name in fact was the 
International Nonproprietary Name (“INN”) required to be used on 
any approved drug (including the brand) with the same active 
ingredient.273 
The seizures were stoking considerable controversy and public 
attention at just the time that ACTA proposals on border measures 
were being leaked.274 Those leaks included proposals to 
 
 272. See Rb Den Haag 18 Juli 2008, No. KG ZA 08-617 m.nt. Kuipers 
(Sosecal/Sisvel) (Neth.) (upholding the manufacturing fiction); Abbott, Seizure of 
Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit, supra note 268 at 37, 43 (discussing the 
Netherlands’ and EU’s decisions). 
 273. See e.g., Another Seizure of Generic Medicines Destined for a Developing 
Country, This Time in Frankfurt, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (June 5, 2009), 
http://www.haiweb.org/19062009/5 Jun%202009%20Press%20release%20Seizure 
%20of%20generic%20medicines%20in%20Frankfurt.pdf (describing a seizure in 
Frankfurt, Germany, of the equivalent of approximately 76,000 courses of 
treatment worth of Amoxicillin bound for the Republic of Vanuatu, on the grounds 
of suspected trademark infringement). 
 274. See John W. Miller & Geeta Anand, India Prepares EU Trade Complaint, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2009; Frederick M. Abbott, Worst Fears Realised: The Dutch 
Confiscation of Medicines Bound from India to Brazil, 13 BRIDGES REV., no. 1, 
2009 at 13; Kaitlin Mara, Generic Drug Delay Called ‘Systemic’ Problem at 
TRIPS Council, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 9, 2009), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2009/06/09/generic-drug-delay-called-%E2%80%9Csystemic%E2%80 
%9D-problem-at-trips-council; Pedro Fonseca & Reese Ewing, Brazil to Object to 
Dutch Seizure of Generic Drug, REUTERS, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/idUSN2327254420090123 (discussing Dutch seizure of a generic high 
blood pressure medicine bound for Brazil); Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev. 
[ICTSD], Dutch Seizure of Generic Drugs Sparks Controversy, 13 BRIDGES 
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., no. 3, Jan. 28, 2009, at 5 (reporting on Brazil’s 
criticism of seizures as a “distorted use of the international intellectual property 
system”); William New, Alarm Escalates Over Delayed Generic Drug Shipments 
as Action Sought, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 6, 2009, 5:13 PM), 
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internationalize similar legal standards to those used in both the 
Dutch and German seizures.275 Later leaked drafts revealed proposals 
to expand injunction requirements to include prevention of the 
exportation of goods as well.276  
The controversies around the Dutch seizures and the leaked drafts 
of ACTA had a notable impact on the negotiation. Later drafts of 
ACTA exempted patents from the Border Measures sections277 and 
made the application of the injunction provisions to patents 
optional.278 These changes were made as ACTA negotiators, 
particularly from the EU, were making public statements that 
“ACTA will not hinder the cross-border transit of legitimate generic 
medicines.”279 ACTA remained controversial among access-to-
medicine advocates280 and was rejected in the EU partially for this 
 
http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2009/03/06/alarm-escalates-over-delayed-generic-
drugshipments-as-action-sought/ (reporting on a statement from global health 
NGOs condemning Dutch seizures); Letter from NGOs to Pascal Lamy, Dir. Gen., 
WTO (Feb. 18, 2009), http://keionline.org/misc-docs/seizures/WTO_seizures_ 
18feb.pdf; see also TRIPS Council, Intervention by India, Agenda Item ‘M’ – 
Other Business – Public Health Dimension of TRIPS Agreement, at 2 (Feb. 4, 
2009), available at http://ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/ 
intervention-by-india.doc; TRIPS Council, Statement by Brazil, Agenda Item ‘M’ – 
Other Business – Public Health Dimension of TRIPS Agreement, ¶¶ 15–16 (Feb. 4, 
2009), available at http://ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/ 
intervention-by-brazil.pdf (challenging Dutch seizures as violating TRIPS and 
WTO trade protections). 
 275. See James Love, Seven Secret ACTA Documents, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY 
INT’L (Dec. 6, 2009), http://keionline.org/node/712; Ruse-Kahn, Creating Barriers 
to International Trade, supra note 270, at 665. 
 276. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal Predecisional/Deliberative 
Draft, Jan. 18, 2010, http://info.publicintelligence.net/actatreaty2010.pdf. 
 277. ACTA, supra note 18, art. 13 n.6. (“The Parties agree that patents and 
protection of undisclosed information do not fall within the scope of this section.”). 
 278. Id. art. 7 n.2. (“A Party may exclude patents and protection of undisclosed 
information from the scope of this Section.”) (emphasis added). 
 279. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 
Report on the 9th Round of Negotiations (July 2, 2010), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/press/index.cfm?id=588&serie=352&langld=en.ACTA; see also Press 
Release, Eur. Comm’n, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: European 
Commission Welcomes Release of Negotiation Documents (Apr. 21, 2010), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=552 (asserting that ACTA 
“will not hamper access to generic medicines”). 
 280. See, e.g., Flynn & Madhani, supra note 255; see also Press Release, Access 
Campaign, EU Parliament Rejects ACTA; Allowing for Continued Access to 
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reason.281  
The TPP proposal reinstates a considerable amount of the most 
controversial scope of the ACTA proposals. The injunction provision 
explicitly extends to “exportation.” And the border measures 
standards extend to exports as well as in transit shipments. Although 
the border measures provision does not extend to patents, its 
extension to confusingly similar trademark claims mirrors the 
standard used in the German seizure case. By definition, a 
confusingly similar mark is not identical to the infringing mark, and, 
therefore, it may not be possible to easily identify a violation through 
a visual comparison at the border. Courts in the United States, for 
example, apply numerous factors to determine whether consumers 
may be confused by the mark in question, under which the visual or 
other similarity of the mark is but a single, and often not 
determinative, factor.282 The inclusion of this standard as one that 
will be determined ex officio by border guards raises concerns that 
unjustified suspensions of trade among TPP member states will 
increase as a result.  
The first part of TPP Article 12.2 proposes that TPP member states 
implement obligations regarding injunctions in TRIPS Article 44. 
This is different from ACTA’s provision on the same subject where 
the affirmative duty to grant injunctions from TRIPS Article 44.1 is 
restated, but without restating or referencing the flexibilities 
 
Generic Medicines in Developing Countries (July 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.msfaccess.org/about-us/media-room/press-releases/eu-parliament-
rejects-acta-allowing-continued-access-generic (reporting that the European 
Parliament voted to reject ACTA on the belief that ACTA as written “would have 
given an unfair advantage to patented medicines, and restricted access to 
affordable generic medicines to the detriment of patients and treatment providers 
alike”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 281. See Magda Fahsi, Inside the European Parliament’s Rejection of ACTA, 
MINTPRESS.NET (July 9, 2012, 2:21 PM), http://www.mintpress.net/inside-the-
european-parliaments-rejection-of-acta/ (relying on Oxfam’s explanation for a 
reason why the agreement was not popular in the European Parliament). 
 282. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Test for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1582–83 (going through the various 
multifactor tests that each circuit has developed); see AMF, Inc. v Sleekcraft 
Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir., 1979) (considering eight factors); see also In re E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (applying similar 
factors). 
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recognized in TRIPS Article 44.2.283 TRIPS Article 44.2 is a key 
flexibility in TRIPS, providing that a country may always forgo the 
grant of injunctions whenever “these remedies are inconsistent with a 
Member’s law,” and as long as “declaratory judgments and adequate 
compensation shall be available.”284 This provision enables countries 
to favor statutory licenses over injunctions in specific cases—a key 
flexibility in TRIPS that was called into question in ACTA.  
C. Damages  
12.3. Each Party shall provide that: 
(a) in civil judicial proceedings, its judicial authorities shall have the 
authority to order the infringer to pay the right holder: 
(i) damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right 
holder has suffered as a result of the infringement, and 
(ii) at least in the case of copyright or related rights infringement 
and trademark counterfeiting, the profits of the infringer that are 
attributable to the infringement and that are not taken into 
account in computing the amount of the damages referred to in 
clause (i). 
(b) in determining damages for infringement of intellectual property 
rights, its judicial authorities shall consider, inter alia, the value of 
 
 283. ACTA, supra note 18, art. 8.1 (“Each Party shall provide that, in civil 
judicial proceedings concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its 
judicial authorities have the authority to issue an order against a party to desist 
from an infringement, and inter alia, an order to that party or, where appropriate, to 
a third party over whom the relevant judicial authority exercises jurisdiction, to 
prevent goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual property right from 
entering into the channels of commerce.”). 
 284. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 44.2 (“Notwithstanding the other 
provisions of this Part and provided that the provisions of Part II specifically 
addressing use by governments, or by third parties authorized by a government, 
without the authorization of the right holder are complied with, Members may 
limit the remedies available against such use to payment of remuneration in 
accordance with subparagraph (h) of Article 31. In other cases, the remedies under 
this Part shall apply or, where these remedies are inconsistent with a Member’s 
law, declaratory judgments and adequate compensation shall be available.”). 
  
194 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:1 
 
the infringed good or value submitted by the right holder.285 
12.4. In civil judicial proceedings, each Party shall, at least with respect to 
works, phonograms, and performances protected by copyright or related 
rights, and in cases of trademark counterfeiting, establish or maintain a 
system that provides for pre-established damages, which shall be 
available upon the election of the right holder. Pre-established damages 
shall be in an amount sufficiently high to constitute a deterrent to future 
infringements and to compensate fully the right holder for the harm 
caused by the infringement. In civil judicial proceedings concerning 
patent infringement, each Party shall provide that its judicial authorities 
shall have the authority to increase damages to an amount that is up to 
three times the amount of the injury found or assessed.286 
The U.S. TPP proposal includes a series of requirements that 
determinations of damages in infringement cases exceed a 
compensatory level, including statutory damages “sufficiently high 
to constitute a deterrent to future infringement.” These standards are 
far beyond the parallel provisions of TRIPS, which require the 
authority to award only “damages adequate to compensate for the 
injury the right holder has suffered,” and only in cases of 
infringement by a person “who knowingly, or with reasonable 
grounds to know, engaged in infringing activity.”287  
A key problem with these compensation-plus measures is that they 
ignore the phenomenon of exclusionary pricing, particularly in 
developing countries. The economic evidence suggests that it will 
often be profit maximizing for an intellectual property holder to 
charge roughly the same price in poor countries with high income 
 
 285. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 12.3. 
 286. Id. art. 12.4. 
 287. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 45(1). ACTA’s provision on damages 
also applies only to “the infringer who, knowingly or with reasonable grounds to 
know, engaged in infringing activity.” ACTA supra note 18, art. 9.1 (requiring 
“damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered as a 
result of the infringement . . . which may include lost profits”). TRIPS permits, but 
does not require, the availability of disgorgement of profits or statutory damages. 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 44(2) (“Members may authorize the judicial 
authorities to order recovery of profits and/or payment of pre-established damages 
even where the infringer did not knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, 
engage in infringing activity.”). 
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inequality as in wealthy countries with less inequality.288 We thus see 
pricing of media goods in poor countries as luxury goods—
affordable only to a sliver of the population.289 Awarding damages 
for mass-market piracy that serves unmet demand based on the retail 
price of the excessively priced good overcompensates the rights 
holder, thus reinforcing the exclusionary pricing behavior that 
created the market for the pirate goods in the first instance. 
The imposition of pre-established, or “statutory,” damages 
compounds the problem of unrealistic damage awards by removing any 
need to prove harm at all. Such damages are not recognized in every 
major copyright system, and there are increasing criticisms of the 
statutory damages in current U.S. law.290 In ACTA, pre-established 
damages were not required. Parties were given the choice between pre-
established damages, presumptions for determining the amount of 
damages, or “additional” copyright damages.291 U.S. law provides for 
statutory damages for copyright violations but does not require that such 
damages be sufficiently high to constitute a deterrent to future 
infringements.292 Normally, civil damages for violation of private rights, 
including rights to contract and property, are to compensate, not deter.   
The proposed triple damages scheme for patent violations is 
extreme. U.S. law reserves treble damages for willful patent 
 
 288. See Flynn et al., supra note 32 (describing the economics of pricing in 
countries with high income inequality); MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, 
supra note 32, at 55−57 (reporting prices of $20.50 and $8.50 in South Africa and 
India, respectively, for the same Coldplay album sold in the United States for $17, 
and reporting GDP per capita in the three countries, respectively, as $5,824, 
$1,031, and $46,857). 
 289. See MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, supra note 32, at 10 
(summarizing the most recent industry-cited rates of piracy, including 90% of the 
film market and 81% of the game market in India); id. at 57–61 (reporting on 
pirate market prices, and suggesting that prices for pirated DVDs in excess of $1 
per film “reflects a constraint on trade”). 
 290. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copy 
Right Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 
(2009) (“[T]he United States is an outlier in the global copyright community in 
giving plaintiffs in copyright cases the ability to elect, at any time before final 
judgment.”). 
 291. ACTA, supra note 18, art. 9.3. 
 292. See Griffin, supra note 88 (explaining section 504(c) of the U.S. Copyright 
Act). 
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infringement.293 However, TPP’s standard does not confine its 
requirement to such cases, and even that standard would not be 
appropriate for all countries. Medicines, like music, are subject to 
uniform global pricing. The $10,000 price in poor countries for AIDS 
medications in 1999 that are now on the market for less than $100 was 
rational, and many medicines are similarly priced at uniform levels in 
rich and poor countries today.294 What should be the damage measure 
for a generic competitor introducing the $100 copy of the $10,000 
drug found to infringe on a patent claim of the originator? The TPP 
proposal suggests $9,900 per infringing copy, tripled, plus litigation 
costs. Such a standard would severely deter generic competition with 
brand holders—a result that is likely intended and would be severely 
detrimental to access-to-affordable-medicine concerns.  
D. Criminal Offenses: “Commercial Scale” 
15.1 Each Party shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be 
applied at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or 
related rights piracy on a commercial scale. Willful copyright or related 
rights piracy on a commercial scale includes: 
(a) significant willful copyright or related rights infringements that 
have no direct or indirect motivation of financial gain and 
(b) willful infringements for purposes of commercial advantage or 
private financial gain. 
For greater certainty, “financial gain” for purposes of this Article includes 
the receipt or expectation of anything of value.295 
The U.S. proposal on criminal offenses appears to require that 
nearly every copyright violation be treated as a crime, and in so 
doing would implement a position it lost in a recent WTO dispute 
with China.296  
 
 293. See 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
 294. See generally Flynn et al., supra note 32. 
 295. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 15.1, n.24 (footnote number omitted). 
 296. Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R, 107–116 (Jan. 26, 2009) 
[hereinafter WTO, China – Measures]. 
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The U.S.-China case in the WTO arose from the TRIPS Article 61 
requirement that member states criminalize cases of willful 
trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy “on a commercial 
scale.”297 China implemented its mandate by making such acts 
criminal only where they met certain thresholds for the quantity of 
infringing goods produced. The United States challenged China’s 
statutory thresholds as being so high as to exclude some activity with 
a commercial purpose that did not reach the quantitative thresholds. 
The WTO panel rejected this definition as reading out the “scale” 
requirement in Article 61, holding that countries are free to limit 
criminal penalties to infringement “carried on at the magnitude or 
extent of typical or usual commercial activity with respect to a given 
product in a given market.”298  
 
 297. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 61; see UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 
43, at 620–21 (discussing flexibilities in Article 61, which accommodate “very 
different approaches with regard to the application of criminal penalties in cases of 
IPR infringement”); Christophe Geiger, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
and Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property: What Consequences for the 
European Union?, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION LAW 
(Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop. & Competition Law Research Paper Series No. 
12-04, 2012), at 4, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2038272 (“It is clear from the negotiations history that Member States were 
meant, in consistency with Art. 1.1 of the Agreement, to have considerable 
flexibility when deciding the manner to implement these criminal penalties in their 
national law.”). 
 298. WTO, China – Measures, supra note 296, ¶ 7.577; see also id., ¶¶ 7.551–52 
(criticizing a U.S. interpretation that “interprets ‘commercial scale’ as basically 
everything that is ‘commercial’ with the exception of some trivial or de minimis 
activities,” and noting that the “difference is minimal” between such a definition and 
one that equates “commercial scale” with “an identical class of acts as the term 
‘commercial purpose’”); id. at ¶ 7.576 (“[E]ach of the words ‘commercial’ and 
‘scale’ provides important context for the interpretation of the other . . . . [I]t is clear 
that none of these uses refer to activities that are simply commercial. Rather, they are 
evidently intended to distinguish certain activities (or premises) from others that 
pertain to or have a bearing on commerce but which do not meet a market 
benchmark in terms of what is typical.”). For analysis of the decision, see generally 
Daniel Gervais, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 549, 552−53 (2009) (outlining the 
qualitative and the quantitative thresholds used to decide whether an activity is on a 
commercial scale); H. Grosse Ruse-Khan, Criminal Enforcement and International 
Law in CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (C. Geiger ed., 2011); 
Peter K. Yu, Shaping Chinese Criminal Enforcement Norms Through the TRIPS 
Agreement, in CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (C. Geiger 
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The U.S. TPP proposal would put in place the position it lost in 
the WTO. It separates the quantitative and qualitative assessments 
and requires countries to criminalize all willful copyright 
“infringement” intended to receive “anything of value,” regardless of 
scale.299 This is an incredibly broad definition that would appear to 
criminalize every “willful” infringing act of copying, which, by 
definition, gives something of value to its receiver.300  
The proposal lacks tempering standards in U.S. law. The 
language in the proposal is based loosely on section 506 of the 
U.S. Copyright Act, through which criminal liability attaches to 
willful infringement of copyright “for purposes of commercial 
advantage or private financial gain.”301 But the U.S. Department of 
Justice has taken the position that Congress’s purpose is “to 
exclude from criminal liability those individuals who willfully 
infringe copyrights solely for their own personal use.”302 The U.S. 
proposal does not reflect this qualification. Nor does it reflect the 
 
ed., 2011); Peter K. Yu, The U.S.-China Dispute over TRIPS Enforcement Drake 
University Law School, Occasional Papers in Intellectual Property Law No. 5 
(2010), http://www.law.drake.edu/academics/ip/docs/ipResearch-op5.pdf; Peter K. 
Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1066−67 (2011); Peter 
K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 727 
(2011). 
 299. Id. art. 15.1(b). In this sense, the U.S. TPP proposal is similar to the U.S. 
proposal for a criminal provision in ACTA, which was ultimately rejected in the 
final text of that agreement. Cf. Ruse-Khan, Gold Standard, supra note 25, at 15 
(describing leaked drafts of a proposed criminal chapter and contrasting them 
with the final text); ACTA, supra note 18, art. 23.1 (“For the purposes of this 
Section, acts carried out on a commercial scale include at least those carried out 
as commercial activities for direct or indirect economic or commercial 
advantage.”). 
 300. See Ruse-Khan, Gold Standard, supra note 25, at 16 (“The notion of 
‘indirect economic or commercial advantage’ might cover internet users 
downloading copyrighted files without right holder authorization and so receiving 
an (indirect) economic advantage of not having to pay the retail price.”). 
 301. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2011). 
 302. 1851 Copyright Infringement—Fourth Element—Commercial Advantage 
or Private Financial Gain, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/ 
foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01851.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (citing 
H.R. Rep. No. 997, 102 Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1992)) (suggesting the example of 
“bartering (i.e., the practice of exchanging infringing works for other infringing 
works),” rather than the mere receipt of goods of value, as an example where the 
standard could be triggered without money changing hands). 
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quantitative definition of “significant” as limiting criminal 
infringement to cases where at least $1,000 worth of material is 
reproduced in a 180-day period.303  
The TPP provision would shift more burden for bringing 
enforcement actions from private right holders to the public. 
Normally the responsibility for enforcing IP infringements and 
other private rights lies with the right holder through private court 
actions. By making the infringement criminal, the responsibility 
and cost of enforcement shifts to the public. By criminalizing 
essentially all willful copyright infringement, the TPP proposed 
standard fails to target the most socially harmful conduct.304 The 
shift of the enforcement power to the government may also invite 
abusive procedures in some countries, including the use of 
copyright enforcement as a pretext for official censorship.305  
Over-criminalizing copyright infringement may have negative 
effects. The fear of over-enforcement may dissuade the use of 
copyrighted materials in new business models, in new expressive 
works, or for socially beneficial activities, such as teaching. Over-
criminalization may also implicate fundamental rights concerns. 
 
 303. See Griffin, supra note 88, at 8. 
 304. See Geiger, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and Criminal 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property, supra note 297, at 11 (arguing that the 
escalation of remedies from civil law to criminal law should be motivated by “the 
aggravated social harm of the infringement”); Reto Hilty et al., Competition and 
Tax Law on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Criminal Measures Aimed at Ensuring the Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights 6 (2006), available at http://www.ip.mpg.de/files/pdf2/Comments-
EnforcementOfIP-Rights.pdf (making a proposal to limit criminalization “to acts 
that are particularly dangerous from the viewpoint of public interest,” such as 
infringements that carry health or safety risk). A clear-eyed economic appraisal 
needs to admit that infringing activities can have social benefits as well as costs. 
Fink, supra note 31, at 7. (“Governments face a trade-off in formulating 
intellectual property policies: stronger exclusive rights increase incentives for 
information and knowledge-producing investments, but also increase the economic 
efficiency loss due to market structure deviating from its competitive ideal.”); 
MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, supra note 32, ch. 1 (describing 
economic benefits to developing countries that derive from replacing high-priced 
imports with locally produced pirated media products). 
 305. See Clifford J. Levy, Russia Uses Microsoft to Suppress Dissent, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2010, at A1 (reporting on the confiscation of computers in 
Irkutsk, Russia, “under the pretext of searching for pirated Microsoft software”). 
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International human rights doctrines and many regional or national 
human rights instruments require that penalties be proportionate to 
the crime. Using the criminal law to deal with more common forms 
of infringement may be disproportionate under such clauses,306 and 
may also violate “the right to freedom to obtain and disseminate 
information, the right to freedom from unreasonable search and 
arrest, the right to inviolability of the home, and the right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions.”307 
E. Internet Service Provider Liability 
Art. 16.3. For the purpose of providing enforcement procedures that 
permit effective action against any act of copyright infringement covered 
by this Chapter, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements 
and criminal and civil remedies that constitute a deterrent to further 
infringements, each Party shall provide, consistent with the framework set 
out in this Article: 
(a) legal incentives for service providers to cooperate with copyright 
owners in deterring the unauthorized storage and transmission of 
copyrighted materials; and 
(b) limitations in its law regarding the scope of remedies available 
against service providers for copyright infringements that they do not 
control, initiate or direct, and that take place through systems or 
networks controlled or operated by them or on their behalf, as set 
forth in this subparagraph (b).308 
Art. 15.4. With respect to the offenses for which this Article requires the 
Parties to provide for criminal procedures and penalties, Parties shall 
 
 306. DOUWE KORFF & IAN BROWN, OPINION ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE 
ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) WITH THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS & THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
47 (2010), available at http://www.greens-efa.eu/fileadmin/dam/Documents/ 
Studies/ACTA_fundamental_rights_assessment.pdf. 
 307. Id.; see Jonathan Griffiths, Criminal Liability for Intellectual Property 
Infringement in Europe – The Role of Fundamental Rights, in CRIMINAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A BLESSING OR A CURSE (C. Geiger 
ed., 2011) 1, 4, 9−11 (arguing that every person is entitled to personal privacy, 
freedom of expression, and the enjoyment of his or her home and possessions, and 
that penalties must not be so severe as to be disproportionate with the nature of the 
criminal offense). 
 308. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 16.3. 
2012] U.S. PROPOSAL FOR IP CHAPTER FOR TPP 201 
ensure that criminal liability for aiding and abetting is available under its 
law. 
TPP contains three sets of standards that encourage Internet 
service providers (“ISPs”) to police the content of users of their 
networks.  
First, TPP Article 16.3(a) requires parties to provide “legal 
incentives for service providers to cooperate with copyright owners 
in deterring the unauthorized storage and transmission of 
copyrighted materials.”309 ACTA requires only that governments 
“endeavor to promote cooperative efforts within the business 
community.”310 Providing legal incentives for ISPs to police the 
Internet is a complex task, for which negotiation of standards in 
secretive international processes is completely inappropriate. 
Intermediaries’ interests are not perfectly aligned with user 
interests. Legal incentives for intermediaries to police networks 
may lead to the censoring of content, including legitimate content, 
choking innovative technology built on their platforms; surveillance 
of users; and threats to privacy and freedom of expression.311 The 
kind of private ordering of copyright enforcement represented by 
the TPP text has been a method of choice in the United States, as 
evidenced by a recent Memorandum of Understanding between 
intermediaries and content owners, encouraged by the U.S. 
Copyright Czar.312 Language about encouraging such cooperation 
309. Id. art. 16.3(a).
310. ACTA, supra note 18, art. 27.3.
311. See Margot Kaminski, Plurilateral Trade Agreements Lack Protections for
Users, Intermediaries, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 27, 2011, 11:47 PM), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/2011/10/27/plurilateral-trade-agreements-lack-
protections-for-users-intermediaries/ [hereinafter Kaminski, Plurilateral Trade 
Agreements]. 
312. See David Kravets, U.S. Copyright Czar Cozied Up to Content Industry,
E-Mails Show, WIRED.COM (Oct. 14, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2011/10/copyright-czar-cozies-up/#more-31071 (reporting on the
personal email records of U.S. Copyright Czar Victoria Espinel, indicating that the
government required “internet service providers, for the first time, to punish
residential internet-service customers who media companies suspect are violating
copyright rules by downloading copyrighted movies or music from peer-to-peer
networks”). See generally Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to
Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81 (2010)
(analyzing private ordering copyright enforcement and graduated response).
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should be viewed in light of these developments, which leave 
businesses unaccountable to users, and users without normal 
expectations of due process protected through court proceedings.  
Second, the TPP proposal introduces a series of liability 
safeguards for ISPs and, in so doing, may promote the extension of 
secondary liability to ISPs. Intermediary liability is not universally 
recognized. USTR has recognized that creating limitations on 
liability encourages countries to adopt intermediary liability in the 
first instance.313  
It can be argued that TPP Article 16.3 mandates a system of ISP 
liability that goes beyond DMCA standards and U.S. case law.314 For 
example, TPP Article 16.3(b)(xi) requires ISPs to identify Internet 
users suspected of infringement, where U.S. courts have found that 
ISPs are not subject to identification subpoenas.315 TPP Article 
16.3(b)(xi) lacks ACTA Article 27.4’s requirements that (i) there be a 
sufficient claim of infringement, (ii) the information be sought for the 
purpose of protecting or enforcing a copyright, and (iii) the procedures 
shall be implemented in a manner that avoids the creation of barriers 
to legitimate activity. TPP Article 16.3(b)(vii) also fails to include the 
DMCA’s second privacy provision, that intermediaries may not access 
material contrary to law.316 ACTA Article 27.2 similarly requires that 
any system of digital enforcement be consistent with that Party’s law 
and preserve fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, 
fair process, and privacy. There are other examples of discrepancies 
between the TPP and DMCA, as well.317 
Finally, TPP contains language in Article 15.4 criminalizing “aiding 
and abetting” copyright infringement that is likely intended to apply to 
online intermediaries. The provision on aiding and abetting in ACTA 
Article 23.4 was directly followed by a provision requiring liability for 
legal persons—that is, companies. Criminal aiding and abetting has not 
appeared in other free trade agreements and, when read in light of 
313. See, e.g., United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 176,
ch. 29 n.28. 
314. TPP IP I, supra note 21, art. 16.3.
315. Id. art. 16.3(b)(xi).
316. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(2) (2010).
317. See generally Kaminski, Plurilateral Trade Agreements, supra note 311.
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ACTA’s language on legal persons, may very well be intended to apply 
to intermediaries. In the United States, the Bureau of Immigrations and 
Customs Enforcement has been seizing domain names, based in part on 
this theory of criminal liability.318 Criminal liability for intermediaries 
could threaten even those intermediaries that comply with safe harbors, 
as criminal and civil systems are distinct. 
CONCLUSION 
The future of the U.S. TPP proposal for an intellectual property 
chapter, and its broader plurilateral agenda, is very much in doubt. 
The dynamics of the TPP do not favor the kind of maximalist IP 
chapter the United States has proposed. The barriers facing its 
ultimate expansion to countries the United States is more concerned 
about—to China, Brazil, and India, for example—are even more 
pronounced. The problems for the United States can be described in 
terms of balance, inclusion, and democratic process. 
This paper has primarily concentrated on the problems of lack of 
substantive balance in the U.S. proposal, which is thwarting its 
acceptance by negotiating parties. The proposal shows that U.S. 
negotiators are trying to convince the poorest countries of the world—
the likes of Vietnam and Peru, for example—to adopt the same or 
higher intellectual property protection and enforcement mandates that 
exist in the United States or that have been achieved in agreements 
with the highest income countries (e.g., in the U.S.-Korea FTA). The 
proposal displays that the United States continues to selectively export 
U.S. law, focusing on the exportation of protections and not exceptions. 
Succeeding in this agenda in the TPP will be exceedingly difficult. 
Countries that have accepted such standards in past trade agreements 
with the United States did so as a tradeoff for U.S. market access. But 
most of the TPP member states already have U.S. FTAs giving them 
market access. The U.S. negotiators must persuade many of the 
318. See David G. Robinson, Following the Money: A Better Way Forward on
the Protect IP Act 9 (Yale Law School Info. Soc’y Project, 2011), available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/6564.htm (“[S]ites whose domain names 
are seized are often one step distant from the actual infringers – one study found 
that ‘[t]he underlying claim in most of the cases in Operation In Our Sites is the 
website violated copyright law by linking to other web sites that stored infringing 
content.’”). 
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countries to accept the intellectual property commitments in exchange 
for nothing. This dynamic emboldens the non-U.S. countries to stand 
firmer in their convictions and will likely result in an intellectual 
property chapter that looks very different from the U.S. proposal.  
The lack of inclusion of a broader group of member states in the 
negotiation process will pose barriers for the ultimate U.S. and 
broader TPP ambition of expanding the agreement to other countries. 
In multilateral negotiations like in the WTO or WIPO, where the 
forum is technically open to all countries of the world that care to 
join, the real work of negotiating the applicable text is done by a 
smaller number of countries representing various coalitions. The 
U.S. pursuit of geographically diverse plurilateral agreements for 
later expansion can be seen as a reflection of this reality, and in the 
abstract its effort to create such agreements is not assailable. The 
important question, however, is who is at the table. If the plurilateral 
coalition intends to expand, then it should include the most 
influential and affected members of the expanded field at the table 
from the onset. The problem, as Peter Yu has remarked, is not that 
the TPP (he was speaking of ACTA) is a “country club” agreement, 
but rather it is a bad country club agreement because the initial club 
setting the rules is not adequately representative of the rest.319   
Finally, there is the issue of democratic process. The TPP process 
was established in 2008, at a time when ACTA seemed to be humming 
along smoothly. Negotiators may have surmised that secrecy works. 
But after ACTA’s implosion, a more rational conclusion would be that 
secrecy is counter-productive. It increases rather than decreases 
controversy so that whatever final text arrives from the process will be 
received by the public and their representatives with derision. The 
process thus far has not responded to this lesson; there have been no 
meaningful increases in the transparency or public participation 
opportunities in the TPP since ACTA’s demise. If TPP as well suffers a 
spectacular failure because of a public rejection of its process, then the 
larger U.S. agenda of shifting these broad and important lawmaking 
initiatives into secret forums may be disrupted. That, in turn, may stoke 
a reconsideration of the processes required for international intellectual 
property lawmaking to be considered legitimate in the face of their 
319. Peter Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 2011 WIPO J. 1, 5.
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broad impacts in the public at large.320 
320. See, e.g., Washington Declaration, supra note 22 (calling for all
international intellectual property negotiations to be “conducted through 
mechanisms of transparency and openness that encourage broad public 
participation,” “within the existing forums responsible for intellectual property 
policy, where both developed and developing countries have full representation, 
and where the texts of and forums for considering proposals are open”). 
